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Abstract
To secure a network of small devices using symmetric key cryptography is
a non-trivial task. Nevertheless, it is important because public key cryptog-
raphy is computationally expensive and therefore infeasible to implement on
some small, battery-powered devices with limited memory. We study methods
for allocating symmetric keys to devices before deployment, known as key pre-
distribution schemes. Using combinatorial techniques, we analyse and design
a variety of key predistribution schemes.
We provide a correction to the previously stated formula for calculating the
resilience of certain random key predistribution schemes, presenting instead a
rigorously proved and widely applicable formula. We also present a simplified
formula for calculating the connectivity.
Next, we examine the role of expander graphs in key predistribution schemes.
We demonstrate that good expansion is desirable for robust schemes, and dis-
cuss how this can be achieved. In particular, we examine the expansion of key
predistribution schemes built from expander graph constructions, which pro-
vide perfect resilience. We show that if perfect resilience is not required, key
predistribution schemes with higher connectivity and expansion can be created
from hypergraphs and designs, and we explore the relationships between these
constructions. We argue for the use of hypergraphs to represent and anal-
yse key predistribution schemes, and identify open problems which, if solved,
could lead to further suitable and robust constructions for key predistribution
schemes.
Finally, we study a class of schemes which we call ‘broadcast-enhanced key
4
predistribution schemes’. These are schemes which make use of a trusted base
station and a broadcast channel to update and revoke keys in a network whilst
it is operational. We explore the range of benefits which such schemes can
provide, and present and analyse two constructions for particular scenarios: a
scheme which allows efficient revocation of devices, and a scheme which creates
hierarchy amongst the devices for efficient routing and battery consumption.
We demonstrate that our schemes provide effective and flexible trade-offs be-
tween the conflicting parameters of connectivity, resilience, key storage and
broadcast load.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many questions in information security can be approached from a combinato-
rial perspective. In this thesis we demonstrate combinatorial, and in particular
graph-theoretical, approaches to the construction and analysis of key predistri-
bution schemes for networks. We use graph theory to suggest new approaches
for the construction of key predistribution schemes, and to draw links between
existing approaches. We also use combinatorial methods to simplify expres-
sions and proofs of existing results, and we give details of certain claims from
the literature which have not been rigorously proven, before providing the
corrected statements and formulae.
Our analysis covers the calculation of resilience in random key predistribution
schemes, the role of expander graphs in key predistribution schemes, designs
and hypergraphs with good expansion, and finally a class of schemes which
unite ideas from broadcast encryption and key predistribution schemes. We
now give an overview of each of the chapters which follow.
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1.1 Chapter overviews
1.1 Chapter overviews
In Chapter 2 we outline the cryptographic principles which form the founda-
tions of all our key predistribution scheme scenarios. Next, we formally define
key predistribution schemes and the relevant combinatorial tools for their con-
struction and analysis. We then provide a brief overview of the literature on
key predistribution schemes, drawing distinctions between deterministic and
random key predistribution schemes, and explaining their connection with key
establishment schemes.
To analyse and compare key predistribution schemes it is helpful to calculate
their resilience, which is a measure of the proportion of the network compro-
mised by an adversary which has learned keys from a small number of nodes.
In Chapter 3 we provide a single formula to express the resilience of a wide
range of random key predistribution schemes. We give details of two previous
statements of this formula: that of Chan et al. [20], which makes an incorrect
assumption of probabilistic independence, and the formula given by Yum and
Lee [75], which is difficult to compute. The chapter also includes a proof of the
commonly-stated formula for the resilience of Eschenauer and Gligor’s seminal
random key predistribution scheme [32], and a simplified expression for the
connectivity of the q-composite scheme from [20].
It is common to represent both key predistribution schemes and networks with
graphs. Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with graph theory in key predistribu-
tion schemes, and in particular the concept of expansion in graphs.
13
1.1 Chapter overviews
A graph which represents the key sharing in a network is known as the key
graph, and a graph which represents the relative locations of distributed de-
vices is known as the communication graph. Vertices represent devices or
‘nodes’, edges in the key graph represent shared keys, and edges in the com-
munication graph correspond to the pairs of nodes which are within wireless
communication range. A pair of devices share an edge in the intersection of
these two graphs exactly when they are within communication range and share
common key(s).
In Chapter 4 we study the use of graph-theoretical tools for the analysis of key
predistribution schemes, and in particular consider the role of expander graphs
in their construction and analysis. We critique the suggestions of Ghosh in [36],
demonstrating that his claim of good expansion being desirable in the product
graph is unsubstantiated. We provide a simple example which demonstrates
that good expansion in the product graph can be achieved even when the
intersection graph is worst-possible.
Instead, we identify that good expansion in the intersection graph is desir-
able for well connected, robust networks, and refer to two key predistribution
schemes [17, 60] which are based on expander graph constructions. These pro-
vide perfect resilience but at the expense of lower connectivity than many other
key predistribution schemes with comparable key storage. In particular, we
show that random key predistribution schemes and many of the combinatorial
designs which have been suggested for use as KPSs have good expansion. This
is a previously unstated advantage of using these constructions for KPSs.
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In Chapter 5 we argue for the use of hypergraphs to represent and construct key
predistribution schemes. We show that a hypergraph representation has ben-
efits over the previously-used graph representations because it clearly demon-
strates the key storage and resilience, as well as the connectivity. Developing
ideas from Chapter 4, we propose that wherever perfect resilience is not re-
quired, higher connectivity can be achieved through the use of expander hyper-
graphs to construct key predistribution schemes. We present a simple exam-
ple of a key predistribution scheme based on a Cayley hypergraph and show
that, whilst far from optimal amongst expanding hypergraph constructions,
it achieves our aims of increasing connectivity and slightly lowering resilience,
whilst maintaining low key storage and good expansion. We argue that further
research into random uniform hypergraph constructions and random strongly
regular graphs would be likely to provide further robust key predistribution
scheme constructions.
For network environments where a trusted base station and broadcast chan-
nel are available, we propose a category of schemes called broadcast-enhanced
key predistribution schemes (BEKPSs) which utilise the extra resources to im-
prove upon standard key predistribution schemes. In Chapter 6 we provide
a simplification of some of the proofs from the scheme of Cichon´ et al. [23],
which we classify as a BEKPS. We then study two particular benefits which
BEKPSs can provide over key predistribution schemes where a base station
and broadcast channel are not available, namely the ease of revocation and
the possibility to create a dynamic hierarchy amongst the devices. We pro-
pose families of BEKPSs which are suitable for each of these scenarios, and our
analysis demonstrates that they are effective in their aims, whilst providing
15
1.2 Publications
practical and flexible trade-offs between connectivity, resilience and broadcast
load.
We conclude in Chapter 7 with a summary of our work, and propose further
questions for future consideration.
1.2 Publications
The research in Chapter 3 is joint work with Ed Kendall, Wilfrid S. Kendall
and Keith M. Martin, and appears as a paper on the Cryptology ePrint
Archive [41].
Chapter 4 is largely based on the paper ‘On the role of expander graphs in
key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks’ [42] with Keith M.
Martin, which was presented at WEWoRC 2011.
Finally, Chapter 6 is joint work with Keith M. Martin, Siaw-Lynn Ng, Maura
B. Paterson and Douglas R. Stinson and also appears on the Cryptology ePrint
Archive [43].
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In this chapter we present the core principles, definitions and notation on
which the subsequent chapters rely. We begin with an introduction to some of
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the fundamental principles of cryptography and information security in Sec-
tion 2.1. In Section 2.2 we define key predistribution schemes and explain the
motivation for their study. Next, in Section 2.3, we give an introduction to
the relevant mathematical tools used in the construction of key predistribution
schemes, namely combinatorial designs and graphs. In particular, Section 2.3.2
demonstrates how graphs can be used to represent key predistribution schemes.
Finally, in Section 2.4 we present a brief review of the literature on determin-
istic and random key predistribution schemes, and explain the connection to
a related concept, key establishment schemes.
2.1 Principles of cryptography and information
security
2.1.1 Cryptography for secrecy and authentication
The principle of encrypting information to provide secrecy is reasonably fa-
miliar: we are surrounded by scenarios where information needs to be stored
or transmitted with restrictions on who can access or read it. Encryption
provides a method for ensuring (or, in many cases, ensuring with high proba-
bility) that only an intended recipient is able to decrypt and view the original
data. Encryption and decryption algorithms generally require at least one
cryptographic key ; we will provide further details in Section 2.1.2.
Another important use of cryptographic keys is to provide forms of authen-
tication. For our purposes, it suffices to say that cryptographic keys can be
used to provide entity authentication, an assurance that the message originated
18
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from a specific person or device, and data authentication or data integrity, an
assurance that the message received is identical to the message sent, and has
not been altered in any way. For more details and examples, see [51].
We note that, in the variety of scenarios which we consider, many will have no
particular need for secrecy. For example, if we consider a network of devices
measuring temperature over an area of land, this data may not be confidential,
and indeed, could easily be obtained by anyone visiting the area. However, it
may well be important for the devices to use cryptography when sharing their
measurements in order to provide assurance that each data point really did
originate from the device claiming to have sent it, and that the measurement
has not been altered during transmission. Thus, we note that there is a variety
of reasons why it may be necessary for devices to store cryptographic keys. In
the analysis which follows we will not be concerned with the purpose of the
keys, or the particular algorithms and protocols in which they will be used,
but simply the question of how to distribute the keys to the devices.
2.1.2 Symmetric and asymmetric keys
Before the 1970s, cryptographic keys were symmetric, that is, the same key
was used to encrypt and decrypt the data. In 1973, James Ellis, Clifford
Cocks and Malcolm Williamson developed an asymmetric algorithm, whereby
the keys needed for encryption and decryption were different. Their work at
GCHQ was not publicised, but similar ideas were developed independently
by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, who in 1976 proposed the idea of
an asymmetric cryptosystem [28] and Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard
19
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Adleman who proposed the RSA cryptosystem in 1977 [59]. We refer the
interested reader to [61, 63] for further details.
Asymmetric schemes are also known as public key algorithms because the en-
cryption key can be made public. That is, they rely on the idea that it is
computationally infeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption
key, as long as a particular computational problem (such as factoring or the
discrete logarithm problem) is computationally infeasible. These ideas revolu-
tionised cryptography as they enabled entities to send and receive encrypted
data without having previously agreed a symmetric key. In particular, public
key cryptography is ideal for exchanging encrypted messages between enti-
ties which have no pre-existing relationship. However, public key algorithms
are currently more computationally expensive than symmetric key algorithms.
There remain applications and devices where public key cryptography is in-
feasible, and pre-agreeing a symmetric key is still necessary. It is on such
scenarios that we focus in this thesis.
2.1.3 Adversary models
When considering the strength of a cryptographic algorithm or protocol, it
is important to consider the type of adversary against which one wishes to
be secure. Notice that no cryptographic protocol between users A and B is
secure if A or B tells the adversary all of the keys being used. Similarly,
many cryptographic algorithms would be insecure against an adversary with
infinite time and/or computing power at its disposal. It is therefore important
to specify exactly which threats one is seeking to protect against. We gen-
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erally make worst-case assumptions, so as to provide an upper bound on the
damage caused by an adversary. We will give our detailed adversary model in
Section 2.2.4.
2.1.4 Key management
Key management is an important part of any system which uses cryptography,
and can easily be a weak link in an otherwise well-designed cryptographic
system. Areas of key management include:
• Key generation: the production of ‘good’ keys, that is, keys which
ideally do not conform to any pattern which an adversary could exploit;
• Key distribution: the allocation of keys to devices;
• Key refreshing/update: replacing keys - it may be desirable to define
a ‘lifetime’ for keys, that is, a window of time during which they may be
used, and after which they should be changed;
• Key revocation: removing a key from use - if a key becomes known to
an adversary, we ideally want to be able to stop that key being used for
further communication.
Our focus will be mainly on key distribution, in particular key predistribution,
as defined in Section 2.2.1. In Chapter 6 we will also discuss how revocation
and updates can be achieved in certain scenarios, and present efficient ways of
doing so.
21
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2.2 Key predistribution schemes
2.2.1 Definition and applications
We consider the distribution of keys to networks of small, resource-constrained
devices, or ‘nodes’. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is an example of such
a network. It is a collection of static, small, battery powered devices called
sensor nodes, which communicate with each other wirelessly. The resulting
network is usually used for monitoring an environment by gathering local data
such as temperature, light or motion. Much of the literature on key predis-
tribution schemes is concerned with wireless (or distributed) sensor networks,
including at least a third of the papers cited in this thesis. However, we will
be considering schemes which are applicable to any distributed, stationary
network of homogeneous, resource-constrained nodes. As we assume that the
nodes are lightweight and battery powered, it is important to consider battery
conservation in order to allow the network to remain effective for the appro-
priate period of time, and to ensure that the storage required of the nodes is
not beyond their memory capacity.
Resource-constrained networks can be deployed in a range of different en-
vironments, including potentially hostile areas such as military or volcanic
zones [71], where it would be dangerous or impractical to carry out the moni-
toring or data gathering by hand. In hostile environments it may be necessary
to encrypt messages for security and/or authentication. Various cryptographic
key management schemes have been proposed for such scenarios. In some cases
there is an online key server or base station to distribute keys to the nodes
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whenever necessary; if not, key predistribution schemes are required.
A key predistribution scheme (KPS) is a method for allocating keys to the
nodes of a network before they are deployed into their chosen environment.
We consider KPSs which assign symmetric keys, since small sensor nodes are
resource-constrained with low storage, communication and computational abil-
ities, and are often unable to support asymmetric cryptography. A major
drawback of KPSs is that once the keys have been predistributed, subsequent
key management operations are challenging to conduct [4]. We will present
examples of KPSs in Section 2.4. In order to make best use of the nodes’ lim-
ited resources, it is usually desirable to minimise the key storage requirement
whilst maximising the connectivity and resilience of a network. We define
these concepts more precisely in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.2 Framework
We identify four aspects of key predistribution which together form a frame-
work in which to categorise and study KPSs. Whilst many papers in the KPS
literature include specifications and/or analysis for each of these stages, others
only briefly mention or omit altogether the details of key generation, shared key
discovery and network alterations, focusing purely on the key predistribution
aspect.
Key generation Before the nodes are deployed, an entity which we call the
trusted base station must create a set of keys. Specifically, a key pool K of
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n symmetric keys {K1, K2, . . . , Kn} is selected from the space of all possible
keys.
Key predistribution The trusted base station allocates to each node a
subset of keys from the key pool. The size of the key pool and the number
of keys allocated to each node are chosen to provide a trade-off between the
conflicting metrics of key storage, connectivity and resilience, as defined in
Section 2.2.3.
Shared key discovery Once the nodes have been deployed, in order for
them to begin secure communication, a shared key discovery protocol such as
one of those given in [17, 73] should be implemented. This ensures that each
node determines the set of other nodes with which it shares keys. If the keys
are assigned in a way known to all the nodes, then a node Ni can broadcast
information about its identity, its node identifier, from which any node Nj
can derive the list of key identifiers which correspond to Ni’s key set. It then
remains for each node to look up whether any of these keys is also known to
them. If keys are not assigned in a deterministic or publicly known way, then
each node has to broadcast its whole list of key identifiers in order to perform
shared key discovery.
Network alterations Some implementations of KPSs will include the ca-
pacity for a network to make alterations after the initial shared key discovery.
Such alterations can include the revoking of keys or nodes, the establishing of
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new keys between nodes, and the updating of old keys. These can be effected
by node voting systems [20, 71] and techniques discussed in Section 2.4.4. If
a trusted base station is able to broadcast instructions to a network as in a
BEKPS (Chapter 6), then a wide range of update and revocation protocols is
possible.
2.2.3 Metrics
The metrics typically used to analyse key predistribution schemes are:
Key storage: the number of keys which each node is required to store.
Unless otherwise stated, the key storage will be constant and denoted by k.
Connectivity: the proportion of nodes which are ‘connected’ by sharing
keys. Connectivity can be measured or estimated both globally and locally [30,
53]. We will refer again to global connectivity in Section 4.6 but in general
we will use the measure of local connectivity Pr1, which is the probability
that a randomly-chosen pair of nodes share at least q ≥ 1 keys, where q is an
intersection threshold dictated by the KPS. Many KPSs only require nodes
to have a single key in common in order to be connected, i.e. q = 1. Where
two nodes share q or more keys, some protocols dictate that they should use a
combination of those keys, such as a hash, to encrypt their communications.
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Resilience: a measure of the network’s susceptibility to compromise by an
adversary. (We define our adversary precisely in Section 2.2.4.) To measure
the resilience we use the parameter fails, which is defined to be the probability
that a randomly-chosen link between a pair of uncompromised nodes is broken
after the adversary has compromised s nodes. By ‘broken’, we mean that the
key or keys securing that link are all known to the adversary. Equivalently,
fails measures the fraction of compromised links between uncompromised nodes
throughout the network, after an adversary has compromised s nodes. Notice
that this is a conditional probability, conditioning on the two nodes in question
being connected.
To the best of our knowledge, the notation ‘Pr1’ and ‘fails’ were first used
in [53] and [45] respectively. They are common measures, and many papers
such as [20, 30] calculate them in the same way but with different notation.
If fails = 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ v − 2 (where v is the total number of nodes) then
it is said that the network has perfect resilience. We note that lower values of
fails represent better resilience, and that fails is not defined for s > v − 2.
To illustrate the trade-offs required between these three parameters, we con-
sider some trivial examples of KPSs.
Example 2.1. Every node is assigned the same single key K.
This would require minimal key storage and ensure that any pair of nodes could
communicate securely, so Pr1 = 1 for all pairs of nodes. However, there would
be minimal resilience against an adversary, as the compromise of a single node
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would reveal the key K, rendering all other links insecure. Formally, fails = 1
for all 1 ≤ s ≤ v − 2.
Example 2.2. A unique key Kij is assigned to every pair of nodes Ni, Nj.
That is, for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ v, nodes Ni and Nj are both preloaded with a key Kij,
with the condition that Kij 6= Klm for all pairs (l,m) 6= (i, j), 1 ≤ l,m ≤ v.
This is called the complete pairwise KPS. Such a KPS has perfect resilience
and maximum connectivity, as Pr1 = 1 for all pairs of nodes. However, each
node has to store v − 1 keys, which is infeasible when v is large.
Example 2.3. Every node Ni is assigned a unique single key Ki.
This example is purely illustrative, since although it provides minimal key stor-
age and perfect resilience, it is an ineffective KPS as there is no connectivity:
Pr1 = 0 for all pairs of nodes.
We see, then, that it is trivial to optimise any two of the three parameters: key
storage, connectivity and resilience. However, in most applications the above
examples are inappropriate, thus we need to consider KPSs which provide
trade-offs between all three of these metrics.
2.2.4 Network adversary model
We will assume that if an adversary has compromised a device and learned
at least one of the keys which it stores, then the adversary knows all of the
keys which it stores. This provides a worst-case analysis of the number of keys
known to the adversary.
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We model our network adversary by assuming that nodes are compromised at
random. It is of course possible in practice that an adversary could employ
a better strategy. For example, the adversary could target two nodes which
appear not to be communicating with each other, in the hope of learning the
maximum 2k keys. (If the nodes were communicating then they must share
at least q keys, and so the adversary would learn at most 2k− q keys by their
compromise.) The random adversary model can therefore be thought of as
calculating a lower bound on fails, hence an upper bound on the resilience,
and is useful as a metric for comparison of KPSs.
We note the distinction between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ adversaries, denoted
in [29] as ‘listening’ and ‘disrupting’ adversaries, respectively. It is usually
assumed that a listening adversary can intercept any message sent through
the network, but can only decrypt a message if he knows all of the keys used
to encrypt it. Thus, if an adversary knows a set of keys KA ⊂ K, any message
sent through the network which is encrypted by a subset of keys from KA can
be intercepted and decrypted by the adversary, regardless of whether or not
the message is routed through compromised nodes.
A disrupting adversary is one which can alter network transmissions. Defensive
measures can be taken against a disrupting adversary, for example in [29],
messages are transmitted in such a way that alterations can be identified, and
the correct message recovered (up to a threshold number of alterations). This
is called fault tolerance, and is useful even in the absence of an adversary to
cope with communication errors and node malfunctions. However, defending
a network against a disrupting adversary is outside of our scope in this thesis:
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we are concerned with efficient methods for distributing keys to devices, rather
than the communication protocols to be used afterwards.
In summary, we make the following assumptions about our adversary:
• on compromising a node, the adversary learns all of its stored keys;
• the adversary compromises nodes at random;
• the adversary can intercept all messages sent through the network;
• the adversary can decrypt a message if and only if he knows the key(s)
used to encrypt that message.
2.3 Combinatorics
2.3.1 Graphs
We now briefly introduce some graph-theoretic terminology and definitions,
collated from [15, 21, 37]. In Section 2.3.2 we explain how graphs are used to
represent and analyse KPSs, and we develop the graph-theoretic understanding
of KPSs in Chapters 4 and 5.
Definition 2.1. A graph G = (V,E) is a set of vertices V = {x1, . . . , xv}
and a set of edges E ⊆ V × V . We use the notation (xi, xj) ∈ E to express
that there is an edge between the vertices xi and xj, and we say that the edge
(xi, xj) is incident to its endpoints xi and xj. Wherever an edge (xi, xj) exists,
xi and xj are said to be adjacent.
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All graphs considered in this thesis will be simple graphs, that is, they are
unweighted, undirected and do not contain self-loops or multiple edges. These
terms respectively mean that we do not assign different weights to vertices or
edges, edges are not directed from one vertex to the other, there are no edges
from a node to itself, and there is at most one edge between any two vertices.
Given subsets of vertices X, Y ⊂ V , the set of edges which connect X and Y
is denoted
E(X, Y ) = {(x, y) : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and (x, y) ∈ E} .
The complement X of X is the vertices which are not in X, that is, X = V \X.
An ordered set of consecutive edges {(xi1, xi2), (xi2, xi3), . . . , (xi(p−1), xip)} in
which all the vertices xi1, xi2, . . . , xip are distinct is called a path of length
p−1. A cycle is a ‘closed’ path which begins and ends at the same vertex, i.e. a
cycle is a path {(xi1, xi2), (xi2, xi3), . . . , (xi(p−1), xip)} where xi1, xi2, . . . , xi(p−1)
are distinct but xi1 = xip. We say that a graph is connected if there is a path
between every pair of vertices, and complete if there is an edge between every
pair of vertices.
The diameter of a graph is the maximum ‘distance’ between pairs of vertices.
That is, let D(xi, xj) be the length of the shortest path between vertices xi
and xj. Then the diameter of the graph is given by maxxi,xj∈V D(xi, xj).
Finally, the degree d(xi) of a vertex xi is the number of edges incident to that
vertex. If all nodes have the same degree d, the graph is said to be d-regular.
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2.3.2 Graph representations of KPSs
It is common to represent KPSs using simple graphs. We draw a graph of a
network by representing the nodes as vertices and the ‘connections’ as edges.
That is, we associate each node Ni with a vertex xi. From now on, we will
refer to the vertex set using the notation V = {N1, N2, . . . , Nv}.
2.3.2.1 Intersection graphs
To be precise in our analysis, we distinguish between the two possible types
of ‘connection’ and consider the separate constituent graphs of a network:
the communication graph G1 = (V,E1) where (Ni, Nj) ∈ E1 if nodes Ni and
Nj are within communication range, and the key graph G2 = (V,E2) where
(Ni, Nj) ∈ E2 if Ni and Nj share at least q common keys. An example of a
communication graph and a key graph are given in Figures 2.1(a) and 2.1(b)
respectively.
N1 N2
N3 N4
(a) Comm. graph
{K1, K2} {K3, K4}
{K1, K3} {K1, K4}
(b) Key graph
N1 N2
N3 N4
K1 K3
K1
(c) Intersection graph
Figure 2.1: Example of corresponding communication, key and intersection
graphs
If the communication graph is complete, it is often omitted from the analysis
as there is no need to check whether nodes can communicate. However, as we
will explain in more detail in Section 4, the communication graph is commonly
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modelled using a random graph, and it then becomes important to analyse how
the communication and key graphs relate to each other.
We say that two nodes Ni and Nj can communicate securely if (Ni, Nj) ∈
E1 ∩ E2, that is if they are adjacent in the intersection graph G1 ∩ G2 =
(V,E1 ∩ E2). This is illustrated in Figure 2.1(c). Where two nodes are not
adjacent in the intersection graph, there are possible key establishment and
message routing protocols which can be used to allow communication between
them; we give further details in Section 2.4.4.
2.3.3 Combinatorial designs
Many KPS constructions rely on combinatorial designs, and so we provide an
introduction to the theory of designs here. A brief review of existing KPSs con-
structed from designs is given in Section 2.4.2, and we present some examples
in more detail in Chapter 4.
The following definitions are widely accepted throughout the literature, and
were compiled with reference to [10, 11, 15, 68], to which we refer the interested
reader for further details and examples. In particular, [15] explains the links
between design theory and coding theory.
Definition 2.2. The power set of a set X is the set of all subsets of X , and
is denoted P(X ).
Definition 2.3. A set system (on X ) is a pair (X ,B) where X is a set and
B ⊆ P(X ).
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For example,
X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
B = {{4}, {1, 3}, {2, 5}, {3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}
is a set system.
A combinatorial design (or, when the context is clear, a design) is a general
term used to describe a set system with some specified conditions such as
regularity, uniformity or set intersection, as we shall now explain.
In the context of combinatorial designs, the elements of the set X are called
points and the elements of B are called blocks. The degree of a point x ∈ X is
the number of blocks containing x. We say that (X ,B) is a regular design of
degree r if every point has degree r. The rank is defined to be the size of the
largest block. If all blocks have the same size, k, then the design is said to be
uniform of rank k and is often called a block design.
We usually add a prefix to the word ‘design’ to specify the properties of the
set system in question, for example, we define a t− (v, k, λ) design to be a pair
(X ,B) where |X | = v, uniform of rank k, and every set of t points is contained
in exactly λ blocks.
Example 2.4. (from [56]) Let X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} and B = {{123},
{456}, {789}, {147}, {258}, {369}, {159}, {267}, {348}, {168}, {249}, {357}}.
Then (X ,B) is a block design which is regular of degree four and uniform of
rank three. Notice that every pair of points occurs in exactly one block, and so
this is a 2− (9, 3, 1) design.
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Combinatorial designs were first proposed for use in KPSs in [16]. A KPS can
be constructed from a design by associating a key with each point, and a node
with each block. That is, node Nj is given the set of keys {Ki : i ∈ Bj}, where
Bj is a block in B. Thus, Example 2.4 could be used to create a KPS for
twelve nodes N1, N2, . . . , N12 using nine keys, K1, K2, . . . , K9, where the first
node N1 stores keys K1, K2, K3, node N2 stores keys K4, K5, K6, . . ., and node
N12 stores keys K3, K5, K7. Figure 2.2 demonstrates a graph representation
of the KPS associated with Example 2.4. The graph is regular of degree
k(r − 1) = 3× 3 = 9. For ease of notation, we write key Ki simply as ‘i’.
{123}
{456}
{789}
{147}
{258}
{369}
{159}
{267}
{348}
{168}
{249}
{357}
Figure 2.2: Graph representation of KPS from Example 2.4
Finally, we introduce the definitions of some classes of designs which have been
used to construct KPSs. In Section 4.5.3.1 we will discuss some properties of
these designs which make them particularly suitable for constructing KPSs.
Definition 2.4. (from [47, Definition 1.2]) A design (X ,B) with |X | = n,
|B| = v is called a (n, v, r, k)-configuration if it is regular of degree r, uniform
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of rank k and any two points occur in at most one block.
A class of configurations called µ-common intersection designs were defined by
Lee and Stinson in [46, 47].
Definition 2.5. Let (X ,B) be a (n, v, r, k)-configuration. We say that (X ,B)
is a µ-common intersection design if, for blocks Bi and Bj, either
Bi ∩Bj 6= ∅
or
| {Bk ∈ B : Bi ∩Bk 6= ∅ and Bj ∩Bk 6= ∅} | ≥ µ.
In terms of the key graph of a KPS, this means that if nodes Ni and Nj
corresponding to blocks Bi and Bj do not share any keys and so are not
adjacent, then they have at least µ common neighbours, i.e. µ nodes with
which they both share a key.
Strongly regular graphs may be regarded as a special type of µ-common inter-
section design, and are defined as follows.
Definition 2.6. (from [14]) A (v, k(r − 1), λ, µ)-strongly regular graph is a
graph on v vertices which is regular of degree k(r − 1) and has the following
properties:
• any two adjacent vertices have exactly λ common neighbours
• any two nonadjacent vertices have exactly µ common neighbours.
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Equivalently, the design (X ,B) is a strongly regular graph if it is regular of
degree r, uniform of rank k, and for blocks Bi and Bj,
Bi ∩Bj 6= ∅ ⇒ | {Bk ∈ B : Bi ∩Bk 6= ∅ and Bj ∩Bk 6= ∅} | = λ
and
Bi ∩Bj = ∅ ⇒ | {Bk ∈ B : Bi ∩Bk 6= ∅ and Bj ∩Bk 6= ∅} | = µ
Strongly regular graphs have been shown to exist for various combinations of
the parameters v, k and r in [45]. Constructions are given in [14, 67, 47] and
we refer the reader to [13] for a discussion on constructing random strongly
regular graphs.
2.4 Existing schemes and techniques
Having seen trivial examples of KPSs in the preceding sections, we now present
a brief summary of the KPSs which have been proposed in the literature to
provide practical trade-offs between the conflicting metrics of key storage, con-
nectivity and resilience. There are randomised and deterministic constructions
for KPSs, and we give an overview of these in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 respec-
tively. In Section 2.4.3 we discuss other schemes which are outside of our
scope, but have strong similarities to key predistribution schemes. Finally, in
Section 2.4.4, we outline possible methods for communication between non-
adjacent nodes in a deployed network, which motivates later discussion in
Chapters 4 and 5 about the desirable properties of KPSs.
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2.4.1 Random KPSs
One approach to key predistribution is through randomised allocation of keys.
The seminal paper by Eschenauer and Gligor [32] presented the first ran-
domised approach to key predistribution, as follows:
Scheme 2.1 (Eschenauer Gligor random key predistribution). A key
pool K of n symmetric keys is generated from the space of all possible keys.
Each node is independently assigned a k-subset of keys from the key pool, cho-
sen uniformly at random from the set of all k-subsets of K. (That is, each node
stores k distinct keys; for each node the keys are chosen without replacement.)
Nodes are deployed into the environment and use a shared key discovery pro-
tocol such as those described in [17, 73] to identify the other nodes with which
they share keys.
Two nodes are said to be ‘connected’ if they have at least one key in common.
If they have more than one key in common, they should select a single one of
their common keys at random to use to secure their communications.
This KPS can achieve high connectivity with relatively low key storage by
careful choice of the size of the key pool. We consider the Eschenauer Gligor
scheme in more detail in Chapter 3, where we state and prove the formulae
for calculating its connectivity and resilience, and discuss the resulting key
graph. In the same chapter we also describe some adaptations of the scheme
which provide different trade-offs between the key storage, connectivity and
resilience.
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We mention here two other random key predistribution schemes from [19],
namely the multipath key reinforcement scheme and the random pairwise keys
scheme:
Scheme 2.2 (The multipath key reinforcement scheme [19]). We men-
tion this scheme here as it is presented in [19] as a random key predistri-
bution scheme. However, the key predistribution stage is the same as that
for Scheme 2.1, and so multipath reinforcement should perhaps be regarded
as a protocol for a deployed network, as discussed in depth in Sections 2.4.3
and 2.4.4. Briefly, the multipath key reinforcement protocol allows any nodes
which share a key to update it using any disjoint paths between them in the net-
work, thereby improving the resilience of the network whilst maintaining the
connectivity and key storage. Such a protocol could be used after any initial
key predistribution scheme to improve resilience, as discussed in Section 2.4.4.
Scheme 2.3 (The random pairwise keys scheme [19]). This scheme al-
locates ‘pairwise’ keys to a random subset of all possible pairs of nodes. By
‘pairwise’, we mean that if a pair of nodes share a key, that key is unique.
Graph-theoretically, the scheme achieves the following. Imagine the complete
pairwise key graph, where every node stores v − 1 unique keys. Delete edges
from this graph at random, until the graph is still connected with some accept-
able probability p. Now assign the appropriate keys to each node so that this is
the resulting key graph. This KPS has perfect resilience and is connected with
probability p.
However, most random key predistribution schemes are largely based on the
Eschenauer Gligor scheme. Since the scope of Chapter 3 is to provide a gen-
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eralised formula for the resilience of a class of random KPSs, we will reserve
further discussion of the variety of random KPSs for the next chapter.
2.4.2 Deterministic KPSs
Since 2004, many different deterministic constructions have been proposed for
KPSs such as [16, 46, 70]. Deterministic schemes can provide advantages over
random KPSs such as
• deterministic rather than probabilistic connectivity and resilience metrics
• more efficient shared key discovery
For further details on the benefits of deterministic KPSs over random KPSs,
see [48].
The majority are based on combinatorial designs, error-correcting codes and/or
graph constructions. We refer the reader to [17, 50, 56] for surveys of these
schemes, and in particular we note that [56] unifies various combinatorial ap-
proaches to KPS construction, pointing out that some apparently different
constructions are in fact equivalent.
We will present and analyse examples of deterministic KPSs constructed from
graphs and combinatorial designs in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Here we
make some observations which motivate the use of certain classes of designs in
constructing KPSs.
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In [47] it is observed that the diameter of the key graph of a µ-common inter-
section design is two, and that if two nodes are not adjacent then they will have
at least µ common neighbouring nodes. We will examine the various ways in
which common neighbours can be beneficial in Section 2.4.4. For an analysis
of the connectivity and resilience of KPSs based on µ-common intersection
designs, see [45, 56]. In Section 4.5.3.2 we show that their good expansion pro-
vides another reason to support the choice of µ-common intersection designs
for constructing KPSs.
Finally, a KPS constructed from a (v, k(r − 1), λ, µ)-strongly regular graph
which is neither complete (k = v − 1, λ = v − 2) nor disconnected (µ = 0
and k = λ + 1) provides good trade-offs between key storage, connectivity
and resilience [46]. Clearly, the key graph will also have diameter two, and by
proving a lower bound on the expansion in Section 4.5.3.3 we will show that
they provide many desirable properties for use in KPSs.
2.4.3 Key establishment
We note the existence of many schemes which are closely related to key pre-
distribution schemes. Although they do not fall within our definition of key
predistribution schemes, they are closely related, and some authors do refer to
them as key predistribution schemes.
In schemes such as [6, 9] which pre-date the key predistribution schemes litera-
ture, nodes are preloaded not with keys, but with secret information or ‘keying
materials’ from which they can generate or establish keys for pairwise or group
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communication. In common with much of the KPS literature, we categorise
such schemes as ‘key generation schemes’ or ‘key establishment schemes’, and
do not include them in our definition of key predistribution schemes. A self-
contained introduction to key establishment schemes is given in [8].
Finally, we note that key distribution patterns as described in [63, Section 10.4]
can be considered as early KPSs, differing only in that they are concerned with
distributing keys for groups of two or more users, and providing a threshold
level of security ω. That is, typically these schemes have the property that for
some ω ∈ N, fails = 0 for 1 ≤ s ≤ ω.
2.4.4 Communication between non-adjacent nodes
Finally, we discuss possible methods for communication between non-adjacent
nodes. Although we will not focus on such protocols in detail, their existence
motivates some design goals which we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5.
If two nodes are not adjacent in the intersection graph then there are various
techniques which can enable them to securely communicate:
• If Ni and Nj do not share a key but share a single common neighbour
Nk, then a message can be sent from Ni to Nk encrypted by their shared
key(s), decrypted by Nk, and then re-encrypted by Nk and sent to Nj
using their shared key(s). This process of encrypting and decrypting
messages along a path through the network is known as link encryption.
• IfNi andNj share µ common neighboursNk1, . . . , Nkµ (as in a KPS based
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on a µ-common intersection design, Section 4.5.3.2) then the message M
can be split into µ random-looking bit strings M1, . . . ,Mµ, so that if Nj
receives all µ message strings, it can recover M . For example, this could
be achieved by creating µ− 1 (pseudo)random bit strings of length |M |,
and choosing the final string Mµ so that M1⊕· · ·⊕Mµ = M as described
in [26]. Then Ni can send each message string via one of the common
neighbours Nk1, . . . , Nkµ using link encryption. The larger the number of
common neighbours, the less chance an adversary has of compromising
all the neighbours and recovering M . However, this comes at the cost of
increased communication through the network.
• In a similar way, common neighbours can be used to establish a shared
key between Ni and Nj. Creating a new key will reduce the communica-
tion overheads in the network after the key is established, in comparison
to using common neighbours for every communication. Nodes Ni and
Nj can agree a new key Kij by one node creating a secret key (prefer-
ably using a good pseudo-random number generator) and transmitting
it to the other node by sending a share of it via each of their common
neighbours, in the way described above. More sophisticated methods are
also possible, such as the one given in [29] which additionally provides a
threshold level of fault tolerance.
• Finally, a pair of nodes which already share a key Kij may use any com-
mon neighbours to reinforce their key, by which we mean creating a new
key K ′ij which is less vulnerable to compromise by an adversary. This is
achieved by ensuring that the adversary can only discover K ′ij by com-
promising every node used in the reinforcement, which is comprised of
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a key establishment scheme as above, followed by XORing the newly
established key with the existing key Kij. Such a protocol, called mul-
tipath reinforcement, is presented in [20] and was introduced briefly in
Section 2.4.1.
For all of the above methods, it is clearly preferable in terms of communication
overheads and resilience if the diameter and average path length in the inter-
section graph are small, so that ‘most’ non-adjacent nodes have at least one
common neighbour or only a short path between them. If two nodes do not
share a common neighbour but have multiple short paths between them, then
better resilience is provided for messages routed or keys shared along these
paths if they are disjoint. This is because if the paths are not disjoint, the
adversary could focus on compromising nodes which lie on the intersection of
the paths to minimise the number of nodes which have to be compromised in
order to recover the message or key.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we will see methods for ensuring that the diameter and
average path length of the key graph are small.
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3.1 Introduction
As explained in Section 2.2.3, a commonly used metric for comparing the re-
silience of key predistribution schemes is fails, which measures the proportion
of network connections which are ‘broken’ by an adversary which has com-
promised s nodes. Correct analysis of schemes is fundamental to the proper
assessment of KPSs. In [20], Chan, Perrig and Song present a formula for mea-
suring the resilience in a class of random key predistribution schemes called
q-composite schemes. We explain how this formula makes an incorrect assump-
tion about independence, and present a correction. Our corrected formula fea-
tures an additional parameter which makes it applicable to a wider variety of
random key predistribution schemes, including the original Eschenauer Gligor
scheme [32]. We also present a simplification of their formula for connectivity.
We refer to the paper by Yum and Lee [75] which also claims to correct the
original formula for the q-composite scheme. However the resulting formula
is complicated, computationally demanding, and hard to understand. The
formula which we propose and prove is easily computable and can be applied
to a wider range of schemes.
In Section 3.2 we give the details of two random key predistribution schemes
and provide proofs of their connectivity and resilience parameters. In Sec-
tion 3.3 we state the previously proposed formulae for the resilience of q-
composite schemes and discuss issues arising in their proofs, before presenting
and proving our generalised formula for fails in Section 3.4. Finally, in Sec-
tion 3.5 we analyse the difference between our formula and that given in [20],
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which can be considered an upper bound on the true value.
3.2 Background: random key predistribution
schemes
For deterministic schemes, fails can usually be computed using exact knowledge
of how many nodes store each key. In [56], Paterson and Stinson generalise
the fails calculation across a range of deterministic schemes. For random key
predistribution schemes, the number of nodes which store each key is only
known probabilistically, adding another layer of complexity to the calculation.
Here we present two examples of random key predistribution schemes. We
derive their respective connectivity and resilience formulae in order to demon-
strate some of the methods for proving our main result, the generalised formula
for fails in random key predistribution schemes. We also provide a simplified
formula for the probability of two nodes having exactly i keys in common.
3.2.1 Eschenauer Gligor KPS
Recall the Eschenauer Gligor KPS [32] which we presented as Scheme 2.1 in
Section 2.4.1, where each node is allocated a random k-subset of keys from
a key pool K, where |K| = n. We noted that two nodes are connected if
they have at least one key in common. Where nodes share more than one
common key, they should select one of them at random to use to secure their
communications. To be precise, we introduce a parameter Ω which is the
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maximum number of common keys which two nodes may use to secure their
communications. For the Eschenauer Gligor scheme, Ω = 1.
3.2.1.1 Connectivity
We now present the probability Pr1 of two nodes being connected in this
scheme. The original paper presents and proves an equivalent expression of
this formula using factorials; we use the binomial coefficient notation for con-
sistency with the majority of the subsequent literature.
Lemma 3.1 (Eschenauer Gligor connectivity). The probability of two nodes
being connected in an Eschenauer Gligor random key predistribution scheme
with key pool size n and key storage k is
Pr1 = 1−
(
n−k
k
)(
n
k
) .
Proof. Suppose that two nodes Ni, Nj store key sets KNi ,KNj respectively.
The probability that they are connected is
1− Pr[they have no keys in common] = 1− Pr[KNi ∩ KNj = ∅].
Fix KNi . Then there are
(
n−k
k
)
ways to pick a k-subset of keys for node Nj so
that KNi ∩ KNj = ∅, out of the total possible
(
n
k
)
ways to pick KNj .
Remark 3.1. We note that it is a common assumption in the literature that
the key graph of the Eschenauer Gligor scheme is equivalent to the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
random graph G(v,Pr1) [31], as asserted in the original paper [32] and in [20].
That is, the key graph is a random graph on v vertices, where each edge exists
with probability Pr1, so that there are approximately
(
v
2
)
Pr1 edges. However,
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this is not the case, as the edge existence probabilities are interdependent. As a
simple example, suppose that the key storage is k = 1, and that for some nodes
Na, Nb, Nc we have (Na, Nb) ∈ E and (Nb, Nc) ∈ E. Then the probability that
(Na, Nc) ∈ E is 1, and not dependent on n, the size of the key pool.
This observation has also been made in [5, 27, 74]. These papers prove that
the Eschenauer Gligor key graph is different from the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph; in
particular, for large networks the expected number of triangles is orders of
magnitude larger in the key graph [5, 74] and the connectivity threshold is
lower. Using the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph to model the Eschenauer Gligor
key graph is therefore pessimistic, in the sense that the key storage required for
the graph to be connected is lower than expected by the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model [27].
3.2.1.2 Resilience
Eschenauer and Gligor do not calculate the resilience of their scheme in the
way that we have defined. They do, however, make the observation that in a
simulation, only 50% of the keys from the key pool were used to secure links:
30% were used to secure a single link, 10% to secure two links and 5% to
secure three links. Thus the compromise of a single key compromises exactly
one other link with probability 0.1.
The standard metric fails for the Eschenauer Gligor scheme is indirectly stated
within another result in [20]. Here we state and prove it formally.
Lemma 3.2 (Eschenauer Gligor resilience). In an Eschenauer Gligor random
key predistribution scheme with key pool size n and key storage k, the resilience
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is given by
fails = 1−
(
1− k
n
)s
. (3.2.1)
Proof. Fix a random link in the network between uncompromised nodes Ni
and Nj, and suppose that they use key Ki to secure their connection.
We begin by considering s = 1, that is, the adversary has compromised a
single node. Let X be a uniformly random k-subset of the key pool K =
{K1, . . . , Kn}, so that it represents the keys known to the adversary after
compromising one node. Then
fail1 = Pr[Ki ∈ X]
= 1− Pr[Ki /∈ X]
= 1−
(
n−1
k
)(
n
k
)
= 1−
(
1− k
n
)
.
Now we generalise for s > 1. Let X1, . . . , Xs be independent uniformly random
subsets of the key pool, each of size k. Then
fails = Pr[Ki ∈ X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xs]
= 1− Pr[Ki /∈ X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xs]
= 1− (Pr[Ki /∈ X1])s
= 1−
(
1− k
n
)s
.
49
3.2 Background: random key predistribution schemes
3.2.2 The q-composite scheme
In many key predistribution schemes, it is possible that a pair of nodes Ni and
Nj have more than one key in common. If Ω = k, nodes may use all of their
ω ≤ k common keys KNi ∩ KNj = {Kt1 , Kt2 , . . . , Ktω} to secure the link, for
example by calculating their shared key to be
Kij = h(Kt1 ||Kt2|| · · · ||Ktω) ,
where h is a suitable function such as a hash function (see [63, Chapter 4]
for an introduction), and where there is a well-defined ordering on the keys
t1 < t2 < · · · < tω so that Kij is uniquely defined. Since an adversary would
have to learn all ω keys to compromise the link, such schemes have better
resilience than those where Ω = 1, such as Scheme 2.1. However, changing Ω
does not affect the connectivity.
Chan et al. [20] present a random KPS which requires nodes to have q > 1
keys in common in order to be connected, called the q-composite scheme. We
give the formal details below. Intuitively, for the same key pool size n and key
storage k, nodes are less likely to be connected in the q-composite scheme than
in the Eschenauer Gligor scheme, but the resilience increases with q. Such a
trade-off may be advantageous for some applications, and the sizes of n, k and
q can be adapted to provide a desirable level of connectivity with as high a
resilience as possible.
Scheme 3.1 (q-composite scheme [20]). The q-composite scheme is similar
to Scheme 2.1, except that nodes must share at least q > 1 keys before they are
allowed to compute a common key, and Ω = k. That is, nodes with fewer than
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q keys in common will not be able to communicate directly, and nodes with q
or more keys in common should hash all of their common keys to create their
link key.
3.2.2.1 Connectivity
We consider the connectivity of the q-composite scheme, that is, the probability
that a pair of nodes share q or more keys. We omit the full proof here because
it is given in [20] and reproduced in [75]. However, we provide an improvement:
the value of p(i), the probability of a pair of nodes sharing exactly i keys, has
previously been given as
p(i) =
(
n
i
)(
n−i
2(k−i)
)(
2(k−i)
k−i
)(
n
k
)2 ,
but we provide an equivalent, simpler expression in Lemma 3.3. Our formula
for p(i) can be derived from the original by expanding the binomial coefficients
and rearranging, but we provide a direct combinatorial proof:
Lemma 3.3. In a random key distribution scheme where nodes are allocated
a random k-subset of keys from a key pool of size n, the probability that a pair
of nodes shares exactly i keys is given by
p(i) =
(
n−k
k−i
)(
k
i
)(
n
k
) . (3.2.2)
Proof. We consider the probability of two nodes N1 and N2 having exactly i
keys in common. Fix i keys from N1’s set of keys. For N2 to have (k− i) keys
which are unknown to N1, it must have (k − i) keys chosen from the (n − k)
keys unknown to N1. Thus there are
(
n−k
k−i
)
ways to do this, out of the
(
n
k
)
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ways to choose keys for N2. Finally, we multiply by the number of ways to fix
i keys from N1’s set of k keys.
Thus we can see that the connectivity of a q-composite scheme is given by the
following formula:
Theorem 3.4 (from [20]). In a q-composite scheme with key pool size n and
key storage k, the connectivity probability is
Pr1 = 1−
q−1∑
i=0
p(i) . (3.2.3)
Remark 3.2. Notice that (3.2.3) is a generalised formula for the probability
of connectivity, which agrees with that given in Lemma 3.1 for the Eschenauer
Gligor scheme: setting q = 1 into (3.2.3) gives
Pr1 = 1− p(0)
= 1−
(
n−k
k
)(
n
k
) .
3.3 Previous formulae for the resilience of the
q-composite scheme
We now discuss approaches which have been proposed for calculating the re-
silience of the q-composite scheme.
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3.3.1 Chan, Perrig and Song
In [20], Chan et al. give the following formula:
fails =
k∑
i=q
(
1−
(
1− k
n
)s)i
p(i)
Pr1
. (3.3.1)
However, the proof is informal and incorrectly assumes independence between
certain events, as we explain below.
Before we explain why this formula for resilience is incorrect, we first note an
aspect of the notation in the original formula which has caused some confusion
in the subsequent literature. Chan et al. consider a parameter p, defined to be
the minimum node-node connectivity probability needed to make the whole
network connected with some high probability. They then define pconnect =
1 −∑q−1i=0 p(i) and state that the key pool size n should be chosen to be the
largest (integer) such that pconnect ≥ p, which is a sensible way to reduce
unnecessary connectivity and keep resilience high. However, in their resilience
formula, they redefine p to equal pconnect. This has caused errors to be made
in its reproduction, for example in [75]. We will always use the notation Pr1
as defined in (3.2.3) to avoid confusion, and for consistency with much of the
deterministic key predistribution literature.
As Yum and Lee point out in [75], the problem with (3.3.1) is an incorrect
assumption of independence. Suppose that, in a 2-composite scheme, a pair
of nodes share keys K1 and K2. For an adversary to break the link between
these nodes requires knowledge of both K1 and K2. Let AKi be the event that
an adversary knows key Ki, and suppose that after compromising s nodes an
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adversary knows x keys. Equation (3.3.1) assumes that
Pr[AK1 ∧ AK2 ] = Pr[AK1 ]Pr[AK2 ] =
(x
n
)2
.
However, this is not true because the events are not independent. Consider
the conditional probability Pr[AK2 |AK1 ]. If the adversary already knows key
K1, then it is slightly less likely that the adversary also knows K2, indeed,
Pr[AK2|AK1 ] = x−1n . Thus, the calculation leads to an overestimation of the
true value of fails, as we demonstrate in Section 3.5.
3.3.2 Yum and Lee
In [75], another formula is proposed for the calculation of fails for q-composite
schemes. However, the formula is difficult to compute, as we now demonstrate.
In [75, Theorem 2], Yum and Lee propose that fails for the q-composite scheme
is given by
min{ks,n}∑
τ=k
[(
n
τ
)( k∑
j=q
(
τ
j
)(
n
j
) p(j)
Pr1
)((
τ
k
)s −∑τ−kλ=1(−1)λ+1(τλ)(τ−λk )s(
n
k
)s
)]
. (3.3.2)
This formula is complicated and computationally laborious to evaluate; in
addition we had difficulty in following the proof. We present a direct proof of
a computationally simpler formula in Corollary 3.7 below. We also note that,
whilst we are able to compute (3.3.2) for small values of n such as n = 17,
our results are different from those given in [75, Table 1]. We are unable to
reproduce any of their sample values, either by interpreting the ‘p’ in (3.3.2)
to mean Pr1 or pconnect. We conclude that there must be a typographical error
somewhere in their formula and/or proof.
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3.4 Generalised resilience for random key predis-
tribution schemes
In order to generalise across many instantiations of random key predistribution
schemes, we have introduced a parameter Ω ≤ k, which acts as an upper
bound on the number of shared keys which nodes can use to compute their
link key. This allows us to derive a formula which describes the resilience of
many different random KPSs, including the schemes described in Section 3.2.
We show in Corollary 3.6 that our formula is equivalent to that of Scheme 2.1
in the special case when q = Ω = 1.
We now present our generalised formula for fails, which applies to any key
predistribution scheme where:
1. each node is allocated k keys, selected independently and uniformly at
random without replacement from a pool of n keys;
2. the intersection threshold is q ≥ 1, that is, nodes may only establish a
link key if they share at least q keys;
3. the upper bound on the number of shared keys a pair of nodes may use
is Ω, where q ≤ Ω ≤ k; if two nodes share more than Ω keys then they
should pick Ω of their keys at random to compute their link key;
4. suppose that a pair of nodes use ω shared keys to create a link key, where
q ≤ ω ≤ Ω. We require that the function (such as hash, XOR, etc.) for
producing the single link key is such that an adversary must know all
of the ω shared keys between a pair of nodes to break the link; if the
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adversary only knows at most ω − 1 of the keys then the link remains
secure.
Theorem 3.5. For any random key predistribution scheme which fulfils con-
ditions (1)–(4) above, the resilience is given by
fails =
1
Pr1
(
Ω∑
ω=q
[
1−
ω∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
(
ω
i
)((n−i
k
)(
n
k
) )s] p(ω))+
1
Pr1
([
1−
Ω∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
(
Ω
i
)((n−i
k
)(
n
k
) )s] k∑
ω=Ω+1
p(ω)
)
. (3.4.1)
Proof. Consider a randomly-chosen pair of uncompromised nodes which share
ω keys, where q ≤ ω ≤ Ω. For ease of notation and without loss of generality,
we label these keys {1, 2, . . . , ω}. The probability that all of these ω keys are
known to an adversary which has compromised s nodes is
Pr[{1, . . . , ω} ⊆ {X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xs}] = 1− Pr
[
ω⋃
i=1
Bi
]
,
where Bi is the event that key i /∈ {X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xs}. Using inclusion-exclusion,
we have
1− Pr
[
ω⋃
i=1
Bi
]
= 1− ωPr[1 /∈ {X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xs}]
+
(
ω
2
)
Pr[1, 2 /∈ {X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xs}] + · · ·
(−1)i−1
(
ω
i
)
Pr[1, . . . , i /∈ {X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xs}] + · · ·
= 1−
ω∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
(
ω
i
)((n−i
k
)(
n
k
) )s .
The probability of a randomly-chosen connected pair of uncompromised nodes
sharing exactly ω keys (q ≤ ω ≤ Ω) is p(ω)
Pr1
. Therefore, for q ≤ ω ≤ Ω we have
fails =
1
Pr1
(
Ω∑
ω=q
[
1−
ω∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
(
ω
i
)((n−i
k
)(
n
k
) )s] p(ω)) .
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For Ω < ω ≤ k, the probability of two connected nodes sharing ω keys is again
p(ω)
Pr1
. However, only Ω of these keys will be used to secure the link, and the
choice of these Ω is made a priori, uniformly at random, and so without loss
of generality they can be labelled 1, 2, . . . ,Ω. Therefore the probability of the
adversary knowing all Ω keys is
Pr[{1, . . . ,Ω} ⊆ {X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xs}] = 1−
Ω∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
(
Ω
i
)((n−i
k
)(
n
k
) )s ,
using the result above, and so for Ω < ω ≤ k,
fails =
1
Pr1
([
1−
Ω∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
(
Ω
i
)((n−i
k
)(
n
k
) )s] k∑
ω=Ω+1
p(ω)
)
.
Adding these two results gives the final formula for fails.
We now demonstrate that our formula agrees with that given in Lemma 3.2,
in the case where q = Ω = 1.
Corollary 3.6 (Eschenauer Gligor resilience revisited). The resilience of a
random KPS which fulfils conditions (1)–(4) and where q = Ω = 1 (such as
the Eschenauer Gligor scheme), is given by
fails = 1−
(
1− k
n
)s
.
Proof. Setting q = Ω = 1 in Equation (3.4.1) gives
fails =
1
Pr1
([
1− (−1)0
(
1
1
)((n−1
k
)(
n
k
) )s] p(1)+[
1− (−1)0
(
1
1
)((n−1
k
)(
n
k
) )s] k∑
ω=2
p(ω)
)
=
∑k
ω=1 p(ω)
Pr1
(
1−
((
n−1
k
)(
n
k
) )s) .
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Since Pr1 is by definition the sum of the probabilities of having 1, 2, . . . , k keys
in common, the first fraction is equal to 1, and we have
fails = 1−
(
(n− 1)!
(n− 1− k)!k!
/
n!
(n− k)!k!
)s
= 1−
(
1− k
n
)s
,
as required.
It is now straightforward to derive the correct formula for the resilience of
Scheme 3.1 from Theorem 3.5:
Corollary 3.7 (q-composite resilience). The resilience of a random KPS that
fulfils conditions (1)–(4) and where q > 1 and Ω = k (such as the q-composite
scheme from [20]) is given by
fails =
1
Pr1
(
k∑
ω=q
[
1−
ω∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
(
ω
i
)((n−i
k
)(
n
k
) )s] p(ω)) . (3.4.2)
Proof. Using Equation (3.4.1), we observe that when Ω = k the summation
from ω = Ω + 1 to ω = k vanishes, leaving the formula given above.
3.5 Numerical examples
We now compare our corrected formula to the original expression for fails. In
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 we contrast equations (3.3.1) and (3.4.2) for sample values
within the q-composite scheme (Ω = k). We fix n = 1000 and k = 100, and in
Table 3.1 we fix q = 10 and vary s from 1 to 20. In Table 3.2 we fix s = 10
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s (3.3.1) (3.4.2) % difference
1 2.75 ×10−11 1.79 ×10−11 53.532634
2 1.85 ×10−8 1.52 ×10−8 21.345324
3 7.03 ×10−7 6.25 ×10−7 12.472689
4 8.27 ×10−6 7.63 ×10−6 6.037381
5 0.000051 0.000048 6.037381
6 0.000213 0.000204 4.544026
7 0.000669 0.000647 3.517733
8 0.001720 0.001674 2.776871
9 0.003794 0.003711 2.222941
10 0.007423 0.007292 1.797917
11 0.013196 0.013006 1.465379
12 0.021692 0.021434 1.201299
13 0.033414 0.033086 0.989159
14 0.048737 0.048342 0.817219
15 0.067871 0.067415 0.676889
16 0.090850 0.090342 0.561736
17 0.117530 0.116984 0.466844
18 0.147617 0.147046 0.388391
19 0.180696 0.180114 0.323365
20 0.216264 0.215683 0.269363
Table 3.1: Comparison of formulae when n = 1000, k = 100, q = 10, hence
Pr1 = 0.555019
and vary q from 1 to 20. Differences are given as a percentage difference, that
is, the final column is given by (3.3.1)−(3.4.2)
(3.4.2)
× 100.
We find that (3.3.1) gives higher values for fails, that is, it underestimates
the resilience. As the differences are small, (3.3.1) can be thought of as an
upper bound on the correct value. We note that an asymptotic approximation
can be derived by routine approximation of (3.4.2) (using the basic techniques
of Poisson approximation to the Binomial distribution); for example, it is a
simple exercise to show that
fails ≈
k∑
ω=q
ω!
Pr1
(
k
ω
)2
e−
1
n(k2−2kω+
ω(ω+1)
2 )
(
1− e− skn
n
)ω
and numerically this presents as a lower bound. These approximations are
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q Pr1 (3.3.1) (3.4.2) % difference
1 0.999985 0.027080 0.026874 0.765811
2 0.999802 0.026966 0.026760 0.769232
3 0.998681 0.026520 0.026314 0.782573
4 0.994211 0.025397 0.025191 0.816410
5 0.981134 0.023337 0.023133 0.881074
6 0.951193 0.020382 0.020183 0.983376
7 0.895315 0.016889 0.016701 1.126261
8 0.807913 0.013337 0.013164 1.310152
9 0.690967 0.010113 0.009960 1.534359
10 0.555019 0.007423 0.007292 1.797917
11 0.416034 0.005313 0.005204 2.099974
12 0.289839 0.003730 0.003641 2.439908
13 0.187255 0.002580 0.002510 2.817340
14 0.112090 0.001765 0.001710 3.232105
15 0.062167 0.001197 0.001154 3.684213
16 0.031964 0.000806 0.000774 4.173823
17 0.015250 0.000540 0.000516 4.701213
18 0.006759 0.000360 0.000342 5.266761
19 0.002786 0.000240 0.000226 5.870935
20 0.001070 0.000159 0.000149 6.514278
Table 3.2: Comparison of formulae when n = 1000, k = 100, s = 10
weakest when Pr1 is very small (when n is large in comparison to k), but such
low connectivity is unlikely to be used in practice. For more appropriate values
of Pr1 for network connectivity, the approximations become more accurate.
It can be seen that, using either formula, the value of fails increases in s
and decreases in q. Conversely, the percentage difference decreases in s and
increases in q. However, as the largest values of the percentage differences
correspond to the smallest values of fails for both equations, the absolute error
in (3.3.1) remains small.
We therefore conclude that whilst our contribution is of mathematical impor-
tance it has limited impact on applications, as the original formula from [20]
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provides a close approximation to the true value.
Sample values for the formula from [75] are not given in the tables; for ex-
act computation using Maple 15, the calculation did not terminate within an
hour for input numbers of the magnitude given in the tables. By contrast,
our formula can be evaluated within seconds on the same computer (AMD
PhenomTM II X4 970 CPU, 3.5 GHz, 16 GB RAM). Approximate calculation
of (3.3.2) revealed answers appearing to converge to the results given by our
formula, (3.4.2).
3.6 Conclusion
We have described two random key predistribution schemes and explained how
the resilience of the q-composite scheme has been inaccurately presented in the
literature. We have derived a formula for fails which is rigorously proven, prac-
tical to compute, and applicable to a wide range of random key predistribution
schemes because of the parameter Ω. Notice that if we take a scheme with
Ω = k and change Ω to be in the range q ≤ Ω < k, then connectivity remains
unchanged but resilience is reduced. Whilst this may be undesirable for many
applications, setting Ω < k may provide practical benefits such as reduced
computation time, and an obstacle to an adversary in determining exactly
which of the common keys have been hashed to create the key for a given link.
Correctly calculating resilience is important for accurately assessing and com-
paring KPSs; in particular, comparisons are often drawn between the perfor-
mances of random and deterministic key predistribution schemes. It is there-
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fore reassuring to know that the original equation in [20] produces probabilities
which are similar to those given by the correct formula for fails. However, es-
tablishing the correct formula is of mathematical importance, and expressing
it in a way which is computable is of practical importance.
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4.1 Introduction
4.1 Introduction
Since networks may be modelled as graphs, tools from graph theory have been
used in both their design and analysis. In this chapter, we explore the role of
expander graphs in KPSs. The expansion of a graph is a measure of how well
connected it is, and how difficult it is to separate subsets of vertices; we will
see the precise definition in Section 4.2. Roughly speaking, a graph has good
expansion if every ‘small’ subset of vertices has a ‘large’ neighbourhood, and
intuitively, expansion is a desirable property for graphs of networks. The term
‘expander graphs’ is used informally to refer to graphs with good expansion.
In 2006, expander graph theory was introduced to the study of KPSs from
two perspectives. On the one hand, C¸amtepe et al. [18] showed that a math-
ematical construction for an expander graph could be used to design a KPS,
resulting in a network which is well connected under certain constraints. On
the other hand, Ghosh [36] claimed that good expansion is a necessary condi-
tion for ‘optimal’ networks. We examine these claims and determine the role
of expander graphs in KPSs for resource-constrained networks.
We show that constructions for KPSs based on expander graphs provide perfect
resilience, but lower connectivity and expansion than many existing compara-
ble KPSs. We argue that expansion is an important metric for assessing KPSs
to be used alongside the other common metrics of key storage, connectivity and
resilience for a given network size. However, we note the difficulty of finding
the expansion coefficient of a graph and so propose estimating the expansion
and using other graph-theoretical techniques to indicate potential weaknesses.
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We begin by introducing expander graphs and the relevant terminology in
Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we outline Ghosh’s claims and show by means
of a counter-example that his conclusion is misdirected towards expansion in
product graphs rather than intersection graphs. In Section 4.4 we discuss how
to maximise the probability of a high expansion coefficient in the intersection
graph, and in Section 4.5 we analyse the extent to which KPSs based on
expander graph constructions achieve this, in comparison to other schemes
from the literature. Finally, in Section 4.6 we suggest practical metrics for
analysing and improving KPSs and the resulting intersection graphs.
4.2 Expander graphs
For a thorough survey of expander graphs and their applications, see [25, 39].
Here we introduce only the aspects of expander graphs which are relevant to
our study, and in particular we restrict our attention to finite graphs.
4.2.1 Boundary properties and expansion
We begin with the definition of a subgraph, before defining boundary properties
and isoperimetric inequalities. Definitions 4.2 and 4.3 are reproduced from [10,
Chapter 16], to which the reader is referred for further details and examples.
Definition 4.1. A subgraph of a graph G = (V,E) is a graph GS = (VS, ES)
in which VS ⊆ V and ES ⊆ E. If VS or ES is a proper subset (that is, VS 6= V
or ES 6= E), then the subgraph is a proper subgraph of G. If VS or ES is empty,
the subgraph is called the null graph. A vertex-induced subgraph is a subset
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S ⊆ V together with the edge set ES := {(Ni, Nj) ∈ E : Ni, Nj ∈ S}.
We can consider boundary properties of subgraphs. Two intuitive examples of
boundary properties are the edge boundary and the vertex boundary:
Definition 4.2. For a graph G = (V,E) and a vertex-induced subgraph on
S ⊂ V , the edge boundary, denoted E(S, S), is defined to be the set of edges
incident to both a vertex in S and a vertex in S = G \S. Similarly, the vertex
boundary is the set of vertices in S adjacent to at least one vertex in S, denoted
by δS.
Definition 4.3. An isoperimetric inequality in a graph is a lower bound on
the size of a boundary, in terms of the size of the subgraph. For example, an
isoperimetric inequality for the edge boundary would be an explicit expression
for
min{|E(S, S)| : S ⊂ G, |S| = i}
for some number of interest i ∈ N.
We are now ready to define the expansion of a graph:
Definition 4.4. A finite graph G = (V,E) is an -edge expander graph, where
the edge-expansion coefficient  is defined by
 = min
S⊂V :|S|≤ v
2
( |E(S, S)|
|S|
)
.
We will explore this definition and the significance of the edge-expansion coef-
ficient in Section 4.2.2. First we make some remarks about the nomenclature
of expansion, which is not consistent throughout the literature.
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Remark 4.1. There is a related definition of an -vertex expander graph, which
is defined in the same way but using the vertex boundary for the isoperimetric
inequality. We have chosen to restrict our study here to edge expansion, as it
is perhaps more intuitive for analysing key sharing, and is the measure used in
the related literature on KPSs. Since we will be consistently referring to edge
expansion properties, we will omit the word ‘edge’ when the context is clear,
for ease of notation.
Remark 4.2. Although the expansion coefficient  is defined for any graph,
the phrase ‘expander graph’ is used informally to refer to graphs with good ex-
pansion, that is, graphs with a high value of , as we explain in Section 4.2.2.
Definitions for  vary slightly across the literature, in particular some defini-
tions use the strict inequality |S| < v
2
. Another name for the edge-expansion
coefficient is the isoperimetric number, which is closely related to the algebraic
connectivity, and in a weighted graph where every vertex has the same weight,
 is equivalent to the Cheeger constant; see [22] for further details.
4.2.2 The implications of large  for networks
We now explore what the definition of the edge-expansion coefficient  means,
and why a high value of  is desirable, through the following observations:
• If  = 0 then we see from the definition that there exists a subset of
vertices S ⊂ V which is disconnected from the rest of the graph, ie.
E(S, S) = ∅. This implies that the graph is not connected.
• A graph is connected if and only if  > 0 (see proof of Lemma 4.1), hence
67
4.2 Expander graphs
all connected graphs are -expander graphs for some positive value of .
• If  is ‘small’, for example  = 1
100
, then there exists a set of vertices S
which is only connected to the rest of the graph by one edge per 100
nodes in S. This is undesirable for a resource-constrained network for
the following reasons:
– The set S is vulnerable to being ‘cut off’ from the rest of the net-
work by a small number of attacks or faults. If S contains c× 100
nodes then there are only c edges between S and S. A small num-
ber of compromises or failures amongst the nodes incident to these
edges (of which there can be no more than 2c) will render all com-
munication between S and S insecure.
– Since S is connected to the rest of the network by comparatively
few edges, a higher communication burden is placed on the small
set of ≤ 2c nodes, since a higher proportion of data needs to be
routed through them. This will drain the batteries of the nodes
nearest to the edges between S and S faster than those of an average
node, so that after some period of time they will run out of energy,
disconnecting S from the rest of the network even though many
nodes in S may still have battery power remaining.
– Reliance on a small number of edges to connect large sets of nodes
may create bottlenecks in the transmission of data through the net-
work, making data collection and/or aggregation less efficient.
• If  is larger, particularly if  > 1, then there is no ‘easy’ way to disconnect
large sets of nodes, and there is a more even spread of communication
68
4.2 Expander graphs
burdens, battery usage and data flow.
We see from these observations that intersection graphs with higher values of
 are more desirable for resource-constrained networks. A graph with a ‘large’
value of  is often said to have ‘good expansion’. The size of  is subject to the
following bounds.
Lemma 4.1. For any connected graph G = (V,E) with |V | ≥ 2,
0 <  ≤ min
x∈V
d(x) .
Proof. We begin by considering the lower bound. Suppose for a contradiction
that  = 0. Then there exists a set S ⊂ V such |E(S, S)| = 0. This contradicts
the fact that G is connected. Since  cannot be negative, we have that  > 0.
For the upper bound, consider the set S = {x} where x ∈ V . It is clear that
|E(S, S)| = d(x), where d(x) is the degree of x as defined in Section 2.3.1, and
so |E(S,S)||S| =
d(x)
1
= d(x). Since the definition of the edge-expansion coefficient
 uses the minimum value over all S ⊂ V with |S| ≤ |V |
2
, we have that
 ≤ minx∈V d(x).
In addition to the observations made above, graphs with good expansion also
have low diameter, logarithmic in the size of the network [39] and contain
multiple short, disjoint paths between nodes [44], the many benefits of which
we discussed in Section 2.4.4. These properties mean that key graphs with
good expansion are particularly desirable for resource-constrained networks.
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The papers by C¸amtepe et al. [18] and Shafiei et al. [60] propose KPSs based on
expander graph constructions. These methods of designing a KPS ensure that
the key graph has good expansion, and we further examine these proposals
in Section 4.5. Before we consider the claims made by Ghosh in [36] about
the necessity of good expansion for ‘optimal’ networks, we introduce one more
definition of expansion, to which we will refer briefly in Section 4.5, and which
we will build upon in Chapter 5.
4.2.3 Spectral expansion
For a d-regular graph G, we define the spectral expansion of G using linear
algebra. The following definitions are compiled with reference to [2, 22, 25, 39].
Definition 4.5. The adjacency matrix of a graph G = (V,E) is defined to be
a |V | × |V | matrix A, where each entry aij is the number of edges incident to
both vertex i and vertex j.
It is easy to see that the adjacency matrix of a simple graph is a symmetric 0−1
matrix, with zeroes on the main diagonal. For a d-regular graph, the sum of
the entries in each row or column is d. Since A is a real symmetric v×v matrix,
it has |V | = v real eigenvalues, λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λv, where all λi ∈ [−d, d].
In fact, it can be shown that λ1 = d, corresponding to eigenvector u1 whose
entries are all 1
v
. We also note that λv = −d if and only if G is bipartite
(two-colourable). We can now define the spectral gap as follows.
Definition 4.6. Let λ˜ be the largest eigenvalue in absolute value with |λ˜| 6= d.
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Then the spectral gap of a d-regular graph G is defined to be λ1 − λ˜ =
d− λ˜ .
The various definitions of expansion are closely related. Tanner [65] and inde-
pendently Alon and Milman [1] proved that
d− λ˜
2
≤  ≤
√
2d(d− λ˜) (4.2.1)
where  is the edge expansion coefficient defined in Definition 4.4. Thus, the
spectral gap may be used as a measure of the spectral expansion: the larger
the spectral gap, the better the expansion of G.
Finally, Alon and Boppana [55] proved that all large d-regular graphs satisfy
λ˜ ≥ 2√d− 1 − o(1). A graph is said to be Ramanujan if this bound is tight,
that is, if λ˜ ≤ 2√d− 1, and therefore Ramanujan graphs have asymptotically
smallest possible λ˜, making them very good spectral expanders [25].
4.3 Expansion in product graphs
In [36] Ghosh considers KPSs with large network size, low key storage per
node, high connectivity and high resilience. He considers jointly ‘optimising’
these parameters, although exactly what this means is unclear, since different
applications will prioritise them differently. Nevertheless, he argues that if a
KPS is in some sense ‘optimal’, the product graph (Definition 4.7) of the key
graph and communication graph must have ‘good expansion properties’. We
show by a counterexample that expansion in the product graph is not a helpful
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measure because the product graph is almost inevitably an expander graph.
Additionally, we show that the product graph is unable to capture the required
detail to analyse a network, and that it is the intersection graph where such
analysis is relevant.
First, we define what is meant by the product graph in this context.
Definition 4.7. The (Cartesian) product graph of two graphs G = (VG, EG)
and H = (VH , EH) is defined as G.H = (VG × VH , EG.H), where the set of
edges EG.H is defined in the following way: for vertices xy, x
′y′ ∈ VG×VH with
xy 6= x′y′, we have (xy, x′y′) ∈ EG.H if
(x = x′ or (x, x′) ∈ EG) and (y = y′ or (y, y′) ∈ EH) .
The definition is perhaps easier to understand through examples. In Figures 4.1
and 4.2 we consider examples of product graphs and examine how they relate
to their constituent communication and key graphs. Figure 4.1 shows a com-
munication and a key graph, and their corresponding intersection and product
graphs. The product graph is represented in Figure 4.1(d) in a way which
demonstrates its construction, and redrawn in Figure 4.1(e) for clarity.
Figure 4.1(d) illustrates that the product graph construction results in four
copies of the key graph, connected to each other in a way which resembles
a large copy of the communication graph. We see that there is an edge in
the product graph (ac, ab) ∈ EG.H because a = a and (c, b) ∈ EH . Simi-
larly, (ca, ba) ∈ EG.H because (c, b) ∈ EG and a = a. However, we find that
(aa, ab) /∈ EG.H because whilst a = a, (a, b) /∈ EH .
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a b
c d
(a) Comm. graph
a b
c d
(b) Key graph
a b
c d
(c) Intersect. graph
aa ab
ac ad
ba bb
bc bd
ca cb
cc cd
da db
dc dd
(d) Product graph
aa ab
ac
ad
ba
bb
bc
bdcacb
cc
cd
da
db
dc
dd
(e) Product graph re-drawn
Figure 4.1: A product graph corresponding to an identical communication and
key graph pair.
In Figure 4.1 the communication and key graphs are identical, giving the best
possible case for intersection. We now calculate the expansion coefficient of the
product graph. Consider sets S of 1, 2, . . . , 8 vertices (recall from the definition
that we should consider subsets S with |S| ≤ |V |
2
, and here |V | = 16). We
observe that any single vertex is connected to the rest of the graph by at least
three edges, any set of two vertices is connected to the rest of the graph by at
least six edges, etc., so that
 = min
{
3
1
,
6
2
,
9
3
,
9
4
,
11
5
,
16
6
,
12
7
,
10
8
}
.
That is,  = 10
8
= 5
4
, so the product graph of Figure 4.1 has expansion coefficient
 = 5
4
.
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a b
c d
(a) Comm. graph
a b
c d
(b) Key graph
a b
c d
(c) Intersect. graph
aa ab
ac ad
ba bb
bc bd
ca cb
cc cd
da db
dc dd
(d) Product graph
aa ab
ac
ad
ba
bb
bc
bdcacb
cc
cd
da
db
dc
dd
(e) Product graph re-drawn
Figure 4.2: A product graph corresponding to a communication and key graph
pair with empty intersection.
Now consider Figure 4.2, where we have retained the same key graph but taken
the complement of the communication graph. Thus, the communication graph
has the same number of edges as that in Figure 4.1(a) but the intersection
graph, shown in Figure 4.2(c), has no edges. Clearly, if this were to represent
a network, it would mean that no secure communication would be possible.
However, the product graph does have edges, and indeed appears well con-
nected. By observation, we find that it too has expansion coefficient  = 5
4
.
Indeed, after some inspection, we find that the product graphs of Figures 4.1
and 4.2 are isomorphic, using a simple bijection to relabel vertices as follows:
Figure 4.1(e) Figure 4.2(e)
(a∗) → (c∗)
(b∗) → (d∗)
(c∗) → (b∗)
(d∗) → (a∗)
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This means that all graph-theoretic properties of connectivity, expansion, de-
gree, diameter etc. are identical between the two product graphs. From this
we see that a product graph with good expansion can occur when the key
and communication graphs intersect ‘fully’, i.e. when EG ∩ EH = EG = EH ,
and when there are no edges in the intersection, i.e. EG ∩ EH = ∅. This
shows that the expansion of the product graph certainly does not correspond
to any degree of ‘optimality’ regarding the intersection graph and therefore
the resulting network. In particular, it strongly suggests that expansion in the
product graph is not a good tool for analysing the connectivity of networks
without reference to the intersection graph. Ghosh’s claim that an ‘optimal’
combination of key and communication graph will result in a product graph
with good expansion tells us very little, since good expansion in the product
graph is almost inevitable, as we will now explain.
Lemma 4.2. A (Cartesian) product graph G.H = (VG×VH , EG.H) is connected
if and only if both G = (VG, EG) and H = (VH , EH) are connected.
Proof. Suppose that the product graph is connected. We want to show that for
any pair of vertices xi, xj ∈ VG there exists a path from xi to xj, and similarly
that there exists a path between every pair of vertices yi, yj ∈ VH .
Pick a pair of vertices xp1, xpn ∈ VG, fix an arbitrary vertex y1 ∈ VH and
consider xp1y1, xpny1 ∈ VG × VH . Since G.H is connected, there exists a path
from xp1y1 to xpny1, say,
(xp1y1, xp2y1), (xp2y1, xp3y1), . . . , (xp(n−1)y1, xpny1) .
By the definition of the product graph, this means that either xpi = xp(i+1) or
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(xpi, xp(i+1)) ∈ EG for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus we have found a path from xp1 to
xpn in G, and so G is connected. Similarly, H is connected.
Now suppose that G and H are each connected. We can construct a (not
necessarily shortest) path between arbitrary vertices xp1yq1, xpnyqm ∈ VG× VH
in the following way. There is a path in G from xp1 to xpn, say
(xp1, xp2), (xp2, xp3), . . . , (xp(n−1), xpn) .
Then by definition, the following is a path in G.H:
(xp1yq1, xp2yq1), (xp2yq1, xp3yq1), . . . , (xp(n−1)yq1, xpnyq1) . (4.3.1)
Similarly, using a path (yq1, yq2), (yq2, yq3), . . . , (yq(m−1), yqm) in H, we have a
path in G.H:
(xpnyq1, xpnyq2), (xpnyq2, xpnyq3), . . . , (xpnyq(m−1), xpnyqm) . (4.3.2)
Since the path (4.3.2) begins at the vertex where path (4.3.1) ends, we can
concatenate them to give a path from xp1yq1 to xpnyqm in G.H.
Corollary 4.3. If G and H are connected, the product graph G.H has expan-
sion coefficient G.H > 0.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 4.1 that a connected graph is an expander graph
for some value of . Therefore, if G and H are connected, the product graph
will be an expander graph for some value of G.H > 0.
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We conjecture that with high probability, G.H > G, H and G.H  0. We jus-
tify this by considering the comparatively large degrees of nodes in the product
graph, and the product graph’s similarity to an expander graph construction.
For any node xy ∈ VG × VH with degrees dG(x), dH(y) in the communication
and key graphs respectively, we can compute its degree in the product graph
as
dG.H(xy) = dG(x)dH(y) + dG(x) + dH(y) . (4.3.3)
Using Lemma 4.1, we have that
G.H ≤ min
xy∈VG×VH
(dG(x)dH(y) + dG(x) + dH(y)) ,
a much higher bound than for the constituent graphs. Since, on average, ver-
tices of the product graph have higher degree than vertices in the constituent
graphs, and since the construction of the product graph makes ‘isolated’ sets
of vertices extremely unlikely, we see that G.H is likely to be large, and in
particular greater than either of G and H . By comparison, the expansion
coefficient of the intersection graph G∩H is forced to be no more than those of
the constituent graphs, G and H , as explained in the next section.
Additionally, the construction of the product graph is not dissimilar to that of
the zig-zag product graph presented in [58] as an expander graph construction,
and used by Shafiei et al in [60] to produce key graphs with good expansion.
We see then that expansion in the product graph is inevitable if the constituent
graphs are connected, is likely to be ‘good’, and does not imply anything about
the quality of the connectivity or expansion in the intersection graph, where
it is needed. Ghosh does not justify his choice of using the product graph as a
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means of studying two graphs simultaneously, and we conclude that there are
no benefits to doing so. In order to capture the relevant interaction between
the key and communication graphs, the intersection graph is the relevant tool,
and it is in the intersection graph where good expansion is desired.
4.4 Expansion in intersection graphs
We claim that when comparing two networks of the same size with identical
key storage, connectivity and resilience parameters, the network represented
by the intersection graph with higher expansion will be the more robust, with
a more evenly distributed flow of data. We justify this using the following
example.
Example 4.1. Consider Figure 4.3 and suppose that these are two intersection
graphs, representing different networks. Each graph is 3-regular on 10 nodes.
We suppose that an Eschenauer Gligor KPS [32] (Scheme 2.1 in Section 2.4.1)
has been used to construct the key graph, where each node stores three keys
chosen randomly from a pool of 25 keys. Recall from Chapter 3 that Ω = 1,
that is, where nodes have more than one key in common, they select just one
of them as their link key.
Using Lemma 3.1, we find that Pr1 = 1− (
22
3 )
(253 )
≈ 0.33, and from Lemma 3.2 we
have fail1 =
3
25
and fails = 1 −
(
1− 3
25
)s
for both graphs. We observe that in
Figure 4.3(a) the expansion is  = 1
5
. This minimum value is achieved by (for
example) picking the set of 5 vertices S = {a, b, c, d, e}, which is only connected
to the rest of the graph by the single edge (e, f). However, in Figure 4.3(b) we
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a
c
b
d
e f
g
i
h
j
(a)  =
1
5
(b)  =
7
5
Figure 4.3: Examples of 3-regular graphs on 10 nodes with different expansion
parameters.
find that  = 7
5
; any set of 5 vertices is connected by at least 7 edges to the rest
of the graph.
For resource-constrained applications, the network represented by Figure 4.3(a)
is less desirable, because:
• it is more vulnerable to a listening adversary, who could decrypt a high
proportion of communications through the network by the compromise of
a single node e or f ;
• nodes e and f are more vulnerable to battery failure;
• a battery failure or other problem on just one of the two nodes e and f
would disconnect the network;
• communication bottlenecks are likely to occur around nodes e and f , mak-
ing communication through the network less efficient.
Conversely, in Figure 4.3(b) the communication burdens are distributed evenly
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across the nodes so that battery power will be used more evenly and there are
no weak spots for an adversary to target in order to quickly damage the rest
of the network. The graph can only be split into disjoint sets by the removal
of 4 or more nodes, that is, almost half of the network. It is clear then that
Figure 4.3(b) represents the less vulnerable network.
From this example we see that some strengths and weaknesses of the ‘layout’
of the network are hidden if we only consider the size, key storage, connectivity
and resilience, and in Section 4.6 we discuss the practicality of using expansion
as another metric for assessing networks. Before that, we consider how best
to probabilistically maximise the expansion in an intersection graph.
Lemma 4.4. The expansion of an intersection graph G ∩H = (V,EG ∩ EH)
is bounded above:
G∩H ≤ min{G, H} .
Proof. We begin by considering the degree of a vertex in the intersection graph,
which is
dG∩H(x) ≤ min (dG(x), dH(x))
because for each vertex y ∈ V adjacent to x, the edge (x, y) ∈ EG will be
removed in the intersection unless (x, y) ∈ EH also. Using Lemma 4.1, we
have that G∩H ≤ minx∈V {dG∩H(x)}.
Without loss of generality, suppose that G ≤ H . Consider a set S of vertices
in G which achieves the minimum |E(S,S)||S| = G. If every edge of E(S, S)
remains in the intersection then G∩H ≤ G, otherwise G∩H < G, since no
edges are added elsewhere in the intersection.
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We see that it is necessary that G and H have high expansion coefficients for
G∩H to be a good expander. If the communication graph is complete then the
expansion of the key graph will be preserved in the intersection. If information
about the locations of the nodes is known a priori or if there is some control
over the communication graph, then keys can be assigned to nodes in a more
efficient manner; see [52] for a survey of KPSs for such scenarios.
However, we usually assume that there is little or no control over the communi-
cation graph and model it using a random graph such as the random geometric
model, as in [18]. If the communication graph is random, all that can be done
to aid good expansion in the intersection graph is to design the KPS so that
the key graph has as high expansion as possible for a particular network size
and for given levels of key storage, connectivity and resilience.
4.5 Analysing the expansion of existing KPSs
Many KPSs produce key graphs with large expansion coefficients for chosen
levels of key storage and resilience, as we will now demonstrate. In particular,
we will discuss and compare the expansion of KPSs based on expander graph
constructions (Section 4.5.1), random KPSs (Section 4.5.2) and KPSs based
on combinatorial designs (Section 4.5.3).
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4.5.1 KPSs based on expander graph constructions
C¸amtepe et al. [18] and Shafiei et al. [60] propose KPSs based on expander
graph constructions and demonstrate that these schemes compare favourably
to other well-regarded KPS approaches. C¸amtepe et al. [18] use a construction
for a Ramanujan graph, which, as we saw in Section 4.2, is an asymptotically
optimal spectral expander graph. The construction they use is for network
size v = p+ 1 and key storage k = q + 1, where p and q are primes congruent
to 1 mod 4 (see [39]). Shafiei et al. [60] use the zig-zag construction for an
expander graph, which has the benefit of being more flexible to produce key
graphs for any sizes of v and k. Both papers use the following method:
1. construct an expander graph G for the appropriate network size and
degree (and, in the case of [18], remove any self-loops or multiple edges.
The authors suggest that these be replaced with randomly-selected edges
such that all nodes have the same degree, though they omit this step from
their example.);
2. assign a unique pairwise key to every edge of G;
3. preload each node with the set of keys which correspond to its set of
edges.
The key graph then has good expansion. However, we claim that it is possible
to achieve higher expansion in a KPS for the same network size and key storage,
as we will now demonstrate.
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4.5.2 Random KPSs
Random graphs are good expanders with high probability [39]. As noted in
Remark 3.1, the random KPS of Eschenauer and Gligor [32] gives a key graph
which is more highly connected than the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph G(v,Pr1) [31].
It therefore seems likely that this and other random KPSs (discussed in Sec-
tion 2.4.1 and Chapter 3) produce key graphs with good expansion.
With the exception of the random pairwise scheme (Scheme 2.3) the key graphs
of these random KPSs are also likely to be better expanders than those based on
expander graph constructions, since for comparable key storage, random KPSs
have larger average node degree. That is, in the KPSs based on expander graph
constructions, the node degree is the same as the key storage because unique
pairwise keys are used. In random KPSs we usually expect that d(Ni) > k for
all vertices Ni, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.2. In the Eschenauer Gligor random KPS [32], the degree d(Ni)
of each node Ni ∈ V in the key graph is almost certainly larger than the key
storage k. For example, if nodes store 50 keys randomly selected from a pool
of 1000 keys, then the expected degree of any node is
(v − 1)×
(
1−
(
950
50
)(
1000
50
)) .
If the network has 1000 nodes, this means that the expected degree is ≈ 71.905.
This implies that for practical values of k, n and v, the connectivity Pr1 is
greater in the Eschenauer Gligor scheme than in KPSs produced by expander
graph constructions. Random graphs are known to be good expanders with
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high probability and so, perhaps contrary to intuition, a key graph based on an
expander graph construction is likely to be a worse expander than a key graph
generated by the Eschenauer Gligor scheme.
It is clear that a benefit of the KPSs based on expander graph constructions is
that each key is only used for one edge, meaning that the graphs have perfect
resilience: fails = 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ v − 2. Therefore, in comparison to other
KPSs with perfect resilience, the KPSs based on expander graphs have an
additional benefit of guaranteeing a known expansion parameter. However,
where perfect resilience is not required, for fixed values of k, n and v, random
KPSs exist with slightly lower resilience but much higher connectivity than
the schemes based on expander graphs from [18] and [60], and in many cases
they also have comparable, if not better, expansion.
Similarly, most schemes based on combinatorial designs also reuse keys so
that d(Ni) > k, and therefore produce key graphs with higher average degree
than those based on expander graph constructions. We will now demonstrate
that the key graphs of many combinatorial designs are also likely to be good
expanders.
4.5.3 Combinatorial designs
Many combinatorial designs have been suggested for use as KPSs [56]. We
will now analyse a subset of these constructions and show that they provide
good expansion in the key graph, which is a previously unstated benefit of the
combinatorial design approach to KPSs.
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4.5.3.1 Finding the expansion of a design
Given any particular design, we can find the adjacency matrix of the corre-
sponding key graph, and hence its spectral gap, which provides bounds on the
expansion coefficient. We may even be able to find  by inspection if v is small.
However, we would like to analyse the expansion of designs in general.
Most of the designs proposed for use in KPSs have the property of being
configurations (Definition 2.4). More information on configurations can be
found in [24, 47]. We note here that the key graph of a configuration is regular:
Lemma 4.5. (from [47, Lemma 1.1]) The key graph of a (n, v, r, k)-config-
uration is regular of degree k(r− 1). This is the maximum possible degree of a
graph of a (n, v, r, k)-design.
We restrict our study of the expansion of designs to configurations, where the
regularity of the key graph will simplify some of the analysis.
The following theorem gives an estimation of the expansion of a regular, uni-
form configuration.
Theorem 4.6. For an (n, v, r, k)-configuration, the edge-expansion coefficient
can be estimated by
 ≈ k(r − 1)
2
.
Proof. In the key graph of an (n, v, r, k)-configuration, the degree of a node is
k(r − 1) (Lemma 4.5). Thus, for a set of nodes S ⊂ V ,
E(S, S) = |S|k(r − 1)− 2E(S, S),
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where E(S, S) counts the number of edges whose endpoints are both in S. The
factor of two is needed because the ‘|S|k(r−1)’ term has counted each of these
edges twice.
We now need to find an expression for E(S, S). Let Na and Nb be nodes in S,
and let Ka and Kb be their respective key sets, each of size k. For simplicity of
notation, label the keys in Ka as K1, . . . , Kk and define random variables Xi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k so that
Xi =
{
1 if key Ki ∈ Kb
0 otherwise .
Then X :=
∑k
i=1Xi counts the number of edges between Na and Nb.
The expected value of Xi, which we will write as Ex[Xi] to avoid confusion
with the edge notation, is given by
Ex[Xi] =
r − 1
v − 1 ,
since there are r − 1 other nodes which know key Ki, out of a total of v − 1
other nodes in the network. By linearity of expectation,
Ex[X] = kEx[Xi] =
k(r − 1)
v − 1 .
Thus the expected number of edges amongst |S| nodes is(|S|
2
)
k(r − 1)
v − 1 ,
hence
Ex[E(S, S)] = |S|k(r − 1)− 2
(|S|
2
)
k(r − 1)
v − 1
= |S|k(r − 1)
[
1− |S| − 1
v − 1
]
.
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Finally, since  = min1≤|S|≤ v
2
|E(S,S)|
|S| , this gives
 ≈ min
1≤|S|≤ v
2
{
k(r − 1)
[
1− |S| − 1
v − 1
]}
= k(r − 1)
[
1− b
v
2
c − 1
v − 1
]
≈ k(r − 1)
2
for large v.
Theorem 4.6 tells us that the expected value of the expansion of a configuration-
based KPS is ‘good’, since in particular k(r−1)
2
> 1 for practical values of
k and r. However, Theorem 4.6 does not guarantee good expansion. As
a counter example, notice that the design (X ,B) where X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6},
B = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}, {4, 5}, {5, 6}, {4, 6}} is a (6, 6, 2, 2)-configuration but
it certainly does not have expansion parameter  = 1 as estimated by Theo-
rem 4.6; on the contrary, it is disconnected and has expansion  = 0.
To successfully construct a KPS from a configuration, we clearly require the
graph of the configuration to be connected. In addition to being k-uniform and
r-regular, configurations which are proposed as constructions for KPSs gener-
ally have further properties which guarantee connectedness. We demonstrate
examples of these properties in Sections 4.5.3.2 and 4.5.3.3, where we give a
brief overview of two classes of configurations which have been proposed as
constructions for KPSs, namely µ-common intersection designs and strongly
regular graphs, and we present lower bounds for their expansion parameters.
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4.5.3.2 µ-common intersection designs
Recall from Definition 2.5 that a KPS constructed from a µ-common inter-
section design has the property that any two nodes which are non-adjacent
have at least µ common neighbours. In [47], the motivation given for using
µ-common intersection designs as KPSs is that if two nodes Ni and Nj wish to
communicate but do not share a common key, then they can communicate via
‘two hops’ if they share at least one common neighbour. In Section 2.4.4 we
considered the various ways in which common neighbours can be beneficial.
We now show that expansion provides another reason to support the choice of
µ-common intersection designs for constructing KPSs.
We have already seen in Section 4.2 that a property of expander graphs is
low diameter, which is beneficial for all of the protocols given in Section 2.4.4.
Having good expansion and having low diameter are related concepts, and we
use this to show that in general, a µ-common intersection design has a large
expansion coefficient:
Lemma 4.7. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with diameter 2. Then for any subset
S, where ∅ 6= S ⊂ V ,
|E(S, S)| ≥ min{|S||S|}.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that |S| ≤ |S|. Now, suppose for a
contradiction that |E(S, S)| < min{|S||S|}, that is, suppose |E(S, S)| < |S|.
Then there exists a node Ni ∈ S which is not adjacent to any node in S.
Denote the set of nodes adjacent to Ni by VNi . We have that VNi ⊆ S, and
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so E(VNi , S) ⊆ E(S, S). Thus |E(VNi , S)| ≤ |E(S, S)| < |S| ≤ |S|, and so
there exists a node Nj ∈ S which is not adjacent to any node in VNi . This
contradicts the property that the graph has diameter 2, since Ni and Nj do
not have a common neighbour.
Corollary 4.8. The graph G = (V,E) of a µ-common intersection design is
an -expander graph, where  ≥ 1.
Proof. Since the graph of a µ-common intersection design has diameter 2, this
is a simple consequence of Lemma 4.7. By definition, the expansion coefficient
is given by
 = min
S⊂V :|S|≤ v
2
{ |E(S, S)|
|S|
}
≥ min
S⊂V :|S|≤ v
2
{ |S|
|S|
}
≥ 1.
Therefore we have shown that µ-common intersection designs are a natural
choice for KPSs, not only because of the ‘two-hop paths’ property mentioned
in [47], but also because they are good expanders, which implies the other
beneficial properties given in Section 4.2.
4.5.3.3 Strongly regular graphs
This bound also holds for strongly regular graphs (Definition 2.6), which may
be regarded as a special type of µ-common intersection design. We also have
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another lower bound:
Lemma 4.9. For a connected (v, k(r − 1), λ, µ) strongly regular graph,
 ≥ k(r − 1)
2
− λ− µ+
√
(λ− µ)2 + 4(k(r − 1)− µ)
4
.
Proof. In [12] it is shown that the non-trivial eigenvalues of a strongly regular
graph are the solutions of the equation
x2 − (λ− µ)x+ (k(r − 1)− µ) = 0 .
Thus the larger root is given by
λ˜ =
λ− µ+√(λ− µ)2 + 4(k(r − 1)− µ)
2
and, using Equation (4.2.1), we have our result.
In Chapter 5 we will see an example of a strongly regular graph as a KPS,
and we will use Lemma 4.9 to show that its expansion is in fact significantly
greater than 1.
4.6 Using expansion as a metric
We have seen that for two networks with the same size, key storage, connec-
tivity and resilience, the network represented by the intersection graph with
the higher expansion coefficient is the more robust, with the more evenly dis-
tributed flow of data. Therefore we suggest that expansion is an important
metric to be considered alongside the usual metrics of key storage, connectiv-
ity and resilience, when designing KPSs and assessing their suitability for use
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in resource-constrained networks. However, we now state some drawbacks to
the use of expansion as a metric, and explain the extent to which they can be
overcome.
Difficulty of determining the expansion coefficient. Determining the
expansion coefficient of a given graph is known to be co-NP-complete [7], and
so testing KPSs for their expansion coefficient is not an easy task. Additionally,
even if the expansion coefficient of the key graph is known, the expansion of
the intersection graph will not be known a priori if the communication graph
is modelled as a random graph.
Nevertheless, the spectral gap can be used to find upper and lower bounds on
the expansion of the key graph (Lemma 4.2.1). If the intersection graph is
known, that is, if it is possible to determine the locations of the nodes after
deployment by using an online base station or GPS, its expansion coefficient
could also be approximated using the spectral gap. This is likely to be rele-
vant if post-deployment key management protocols are available such as key
refreshing [4] or key redistribution (Chapter 6), for which it could be useful to
know as much as possible about the vulnerability of the network. Some key
management protocols are able to provide targeted improvements to specific
weak areas of the network, and we explain below how best to identify such
weaknesses.
Limitations of the expansion coefficient. We note that the expansion
coefficient alone does not claim to fully describe the structure of the graph,
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giving only a ‘worst case’ assessment. That is, the value of  only reflects the
weakest point of the graph and tells us nothing about the structure of the
graph elsewhere.
For example, consider an intersection graph on v nodes which is effectively
partitioned into two sets: a set of v − 1 nodes with good expansion, and a
final node which is disconnected from the rest of the graph, as demonstrated
in Figure 4.4(b). We would find that  = 0, and we would suspect that the
graph is less than desirable for network applications.
(a)  = 0 (b)  = 0
(c)  = 0
Figure 4.4: Distinguishing between cases where  = 0
However, particularly in a network of thousands of nodes, the disconnection
of one node is unlikely to be severely detrimental to the network; indeed, loss
of some nodes due to poor positioning or battery failure may be expected.
Knowing only that  = 0 does not distinguish between the following cases:
1. the graph is completely disconnected (Figure 4.4(a));
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2. a single node is disconnected from the rest of the graph, which otherwise
has good expansion (Figure 4.4(b));
3. the disconnected graph is a union of smaller graphs, some with good
expansion (Figure 4.4(c)).
If an intersection graph falls into Case 1 then it is likely that the key graph
has low connectivity, i.e. a low value of Pr1. However, for the same values of
network size, key storage, connectivity and resilience, knowing only that  = 0
in the intersection graph cannot distinguish between the Cases 2 and 3, though
Case 2 is likely to be much better for network applications.
Therefore, we suggest some graph-theoretic tools which also serve as indicators
of whether the structure of a graph is suitable for a network. These may be
used alone or in conjunction with (an estimate of) the expansion coefficient in
order to analyse a proposed KPS, and where possible to analyse the resulting
intersection graph.
4.6.1 Components
We note that to distinguish between the cases in Figure 4.4 it is relevant to
know the number of components. A component of a graph is a connected
vertex-induced subgraph containing the maximal number of edges [21], that
is, a subset S of one or more vertices of the graph, where the vertices of S
are connected but E(S, S) = ∅. Hence Figure 4.4(a) has nine components,
Figure 4.4(b) has two, and Figure 4.4(c) has three. For applications where
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data must be routed throughout the network, it is desirable to minimise the
number of components.
Unlike finding the expansion coefficient of a graph, calculating the number of
components can be done in linear time using depth-first search, as described
in [40]. The global connectivity of a graph is the number of nodes in its largest
component divided by the total number of nodes. We wish the global connec-
tivity to be as close to one as possible.
4.6.2 Cut-edges
A cut-edge (also known as a bridge) is an edge whose deletion increases the
number of components. Equivalently, an edge is a cut-edge if it is not contained
in any cycle of the graph. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3, where the edge (e, f)
is a cut-edge.
As we have seen, cut-edges in the intersection graph of a network are undesir-
able because they can cause bottlenecks, increase communication burdens on
the nodes at their endpoints, and create weak points in the network where a
small fault or compromise by an adversary creates significant damage. There-
fore, one of the reasons why intersection graphs with high expansion are de-
sirable for networks is because they are less likely to have cut-edges:
• If  > 1b v2c then we know that there is no cut-edge which, if removed,
would separate the graph into two components, each of size v
2
(or bv
2
c
and bv
2
c+ 1 if v is odd).
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• If  = 1
2
then it is possible that there are cut-edges which, if removed,
would disconnect at most two nodes from the network.
• If  > 1 then for all S ⊂ V with |S| ≤ v
2
,
|E(S, S)| > |S| ≥ 1 ,
and so there can be no cut-edges in the graph.
Determining whether a graph contains cut-edges can also be achieved by a
linear time algorithm [66].
4.6.3 Cutpoints
There is also a related notion of cutpoints in graphs; here we reproduce the
definition from [21].
Definition 4.8. Consider a simple connected graph G = (V,E), and a vertex-
induced subgraph GS = (S,ES) on a subset of the vertices ∅ 6= S ⊂ V . Let
ES = E\ES, and let VS be the set of vertices which are incident to edges in ES.
Whenever there exists such a subgraph GS so that |S∩VS| = 1, then the single
node v at which they intersect is called a cutpoint of G. In an unconnected
graph, a node is called a cutpoint if it is a cutpoint of one of its components.
Since G has no self-loops, a cutpoint is a node whose removal increases the
number of components by at least one.
We see then that in Figure 4.3(a), nodes e and f are cutpoints, and that graphs
with good expansion will have few cutpoints. If a graph contains no cutpoints
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it is said to be nonseparable or biconnected, which again is clearly desirable for
an intersection graph representing a network.
The website [76] gives examples of Java algorithms which find the nonsep-
arable components of given graphs and can even add edges to make graphs
nonseparable. Tools such as this can provide simple, effective ways to analyse
an intersection graph of a deployed network and indeed, wherever the post-
deployment key management protocols allow, to make improvements to the
structure of the intersection graph.
4.7 Conclusion
We have shown that if we fix levels of key storage, network size, connectivity
and resilience, then the larger the value of the expansion coefficient  in the
intersection graph, the better suited it will be for resource-constrained net-
works. This is because graphs with good expansion are well connected with
low diameter and do not have the vulnerabilities of cut-edges and cutpoints.
We have shown that the expansion coefficient of the product graph is not a
relevant metric; rather, it is the intersection graph where a high expansion
coefficient is desirable.
In a setting where there is control over the communication graph, the expansion
of the intersection graph should be an important consideration in the design of
the key graph. If there is no control over the communication graph, then after
choosing levels of network size, key storage, connectivity and resilience, the
best choice of KPS is the one with the highest expansion, since it will maximise
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the probability of achieving good expansion in the intersection graph.
The key graphs of the KPSs proposed in [18] and [60] have good expansion, and
the use of unique pairwise keys gives perfect resilience. However, many existing
KPSs, including random KPSs and those based on µ-common intersection
designs and strongly regular graphs, are able to achieve better expansion for
the same key storage and network size, at the cost of lower resilience.
Finally, we have suggested that expansion is an important metric for comparing
KPSs proposed for resource-constrained networks, and a useful parameter for
analysing intersection graphs after deployment in order to improve weak parts
of the network. Determining the expansion of a graph is co-NP-complete and
gives only a worst-case assessment of the graph. Therefore we have proposed
the use of linear time algorithms to estimate the expansion, and introduced
related graph-theoretic properties which could be used to analyse the key and
intersection graphs of networks.
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we discuss the role of hypergraphs in the representation and
construction of KPSs. We show that there are benefits to using hypergraphs
rather than graphs to represent KPSs, extend ideas from Chapter 4 to con-
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struct further KPSs with good expansion, and draw connections with the lit-
erature on KPSs based on combinatorial designs.
We begin in Section 5.2 by defining hypergraphs and arguing for their use
in representing KPSs, as they are able to demonstrate key storage and re-
silience as well as connectivity. We present motivating examples, and discuss
the connection between hypergraphs and designs. In Section 5.3 we define ex-
pansion in hypergraphs, explain why hypergraphs with good expansion have
advantages over graphs with good expansion for the construction of KPSs, and
outline various constructions. In particular, we give an example of a Cayley
hypergraph and demonstrate its effectiveness as a basis for a KPS.
5.2 Hypergraph representations of KPSs
We now define hypergraphs, which can be considered as a generalisation of
graphs, where each edge may be incident to more than two vertices.
Definition 5.1. A hypergraph H = (V,E) is a set of vertices V = {N1, . . . , Nv}
and a set of hyperedges E. A hyperedge is a subset of V of cardinality ≥ 2,
written as
(Ni1, . . . , Nir) ∈ E
where r ≥ 2. If every edge contains r vertices, we say that the hypergraph is
r-uniform. Thus, a simple graph can be thought of as a 2-uniform hypergraph.
In Section 2.3.2 we introduced the use of graphs to represent KPSs, which is
common in the literature. As far as we are aware, hypergraphs have not pre-
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viously been used to represent KPSs. We suggest that representing a KPS by
a hypergraph has advantages over a graph representation, namely by demon-
strating the key storage and resilience of the KPS in addition to the connec-
tivity, as we now explain.
5.2.1 Representing a KPS with a hypergraph
We consider again the example key graph from Section 2.3.2.1 which we repli-
cate here in Figure 5.1(a), without the key labels. We can represent the same
KPS with a hypergraph by letting each key correspond to a hyperedge, so the
hyperedge is incident to all the nodes which know the corresponding key.
There are various equivalent ways to draw hyperedges: Figure 5.1(b) demon-
strates perhaps the more intuitive method, where a hyperedge ‘contains’ its
vertices; Figure 5.1(c) uses the convention of drawing a hyperedge as ‘spokes’
from a midpoint between the set of incident vertices. The latter will be used
throughout the remainder of this chapter as it is less likely to lead to ambiguity.
Both graph and hypergraph representations demonstrate the connectivity of
the KPS. The benefit of using a hypergraph representation rather than a graph
representation is two-fold. Without the need to use key labels, we can deduce
the key storage and the resilience of the KPS from the hypergraph using the
following observations:
1. the degree of a node is equal to the number of keys stored by that node,
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(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 5.1: Graph and hypergraph representations of a simple KPS
that is, d = k
2. the number of vertices incident to each hyperedge, r, demonstrates the
number of nodes which store each key, allowing us to calculate the re-
silience.
Without key labels, it is impossible to determine the exact key storage and
resilience from the graph representation.
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5.2.2 Trivial KPS examples
To take an extreme example, consider Figure 5.2, which shows (with labels)
the key graphs of two of the trivial KPS examples from Section 2.2.3 on four
nodes. That is, Figure 5.2(a) is the KPS where every node stores a single key,
K, and Figure 5.2(b) is the KPS where each pair of nodes is assigned a unique
key. Notice that both key graphs are complete, despite the difference in their
resilience. Without the edge labels (which would be infeasible to draw on a
large graph) the graphs would be isomorphic, and thus the important metrics
of key storage and resilience would not be represented.
K
K
K
K
K
K
(a) Each node is assigned a
single key, K
K1
K2
K3
K4
K5
K6
(b) Every pair of nodes is as-
signed a unique key
Figure 5.2: Trivial key predistribution schemes represented by graphs
By comparison, without the need for key labels, the corresponding hypergraph
representations given in Figure 5.3 clearly show the key storage and the number
of nodes which store each key: we observe from the nodes’ degrees that k = 1
in Figure 5.3(a) and k = 3 in Figure 5.3(b), and from the magnitude of the
hyperedge(s) that r = 4 in Figure 5.3(a) and r = 2 in Figure 5.3(b)), which
immediately tells us that the resilience is worst possible in Figure 5.3(a) and
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(a) Each node is assigned a
single key, K
(b) Every pair of nodes is
assigned a unique key
Figure 5.3: Trivial key predistribution schemes represented by hypergraphs
best possible in Figure 5.3(b).
5.2.3 Design-based KPS example
We now consider another, less extreme example. Recall our 2− (9, 3, 1) design
from Example 2.4 in Section 2.3.3: X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} and B = {{123},
{456}, {789}, {147}, {258}, {369}, {159}, {267}, {348}, {168}, {249}, {357}},
which can be considered as a KPS where points represent keys and each block
corresponds to a node’s key set. The graph representation of this KPS is repro-
duced in Figure 5.4(a) and, for comparison, Figure 5.4(b) gives a hypergraph
representation of the same KPS. We show in Section 5.2.4 that it is straight-
forward to construct a hypergraph representation of a design, and indeed that
it is an intuitive representation.
Figure 5.4(a) clearly demonstrates the connectivity: we can see that each node
is connected to nine other nodes, hence Pr1 =
9
11
= 0.8181 . . . . The labels tell
us the set of keys known to each node, and from this we deduce that k = 3.
After a little careful study, we can also observe that r = 4. However, without
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{123}
{456}
{789}
{147}
{258}
{369}
{159}
{267}
{348}
{168}
{249}
{357}
(a) Graph representation of KPS from Example 2.4
N1
N2
N3
N4
N5
N6
N7
N8
N9
N10
N11
N12
1
2
3 4
5
6
7
8
9
(b) Hypergraph representation of KPS from Exam-
ple 2.4
Figure 5.4: Graph and hypergraph representations of a 2− (9, 3, 1) design
the key labels it would not be possible to determine k and r with certainty.
By contrast, Figure 5.4(b) demonstrates clearly that k = 3 (node degree) and
r = 4 (hyperedges uniformly incident to four vertices). A simple calculation of
k(r − 1) = 3× 3 = 9 tells us that each node is connected to nine other nodes,
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and hence the connectivity of the KPS is Pr1 =
9
11
. Key labels are included
in Figure 5.4(b) for clarity later, but notice that they are not needed for these
calculations.
In summary, without key labels, a graph only provides an exact representation
of the connectivity of a KPS, whereas a hypergraph unambiguously represents
the connectivity, key storage and resilience. Even with key labels, it is easier to
observe the re-use of keys (the value of r) from the hypergraph representation.
5.2.4 Hypergraphs and designs
We now demonstrate a method for constructing a hypergraph representation
of a design, and explain how these two combinatorial objects are closely linked
by their incidence matrices.
Definition 5.2. The incidence matrix M of a design is a matrix where the
columns represent blocks, rows represent points, and whose entries are given
by:
mij =
{
1 if point i is in block j
0 otherwise
.
Hence, the incidence matrix of the 2 − (9, 3, 1) design from Example 2.4 in
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Section 2.3.3 is
M =

1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0

.
It is then straightforward to see that key K1 is given to nodes N1, N4, N7, N10,
key K2 is given to nodes N1, N5, N8, N11, and so on, and hence to construct a
hypergraph representation, as shown in Figure 5.4(b).
Finally, we make a remark about the relationship between hypergraphs and
designs, to which we will refer in Section 5.3.3.
Remark 5.1. Since a (hyper)graph G = (V,E) is defined by its vertex set V
and (hyper)edge set E, a (hyper)graph is a set system. The two concepts are
equivalent. In particular, a graph is a set system which is uniform of rank 2. An
r-uniform hypergraph is a set system which is uniform of rank r. Further, as
we now demonstrate, the hypergraph representation of a combinatorial design
can be a regular, uniform design itself. The hypergraph H = (V,E) from
Figure 5.4(b) is given by V = {1, 2, . . . , 12}, and
E = {{1, 4, 7, 10}, {1, 5, 8, 11}, {1, 6, 9, 12}, {2, 4, 9, 11}, {2, 5, 7, 12},
{2, 6, 8, 10}, {3, 4, 8, 12}, {3, 5, 9, 10}, {3, 6, 7, 11}}.
Regarding H = (V,E) as a combinatorial design, that is, regarding the hyper-
edges as blocks, we see that this design is regular of degree 3, uniform of rank 4,
and has incidence matrix M t, the transpose of the incidence matrix M above.
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5.3 Expansion in hypergraphs
In Chapter 4 we noted that good expansion is a desirable property for key
predistribution schemes. That is, it is desirable to have good expansion in the
intersection graph, and therefore in the key graph. However, attempts to create
a key predistribution scheme from known expander graph constructions (as in
[18, 60]) have provided an extreme in the trade-off between connectivity and
resilience: they provide perfect resilience at the expense of low connectivity
(in comparison to KPSs without perfect resilience, given fixed key storage
k). Here, we show how to adapt existing hypergraph constructions which are
known to provide good expansion, to create KPSs with good expansion and
without perfect resilience.
5.3.1 Expansion in KPSs without perfect resilience
The constructions in [18, 60] take an expander graph construction, remove any
self-loops and multi-edges, and then assign a unique key to each edge. Thus,
each key is used to secure exactly one link, and so perfect resilience is achieved.
However, this also means that if a node stores k keys then it only has degree
k in the key graph. Other KPS constructions tend to re-use keys, such that
a node which stores k keys will often have degree significantly greater than k,
and hence the network has higher connectivity.
Therefore, if perfect resilience is the main priority, then these expander graph
constructions are appropriate. However, if perfect resilience is not required,
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then considerably higher connectivity can be achieved. We now address how
to retain the focus of obtaining good expansion in a KPS without perfect
resilience.
A na¨ıve approach would be to take an existing expander graph construction
for KPSs, such as those in [18, 60], and simply assign the same key to multiple
edges. However, it is not entirely clear how best to do this. One way would
be to create the expander graph, pick a node at random, and assign a key K1
to two of its edges, repeat for a key K2, etc. However, such an approach could
lead to unnecessarily high key storage for some nodes, whilst others receive
comparatively few keys. In addition, an expander with higher connectivity
than in [18, 60] should be picked in the first place, as otherwise we are reducing
the resilience whilst maintaining the same connectivity. It is not immediately
obvious how many edges the initial expander construction should have in order
to maintain a similar magnitude of key storage and maintain a desirable trade-
off between connectivity and resilience.
Therefore, whilst this method may have merit, we demonstrate a ‘tidier’ so-
lution, which harnesses the properties of hypergraphs to achieve exactly what
we seek: a KPS with good expansion which has a deterministic construction,
enabling detailed analysis, and where each key is known to r > 2 nodes. We
propose that if we could find a ‘nice’ hypergraph with r > 2 and, in some
sense, good connectivity and expansion, then we could still assign a unique
key per edge, without resulting in having perfect resilience.
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5.3.2 Constructions for hypergraphs with good expansion
The literature on hypergraphs with good expansion (sometimes called ‘expand-
ing hypergraphs’) is limited. In [35], the notion of eigenvalues of a graph is
extended to hypergraphs, and thus Friedman et al. are able to analyse the
second eigenvalue of a hypergraph. This allows them to carry over the concept
from graph theory of a spectral expander graph being one with large spectral
gap (Section 4.2). They prove many theorems about the properties of such ex-
panding hypergraphs, and provide a construction, namely Cayley hypergraphs.
Whilst they demonstrate that Cayley hypergraphs have good expansion, they
also note that the expansion of a general Cayley hypergraph is far from the
optimal bounds which are proven in the paper.
There is currently no known method for generating uniform hypergraphs at
random [39]. If there were, they would likely provide a very promising way of
constructing KPSs, since it is proven in [35] that a random uniform hypergraph
has good expansion with high probability.
In [57] two further approaches to constructions of hypergraphs with good ex-
pansion are given: explicit constructions from Gower’s Theorem, and semi-
explicit constructions from Fourier Analysis. However, in order to provide a
simple demonstration of the method of constructing a KPS from a hypergraph,
we will use the Cayley hypergraph construction, which has good (though far
from optimal) expansion, and we will compare its effectiveness as a construc-
tion for a KPS to the construction from [18] based on a Ramanujan expander
graph.
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5.3.3 Cayley hypergraphs
We use the Cayley expanding hypergraph construction from [34] for our anal-
ysis because it is straightforward to define and construct, whilst noting that
Cayley hypergraphs have far from optimal expansion when considering the
second eigenvalue.
Definition 5.3. Let V be a group, and W ⊂ V . The 3-uniform Cayley
hypergraph on V and W is the hypergraph whose vertices are the elements of
V and whose hyperedge set is given by
E = {(x, y, z) : x, y, z distinct, xyz ∈ W}.
Remark 5.2. We note that, to the best of our knowledge, the earliest definition
of a Cayley hypergraph is given in [34], as an extension of the widely-known
definition of a Cayley graph (or 2-hypergraph). It is stated as the definition of
a ‘3-regular’ Cayley hypergraph on V and W . However, the word ‘regular’ is
more usually used to mean that the number of (hyper)edges incident to each
node is constant. This is not necessarily the case in Cayley hypergraphs (as
we will demonstrate below) and indeed there will generally be more than three
hyperedges incident to each node. We therefore use the word ‘uniform’ for
consistency with the recent literature.
In addition, for the hypergraph to be 3-uniform we require that x 6= y 6= z 6= x.
Otherwise, hyperedges of the form (x, x, z) and (x, x, x) would be included,
which are not usually considered to be 3-edges. This is not stated in the defi-
nition in [34].
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Figure 5.5: KPS from Ramanujan expander graph construction, from [18]
5.3.4 Comparing Ramanujan expander graphs and Cayley
hypergraphs as constructions for KPSs
In the example given in [18], a KPS is created for 18 nodes from a Ramanujan
expander graph. We reproduce their key graph in Figure 5.5.
Each node stores 4, 5 or 6 keys, and there are 46 different keys used in total,
each securing exactly one link. Thus we have fails = 0 for all s ≤ 16 and
Pr1 =
46(
18
2
) = 46
153
≈ 0.3.
For a direct comparison, we now construct a KPS for 18 nodes using a 3-
uniform Cayley hypergraph. The Cayley hypergraph H = (V,E) where V =
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{0, 1, . . . , 17} and
E = {(x, y, z) : x, y, z distinct, x+ y + z ≡ 0 mod 18}
also has 46 hyperedges, but each hyperedge connects three nodes. Thus there
are 46× 3 = 138 ‘pairs’ of links, and so
Pr1 =
138(
18
2
) =≈ 0.902 ; (5.3.1)
we have tripled the connectivity. This has not been at the cost of a large
reduction in resilience:
fail1 =
1
3
7
124
+
2
3
8
122
≈ 0.0625 (5.3.2)
because:
• One third of the nodes store 7 keys. On compromising one of these nodes,
the adversary learns 7 keys. There are then 138−(7×2) uncompromised
links remaining, of which 7 use a key known to the adversary.
• Similarly, two thirds of the nodes store 8 keys, and compromising one of
these leaves 138−(8×2) uncompromised links, of which 8 are vulnerable.
We will provide a general formula for fails at the end of this section, after
making a simplifying assumption.
We also note that there is a more equal spread of key storage per node in this
construction than in the Ramanujan construction from [18], that is, the key
storage for node Ni is kNi ∈ {7, 8}, whereas in the Ramanujan construction
kNi ∈ {4, 5, 6}. However, for large networks the Cayley construction does not
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Figure 5.6: Cayley hypergraph on 18 nodes
scale well: the key storage is ≈ v−1
2
. Nevertheless, it serves as a simple example
of the use of a hypergraph to construct a KPS.
We consider the expansion of our Cayley hypergraph. By inspection, we can
find a subset of vertices S with |S| = 9, and |E(S, S)| = 72, giving
 ≤ 8 . (5.3.3)
After making some further observations we will show that, in fact, the addition
of two hyperedges gives  = 8.
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Although our particular choice of Cayley hypergraph is far from optimal, it
serves as a simple comparison to the Ramanujan construction, and the com-
parison is favourable: it seems that KPSs with practical trade-offs between
connectivity and resilience, as well as the benefits of good expansion, can be
constructed from hypergraphs with good expansion.
But of course this is not entirely surprising. Recall from Remark 5.1 in Sec-
tion 5.2.4 that a hypergraph is a set system, and that an r-uniform, k-regular
hypergraph H = (V,E) can be regarded as an r-uniform, k-regular design in
itself, or as the representation of a k-uniform, r-regular design, whose incidence
matrix is the transpose of the incidence matrix of H. Thus, our construction
bears a strong resemblance to a combinatorial design, and the effectiveness of
designs as constructions for KPSs is well established.
To recover the set system to which our Cayley hypergraph on 18 nodes cor-
responds, we generate the 46 × 18 incidence matrix M , where each row cor-
responds to a hyperedge and each column corresponds to a key, as shown in
Figure 5.7.
Now, by reading down each column, we find the key set of each node and
recover the set system (X ,B) where X = {01, 02, . . . , 46} and the blocks of B
are:
{01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08}, {01, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15}, {02, 09, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20},
{03, 10, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25}, {04, 11, 17, 21, 26, 27, 28}, {05, 12, 18, 22, 26, 29, 30, 31},
{06, 13, 19, 23, 27, 29, 32, 33}, {07, 14, 20, 24, 29, 34, 35, 36}, {08, 15, 24, 27, 37, 38, 39},
{15, 20, 23, 26, 40, 41, 42, 43}, {08, 14, 19, 22, 40, 44, 45}, {07, 13, 18, 21, 37, 41, 44, 46},
{06, 12, 17, 34, 38, 42, 45, 46}, {05, 11, 16, 32, 35, 39, 43, 46}, {04, 10, 30, 33, 36, 43, 45},
{03, 09, 28, 31, 36, 39, 42, 44}, {02, 25, 31, 33, 35, 38, 41}, {01, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 37, 40}.
Then (X ,B) is a design, regular of degree three, with rank eight. Notice that it
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M =

1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0

Figure 5.7: Incidence matrix for Cayley hypergraph on 18 nodes
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is not uniform, as some blocks have seven points. However, if we simply added
the hyperedges {2, 8, 14} and {4, 10, 16} to our Cayley hypergraph, we would
then have a 3-uniform, 8-regular hypergraph, corresponding to an 8-uniform,
3-regular design. (These additional hyperedges are picked using the six nodes
which have degree seven, and assigning hyperedges so that no pair of nodes is
incident to more than one hyperedge.) Explicitly, we would have the design
(X ,B) where X = {01, 02, . . . , 48} and the blocks of B are:
{01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08}, {01, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15}, {02, 09, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 47},
{03, 10, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25}, {04, 11, 17, 21, 26, 27, 28, 48}, {05, 12, 18, 22, 26, 29, 30, 31},
{06, 13, 19, 23, 27, 29, 32, 33}, {07, 14, 20, 24, 29, 34, 35, 36}, {08, 15, 24, 27, 37, 38, 39, 47},
{15, 20, 23, 26, 40, 41, 42, 43}, {08, 14, 19, 22, 40, 44, 45, 48}, {07, 13, 18, 21, 37, 41, 44, 46},
{06, 12, 17, 34, 38, 42, 45, 46}, {05, 11, 16, 32, 35, 39, 43, 46}, {04, 10, 30, 33, 36, 43, 45, 47},
{03, 09, 28, 31, 36, 39, 42, 44}, {02, 25, 31, 33, 35, 38, 41, 48}, {01, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 37, 40}.
Notice that this is not a 2−(48, 8, 1) design, since, for example, it can easily be
checked that points 1 and 16 do not appear in the same block. However, this
design is a configuration (Definition 2.4). Notice that for each block Bi there
is exactly one block Bj with which it does not share any keys, i.e. Bi∩Bj = ∅.
Thus, Bi and Bj have 16 common neighbours, and so this is a 16-common
intersection design. Further, for every Bi and Bj with Bi ∩ Bj 6= ∅, there are
λ = 14 common neighbours, and thus this is a (18, 16, 14, 16) strongly regular
graph. We have already established that strongly regular graphs make good
constructions for KPSs in Section 4.5.3.3, and in particular, Lemma 4.9 gives
 ≥ 8− (−2) +
√
(−2)2 + 4× 0
4
= 8 .
Together with Equation (5.3.3), this gives  = 8, which shows that our pro-
posed KPS construction does have good expansion.
Finally, we can find the connectivity and resilience of this KPS based on an
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extended Cayley hypergraph. By observation,
Pr1 =
144(
18
2
) ≈ 0.941, (5.3.4)
and
fail1 =
8
128
=
1
16
= 0.0625. (5.3.5)
Thus, by adding the extra two edges, the connectivity has increased from
approximately 0.902 to 0.941 (Equations (5.3.1) and Equation (5.3.4)), and the
resilience has fractionally improved: the difference between Equation (5.3.2)
and Equation (5.3.5) is ≈ 0.000033.
Calculating fail2 using conditional probabilities, we find that
fail2 =
1
17
(
8
128
+
8
112
)
+
16
17
(
8
128
+
7
113
)
= 0.125005 (5.3.6)
because: suppose the adversary has compromised one node, which without
loss of generality we will call N1, and so the adversary has learned key set
KN1 . Now there is one node Ni out of the remaining 17 nodes for which
KN1
⋂KNi = ∅, that is, one node which would reveal 8 further keys to the
adversary. Compromising any of the other 16 nodes reveals exactly 7 new
keys, as |KN1
⋂KNj | = 1 for all 2 ≤ j ≤ 18, j 6= i.
In [46] the following formula is given as an estimate for the resilience of a KPS
composed of l copies of a strongly regular graph:
fails = 1−
(
v−l−2
s
)(
v−2
s
) . (5.3.7)
Table 5.1 gives the exact values of Equation (5.3.7) for our extended Cayley
hypergraph (l = 1) for s = 1, . . . , 15, and we see that it agrees exactly with
Equation (5.3.5) and approximately with Equation (5.3.6).
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s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
fails 0.0625 0.125 0.1875 0.25 0.3125 0.375 0.4375 0.5
s 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
fails 0.5625 0.625 0.6875 0.75 0.8125 0.875 0.9375
Table 5.1: Resilience of the extended Cayley hypergraph
Table 5.1 shows that fails increases steadily with s. In particular, fails = 0.5
when s = v
2
− 1. As a point of comparison, recall from Lemma 3.2 that the
resilience of an Eschenauer Gligor scheme is given by fails = 1 −
(
1− k
n
)s
.
Thus an Eschenauer Gligor scheme which also has fail1 = 0.0625 has param-
eters k
n
= 1
16
, and this proportion gives fails > 0.5 for s ≥ 11. Indeed, for
each s, the Eschenauer Gligor value of fails with
k
n
= 1
16
is smaller than the
approximate value of fails for the extended Cayley hypergraph KPS given by
Equation (5.3.7).
However, if we make a comparison based on key storage and size of key pool,
that is, fixing k = 8 and n = 48, we find that the KPS based on an extended
Cayley hypergraph performs better, since the Eschenauer Gligor KPS has lower
connectivity: Pr1 ≈ 0.796, and poorer resilience: fail1 ≈ 0.167 and fails > 0.5
for s ≥ 4.
In summary, although the extended Cayley hypergraph construction for a KPS
does not scale well, it does provide good expansion, a lower bound for which
can be easily found, and there are combinations of parameters k and n for
which it outperforms the Eschenauer Gligor KPS.
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5.4 Conclusion
Our exploration of hypergraphs and their expansion has led to some conclu-
sions and some further questions.
Firstly, we have shown that using hypergraphs rather than graphs to repre-
sent KPSs has the benefits of demonstrating the key storage and resilience
in addition to the connectivity, and we have therefore recommended using
hypergraphs for representing and analysing KPSs.
After noting that existing expander graph constructions for KPSs have perfect
resilience, we have demonstrated that, where perfect resilience is not required,
connectivity and expansion can be improved by re-using keys. A hypergraph
is a natural tool for constructing such schemes, where each key is known to
more than two nodes. We therefore propose looking to the literature on hy-
pergraphs with good expansion for KPS constructions with low key storage,
good connectivity, high expansion and good - though not perfect - resilience.
There are currently few constructions for hypergraphs which approach the opti-
mal proven bounds for expansion. We have reasoned that any future construc-
tions proposed for hypergraphs with good expansion are likely to correspond
to good constructions for KPSs since they would have the following properties:
• Re-use of keys, providing a trade-off between connectivity and resilience
which is more suitable for many applications than the low connectivity
given by a scheme with perfect resilience (and equal key storage).
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• The benefits of good expansion: low diameter and average path length,
more equal sharing of communication burdens, efficient data flow due to
lack of bottlenecks, and few vulnerabilities (cutpoints and cut-edges).
• If the construction is deterministic, the KPS will also benefit from non-
probabilistic metrics for key storage, connectivity and resilience, and,
typically, more efficient shared key discovery.
However, we have noted that hypergraphs are set systems, and it is possible
that any such construction may already be established in the literature as a
combinatorial design. Indeed, since combinatorial designs are hypergraphs,
our results in Section 4.5 about the expansion of configurations, µ-common
intersection designs and strongly regular graphs support the claims of this
chapter.
We used a Cayley hypergraph as an example of constructing a KPS from a
hypergraph. Although far from optimal in terms of hypergraph expansion, we
demonstrated that a hypergraph approach such as this could be used to con-
struct a KPS with low key storage, good resilience and considerably higher con-
nectivity and expansion than that of the Ramanujan expander graph from [18].
We also showed that the (extended) construction is equivalent to a strongly
regular graph with expansion  = 8. It seems possible that the problem of
finding a construction for random uniform hypergraphs with good expansion
may be related to the problem of finding random strongly regular graphs, as
discussed in [34] and [13] respectively, and that solving either problem may
lead to a good construction for a KPS.
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6.1 Introduction
We present a formalisation of a category of schemes which we call broadcast-
enhanced key predistribution schemes (BEKPSs). These schemes are suitable
for networks with access to a trusted base station and an authenticated broad-
cast channel. We demonstrate that the access to these extra resources allows
for the creation of BEKPSs with advantages over key predistribution schemes
such as flexibility and more efficient revocation. There are many possible
ways to implement BEKPSs, and we propose a framework for describing and
analysing them.
We begin in Section 6.2 by introducing the ideas and terminology of a closely-
related concept, namely broadcast encryption, before defining BEKPSs them-
selves and suggesting motivations for their study. In Section 6.3 we then give
an example of a BEKPS and present in more detail the model, setting and
metrics for analysing BEKPSs.
In [23], Cichon´, Go le¸biewski and Kuty lowski propose a scheme for ‘redistribut-
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ing’ keys to a wireless sensor network using a broadcast channel after an initial
key predistribution. We classify this as a BEKPS and analyse it in that con-
text. Section 6.4 provides some simpler versions of proofs from [23] and dis-
cusses modifications of the Cichon´ et al. BEKPS based on defining a suitable
intersection threshold.
Finally, we present two families of BEKPSs designed for particular scenarios:
in Section 6.5 we propose a construction for BEKPSs designed for efficient re-
vocation of nodes, and in Section 6.6 we propose BEKPSs which harness some
of the advantages of hierarchical networks in a homogeneous network of nodes.
We include these two families of schemes as examples of the many applications
of BEKPSs, and to demonstrate that explicit formulae can be derived for the
connectivity, resilience and broadcast cost, allowing for precise and efficient
analysis of BEKPSs. Our analysis demonstrates their effectiveness in achiev-
ing their aims in resource-constrained networks. We conclude in Section 6.7
and present ideas for future work.
6.2 Motivation and definitions
6.2.1 Broadcast encryption
There are many applications where it is possible for a trusted base station
to use a broadcast channel to communicate with nodes during the operational
phase of the network. This broadcast channel can be used not only to distribute
content, but also to conduct key management operations. Such applications
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have been widely studied in the context of broadcast encryption. The first
broadcast encryption schemes were given in [3, 33]. A classic example of a
broadcast encryption application is pay-TV systems, where a key predistribu-
tion scheme is used to install keys into set-top boxes during the initialisation
phase. The access to content is then managed by broadcasting the encrypted
content along with a key management ‘header’ whose purpose is to provide an
additional key ‘layer’ of content keys. The combined use of the predistributed
keys and content keys defines the set of users that are able to decrypt and
hence view the content. Note that whilst a pair of users may at times share
keys, there is no motivation in the design of the scheme for users to be able to
communicate with each other; the purpose of a broadcast encryption scheme
is to control access to content.
6.2.2 Broadcast-enchanced key predistribution
Recall that key predistribution is a technique particularly suited to resource-
constrained environments where public key cryptography is infeasible and there
is no method for distributing symmetric keys once the network is operational,
in particular for networks where a secure channel cannot be established be-
tween the network and base station after deployment. A major drawback of
KPSs is that once the keys have been predistributed, subsequent key manage-
ment operations are challenging to conduct [4]. We define a broadcast-enhanced
key predistribution scheme to be a key distribution scheme designed for a net-
work where a trusted base station and an authenticated broadcast channel
will be available. We distinguish between the underlying keys which are pre-
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distributed to the nodes, and the temporal keys which are broadcast by the
base station and which the nodes may use for communication until the next
broadcast. The base station broadcasts the temporal keys by encrypting them
using underlying keys, as we will describe in Section 6.3.
Broadcast encryption can be regarded as a type of BEKPS, but with funda-
mentally different design goals: in broadcast encryption, temporal key sharing
between nodes is incidental. In this paper we consider BEKPSs for applications
where communication between nodes is important, for example in networks of
data-gathering nodes, and so temporal key sharing is one of the primary design
goals. Such differences of purpose create substantial differences between the
designs of typical BE schemes and BEKPSs; in Section 6.5 we see how a na¨ıve
approach to designing a BEKPS from an LKH broadcast encryption scheme
would not provide sufficient resilience.
6.2.3 Advantages of BEKPSs over KPSs
Where a base station and broadcast channel are available, there are several
advantages of deploying broadcast-enhanced key predistribution as opposed to
the use of a basic KPS, including:
• Flexibility: Underlying keys may be allocated in a way which is unde-
sirable, either because there was a lack of control over the initial deploy-
ment, or because the purpose or priorities of the network have changed
over time. For example, as node batteries become drained, it may be de-
sirable to reduce the burdens on remaining nodes by distributing fewer
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temporal keys and maintaining a connected network. A BEKPS enables
the base station flexibility to ensure that some undesirable properties of
the underlying key predistribution do not persist in the temporal key
distribution. This is clear when we consider that the number of tem-
poral keys shared by two nodes can be greater than, equal to, or less
than the number of underlying keys which they share. Changes may be
temporary, and hence only effective between a small number of updates,
or permenantly sustained by future updates.
• Ease of revocation: In any BEKPS it is possible to revoke a node by
ensuring it does not receive any future temporal keys. This can be done
simply by omitting that node’s underlying keys from the set of underlying
keys used to encrypt all future temporal key broadcasts. This straight-
forward approach benefits from reducing the size of future broadcasts
for the base station. However, it has the potential to reduce the connec-
tivity and resilience of the remaining network (we define these terms in
Section 6.3), and repeated revocations may lead to rapid degeneration
of the remaining network [23]. In Section 6.5 we discuss a practical way
to design a BEKPS for efficient revocation, where repeated revocations
increase the broadcast cost but do not lead to network degeneration.
• Creating hierarchy in the temporal key distribution: The distri-
bution of the temporal keys may coincidentally or deliberately feature
‘imbalances’, for example, certain nodes may store more keys than aver-
age. Nodes which store extra keys may be desirable for efficient routing
of information through the network, and indeed KPSs have been pro-
posed for heterogenous networks; see [17, 49] for a brief survey. In ho-
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mogeneous networks (where all nodes have identical hardware), having
comparatively more keys brings with it the disadvantages of increased
communication burdens and quicker battery drainage. One way to re-
duce the damage that this causes to the network is to change at regular
intervals the nodes which are required to store extra keys, as in the elec-
tion of cluster heads in a network - see [62].
In any network where some nodes store extra keys, the compromise of
such a node will be more detrimental to the resilience of the network
than the compromise of the average node. In Section 6.6 we propose a
family of BEKPSs which provide the benefits of efficient routing found in
hierarchical networks, whilst frequent temporal key updates reduce the
resilience risks and battery drainage.
6.3 Framework
In this section we propose the framework for a BEKPS protocol by describ-
ing our model and setting, defining the relevant notation and metrics for our
analysis, and providing examples.
6.3.1 BEKPS model
We propose BEKPSs for networks of v nodes, N1, N2, . . . , Nv, a trusted author-
ity that preloads the underlying keys onto the nodes, and a (not necessarily
distinct) trusted base station that can broadcast to all nodes using a broadcast
channel.
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A BEKPS protocol is comprised of the following phases:
1. Underlying key predistribution: Each node Ni is allocated a set of
underlying keys from the underlying key pool Kυ = {u1, u2, . . . , un} be-
fore deployment, according to a key predistribution scheme. Underlying
keys are solely for the purpose of encrypting and decrypting temporal
keys, and should not be used for node to node communication. Once
the nodes are deployed, we assume that the underlying keys are fixed
and cannot be altered by the base station or overwritten by the nodes.
(We justify this assumption by noting that if it were possible to securely
supply nodes with new underlying keys, then the resulting system could
simply be considered as an entirely new BEKPS and analysed within our
model.)
2. Temporal key distribution: After the nodes are deployed, the base
station broadcasts temporal keys to them in order for them to commu-
nicate. Each node is allocated a set of temporal keys from a temporal
key pool Kτ = {t1, t2, . . . , tm}. The temporal keys are broadcast to the
nodes encrypted by underlying keys, so that a node learns a temporal
key if and only if the temporal key is encrypted by an underlying key
known to that node.
3. Shared key discovery: Once the temporal keys have been broadcast,
a shared key discovery protocol such as one of those given in [17, 73]
can be used so that each node establishes the set of other nodes with
which it shares keys. As in KPSs, this can be executed more efficiently if
the temporal keys are assigned in a deterministic or publicly known way,
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such that the broadcast of a node identifier is sufficient for other nodes
to deduce that node’s key identifiers.
All BEKPSs described in this chapter use variations on the Eschenauer
Gligor KPS [32], as described in Scheme 2.1, Section 2.4.1. Shared key
discovery therefore requires all nodes to broadcast their key identifiers,
unless the assignment of keys is made public. Since this does not vary
throughout the chapter, we will generally omit a description of this phase
when defining our BEKPSs.
4. Temporal key update: A new temporal key pool may be generated
and new sets of temporal keys broadcast as often as desired, according
to the constraints of the network.
We now present an example of a BEKPS: the ‘key redistribution’ scheme of
Cichon´ et al. [23].
Scheme 6.1. Underlying keys are distributed randomly, as in an Eschenauer
Gligor KPS [32]: a key pool of underlying keys Kυ = {u1, u2, . . . , un} is gen-
erated, and each node is allocated a random k-subset of Kυ. A temporal key
pool Kτ = {t1, t2, . . . , tm} of m = n/c temporal keys is generated, where c is a
small constant. Each temporal key is encrypted using c underlying keys, and
the base station then broadcasts the encrypted temporal keys to the network.
In general, the choice of which underlying keys should encrypt each temporal
key can be made randomly or deterministically. In the Cichon´ et al. scheme,
the underlying keys which should be used to encrypt each temporal key are
chosen in a pseudorandom way. That is, we take a pseudorandom bijec-
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tion pi between {1, . . . ,m} × {1, . . . , c} and {1, . . . , n} and encrypt ti using
upi(i,1), . . . , upi(i,c). Presumably, a new pi is chosen before each update. To sim-
plify the notation, we relabel the underlying keys so that u1 = upi(1,1), u2 =
upi(1,2), . . . , un = upi(n/c,c) so that the first c underlying keys encrypt t1 and so
on. Then the base station broadcasts:
Eu1(t1), Eu2(t1), . . . , Euc(t1)
Eu(c+1)(t2), Eu(c+2)(t2), . . . , Eu2c(t2)
...
Eu(n−c)(tn/c), Eu(n−c+1)(tn/c), . . . , Eun(tn/c)
6.3.2 Setting
We now describe in more detail the setting for which we design BEKPSs.
Communication range: We consider static, homogeneous networks, as in-
troduced in Section 2.2.1. As described in Sections 2.3.2 and 4.4, in many
applications the nodes will not all be within communication range of each
other, and therefore to fully analyse the deployed network we must consider
the intersection of the key graph and the communication graph. However, our
contributions in this chapter relate to the properties of the key graph, and so
this is where we perform our analysis. Our results can be applied to a partic-
ular scenario with its corresponding communication graph in the same way as
for any key predistribution scheme; for an example, see [18] where a random
geometric graph is used to model the nodes’ locations.
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Adversary model: We assume the existence of a strong adversary who is
able to compromise nodes to learn both temporal and underlying keys, and to
keep records of all previous transmissions. It should be noted that a BEKPS
does not provide backwards and forwards security against such an adversary,
that is, exposure of an underlying key reveals all future and past temporal
keys. It would be possible to provide such security against a weaker adversary
who was only able to obtain temporal keys, for example in networks where
underlying keys are stored in tamper-resistant hardware.
We suppose that the adversary compromises each node with equal probabil-
ity. As discussed in Section 2.2.4, it is credible to imagine an adversary which
compromises nodes in a carefully-targetted order so as to expose the greatest
possible number of keys through the smallest number of compromises. How-
ever, the random node compromise model which we use allows us to compare
many different schemes by providing a lower bound on fails.
Resource constraints: As with KPSs, we consider BEKPSs for resource-
constrained environments where asymmetric cryptography is infeasible. If
there were no other constraints on resources then it would be trivial to de-
sign a BEKPS with almost any properties:
• If there were no limit to the number of keys a node could store, then
every pair of nodes could share a unique underlying key, or indeed ev-
ery possible subset of nodes could share a unique underlying key. This
would make it possible to achieve temporal key sharing across any ar-
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bitrary group of nodes, though with the potential for high broadcast
requirements.
• If the broadcast size were unlimited, each node could store a single,
unique underlying key. The base station could then individually target
nodes when broadcasting temporal keys, and achieve any desired combi-
nation of shared temporal keys amongst the nodes.
However, such a high use of resources will not always be feasible. Our focus in
this chapter will be on BEKPSs for resource-constrained networks, where key
storage and broadcast capability are limited, and where it is desirable for the
longevity of the network to minimise the communication and computational
requirements of the nodes.
6.3.3 Metrics
As in KPSs, the resource constraints dictate that there is a trade-off to be made
between minimising key storage and maximising connectivity and resilience.
For BEKPSs these metrics need to be defined in a little more detail, and we
identify two further metrics to consider.
Key storage: We have previously denoted the number of keys that a node
can store by k. When considering BEKPSs, we will use k to denote the number
of underlying keys which nodes are required to store, and we will use κ to
denote the number of temporal keys broadcast to each node. We denote the
total number of keys which each node stores by σ, where σ = k + κ. As in
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KPSs, key storage should be minimised. We note that in BEKPSs the number
of temporal keys κ that a node is required to store is not necessarily constant
over time.
Connectivity: As with KPSs, we measure connectivity by Pr1, the probabil-
ity that a randomly picked pair of nodes is connected. That is, the probability
that they share at least q temporal keys, where q is the number of temporal
keys required to compute a link key, as specified by the scheme. It is usually
desirable to maximise Pr1 in BEKPSs. Connectivity in the underlying key
predistribution is not necessarily required.
Resilience: As with KPSs, resilience is measured by fails, the probability
that a temporal link between two uncompromised nodes Ni, Nj is insecure
after s other nodes are compromised. In this chapter we confine our analysis
to the computation of fail1 for the ease of comparing schemes.
Broadcast cost: We define the broadcast cost b to be the number of en-
crypted temporal keys broadcast by the base station at each update. That
is, b gives the number of temporal keys being broadcast, multiplied by the
number of underlying keys used to encrypt each temporal key. For example,
in Scheme 6.1 we have b = cn/c = n. We consider ways to minimise the
broadcast cost.
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Revocation efficiency: Since nodes may develop faults and we assume the
presence of an adversary, the ability to revoke keys and/or nodes adds robust-
ness to a network. We will describe nodes which are to be revoked, that is,
nodes suspected to be compromised by an adversary, displaying irregularities,
or otherwise weakening the network, as ‘compromised nodes’. We will refer to
the remaining nodes which (as far as the base station can tell) have not been
compromised and are functioning as they should, as ‘uncompromised’.
We analyse a BEKPS’s capability to revoke compromised nodes by the metrics:
• broadcast cost br for the revocation of r nodes during a temporal key
update;
• number of uncompromised nodes which lose keys because of the revoca-
tion of r compromised nodes.
We note that for many subsets of these metrics it is trivial to devise a BEKPS
which optimises them. For example, storage, connectivity and broadcast cost
can be optimised by all nodes storing a single underlying key u1, with which a
single temporal key t1 is encrypted and broadcast. Nodes would be connected
with probability Pr1 = 1, but resilience would be minimised and revocation of
a strict subset of nodes would be impossible. Therefore we are interested in
schemes which provide suitable trade-offs between all of these metrics.
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6.3.4 Expansion
We note that we have not listed expansion as a metric for analysing BEKPSs.
This is because for some BEKPSs it is not an important design goal: in partic-
ular, the hierarchical BEKPS proposed in Section 6.6 deliberately creates a key
graph where ‘secondary’ nodes are not well connected to the rest of the graph.
In Chapter 4 we explained that such a key graph is undesirable for a KPS,
creating unnecessary burdens on certain, more connected nodes. In contrast,
in a BEKPS we can exploit the flexibility provided by the base station and
broadcast channel to regularly redistribute these burdens and create a more
efficient network in the long-term.
6.4 The BEKPS of Cichon´ et al.
Much of the work in this section was conducted by Douglas R. Stinson and
appeared in the preprint [64]. It was later incorporated into the paper [43],
and we include our interpretation of it here for completeness in the discussion
of BEKPSs.
We noted in Section 6.1 that Cichon´, Go le¸biewski and Kuty lowski present a
technique for ‘key redistribution’ in sensor networks [23], which we classify as
a BEKPS. The details of their scheme are given in Scheme 6.1. In this section
we provide simpler proofs of some of their results (Section 6.4.1), refine the
estimates for the expected number of shared underlying and temporal keys
between two nodes (Section 6.4.2) and give a precise analysis of the resilience
135
6.4 The BEKPS of Cichon´ et al.
(Section 6.4.3). In Section 6.4.4 we present some numerical values of our
formulae, and finally in Section 6.4.5 we discuss a modification to the scheme
based on defining a suitable intersection threshold.
6.4.1 Simplifying proofs from [Cichon´ et al. 2010]
In this section we give some simplified proofs of results from [23]. We begin
by establishing a combinatorial framework.
We have noted that each node is assigned a k-subset of underlying keys from
Kυ. The indices of these keys form a k-subset of X = {1, . . . , n} that we
term a block. For the purposes of our analysis, each node can be identified
with its corresponding key block; henceforth we will use the terms ‘node’ and
‘block’ interchangeably. Note that every block is a k-subset of {1, . . . , n} that is
chosen independently and uniformly at random from the set of all
(
n
k
)
possible
k-subsets.
In [23, Theorem 1], formulae are proven for the expected number of shared
underlying keys and the expected number of shared temporal keys between a
pair of nodes. The proofs given in [23] use some heavy machinery involving
generating functions. However, this theorem has a quick, simple proof based
on the linearity of expectation of random variables.
First we consider [23, Theorem 1 (part 2)], which asserts that the expected
number of temporal keys shared by two nodes is n
c
(
1− (
n−c
k )
(nk)
)2
. Suppose that
G1, . . . , Gn/c partition the n-set {1, . . . , n} into m = n/c disjoint c-sets. Let A
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and B be random blocks. The number of temporal keys shared by A and B is
ωA,B = |{i : A ∩Gi 6= ∅ and B ∩Gi 6= ∅}|.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n/m, define a random variable X˜i = 1 if A∩Gi 6= ∅ and B∩Gi 6= ∅,
and define X˜i = 0, otherwise. Let X˜ =
∑n/c
i=1 X˜i. Then X˜ computes ωA,B and
E[X˜] is the expected value of ωA,B. It is obvious that
Pr[A ∩Gi 6= ∅] = Pr[B ∩Gi 6= ∅] = 1−
(
n−c
k
)(
n
k
)
and hence
E[X˜i] = Pr[A ∩Gi 6= ∅ and B ∩Gi 6= ∅] =
(
1−
(
n−c
k
)(
n
k
) )2 .
By linearity of expectation,
E[X˜] =
n
c
(
1−
(
n−c
k
)(
n
k
) )2 , (6.4.1)
which proves [23, Theorem 1 (part 2)].
To prove [23, Theorem 1 (part 1)] which states that the expected number of
underlying keys shared between two nodes is k
2
n
, we just set c = 1 in the
formula derived above. We have
E[number of shared underlying keys] =
n
1
(
1−
(
n−1
k
)(
n
k
) )2
= n
(
1− n− k
n
)2
=
k2
n
,
which proves the desired result.
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6.4.2 Refining estimates
We have reproved the exact formula for the expected number of shared tempo-
ral keys. In [23, Corollary 1], an estimate for Equation (6.4.1) is given when k
is roughly
√
n. However, we can also estimate Equation (6.4.1) when k 6= √n.
First, we estimate (
n−c
k
)(
n
k
) ≈ (n− c)k
nk
=
(
1− c
n
)k
,
so
E[X˜] ≈ n
c
(
1−
(
1− c
n
)k)2
.
Next, (
1− c
n
)k
≈ 1− kc
n
+
k2c2
2n2
,
so
E[X˜] ≈ n
c
(
kc
n
− k
2c2
2n2
)2
=
k2c
n
(
1− kc
2n
)2
.
Finally, if we expand the square and ignore the last term, we get
E[X˜] ≈ k
2c
n
(
1− kc
n
)
. (6.4.2)
If k =
√
n, then our estimate (6.4.2) is
k2c
n
− k
3c2
n2
=
k2c
n
− c
2
√
n
.
The estimate given in [23] is
k2c
n
+O
(
1√
n
)
.
However, in [23], c is assumed to be fixed and the big-oh hides an unspecified
constant that depends on c. To demonstrate this, we provide some example
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values of the estimates:
n k c exact E[X˜] estimate (6.4.2) estimate from [23]
10000 50 8 1.933 1.920 2.000
10000 50 16 3.718 3.680 4.000
10000 100 8 7.466 7.360 8.000
10000 100 16 13.810 13.440 16.000
10000 150 16 28.876 27.360 36.000
6.4.3 Refining the calculation of resilience
For the analysis in this section we consider the resilience of the Cichon´ et al.
BEKPS during a single broadcast phase, that is, during a time period where
each node’s set of temporal keys is not updated. Thus we are concerned with
the compromise of temporal keys; an adversary’s knowledge of underlying keys
is irrelevant to the analysis.
Cichon´ et al. [23] study the resilience of their BEKPS but they make several
simplifying assumptions. Here we give a much more general analysis and we
derive general formulae for resilience. In [23, Theorem 2], it is assumed that
two nodes A and B have exactly c temporal keys in common. In view of the
estimates provided in the last section, this is roughly the expected number of
common temporal keys when k =
√
n. Under this assumption, [23, Theorem
2] estimates the probability that a random node C contains these c common
temporal keys to be (kc/n)c. We calculate the resilience when k 6= √n.
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6.4.3.1 Temporal key sets
As before, suppose that G1, . . . , Gn/c partition an n-set X = {1, . . . , n} into
m = n/c disjoint c-sets. Suppose A is a random block (i.e., a k-subset of X)
and define
I(A) = {i : A ∩Gi 6= ∅}.
I(A) is the set of indices of the temporal keys held by A. Then let
κA = |I(A)|;
κA is the number of temporal keys held by A.
Fix any i-subset I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. Define
M(i) = |{A : I(A) = I}|.
Note that M(i) counts the number of possible nodes whose set of temporal
keys is equal to I. The value M(i) does not depend on the particular i-subset
I that was chosen.
It is easy to see that
|{A : I(A) ⊆ I}| =
(
ic
k
)
. (6.4.3)
We can derive a formula for M(i) from (6.4.3) by applying the principle of
inclusion-exclusion.
Lemma 6.1. For i ≥ 1, we have
M(i) =
i−1∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
(i− j)c
k
)(
i
j
)
. (6.4.4)
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Next, define
N(i) = |{A : κA = i}|.
N(i) is the number of possible nodes holding exactly i temporal keys. The
following is an immediate consequence of (6.4.4).
Lemma 6.2. For i ≥ 1, we have
N(i) =
(
m
i
)
M(i) =
i−1∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
m
i
)(
(i− j)c
k
)(
i
j
)
. (6.4.5)
6.4.3.2 Intersection of two blocks
Next, we consider intersections of two blocks. For ω ≥ 1, define a ω-link to be
an ordered pair of two nodes that contain exactly ω common temporal keys.
Let P (ω) denote the number of possible ω-links; then
P (ω) = |{(A,B) : |I(A) ∩ I(B)| = ω}|.
We have the following formula for P (ω):
Lemma 6.3. For ω ≥ 1, we have
P (ω) =
k∑
i=ω
k∑
j=ω
(
m− i
j − ω
)(
i
ω
)
N(i)M(j). (6.4.6)
For ω = 0, we have
P (0) =
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
(
m− i
j
)
N(i)M(j). (6.4.7)
Proof. Let i = κA and j = κB. We can choose A in N(i) ways. For each choice
of A, choose ω indices in I(A) and choose j − ω indices in {1, . . . ,m}\I(A).
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Let the set of the j chosen indices be denoted by J . Then choose B such that
I(B) = J ; there are M(j) ways to do this.
Remark 6.1. We can verify the formulae (6.4.6) and (6.4.7) by checking that
the following equations hold for various values of n, c and k:
k∑
ω=0
P (ω) =
(
n
k
)2
and ∑k
ω=1 ωP (ω)(
n
k
)2 = nc
(
1−
(
n−c
k
)(
n
k
) )2 .
6.4.3.3 Compromised links and resilience
We can now find expressions for the number of nodes which will compromise
a given link, and derive the formula for fail1. Suppose that (A,B) is a ω-link.
Then define
S(ω) = |{C : I(A) ∩ I(B) ⊆ I(C)}|.
S(ω) denotes the number of possible nodes that will compromise the ω-link
(A,B), and it does not depend on the particular choices of A and B.
Lemma 6.4. For any ω > 0, we have
S(ω) =
k∑
i=ω
(
m− ω
i− ω
)
M(i). (6.4.8)
Proof. Let i = κC . Choose i− ω indices in
{1, . . . ,m}\(I(A) ∩ I(B)).
Let J denote the i-set consisting of the i−ω chosen indices along with I(A)∩
I(B). Then choose C such that I(C) = J ; there are M(i) ways to do this.
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Finally, define
T (ω) = |{(A,B,C) : |I(A) ∩ I(B)| = ω and I(A) ∩ I(B) ⊆ I(C)}|.
T (ω) counts triples (A,B,C) where (A,B) is a ω-link compromised by C. It
is clear, applying (6.4.8), that the following formula holds.
Lemma 6.5. For any ω > 0, we have
T (ω) = P (ω)S(ω) =
k∑
i=ω
(
m− ω
i− ω
)
M(i)P (ω).
Now we are in a position to compute some resilience parameters. Recall that
fail1 denotes the probability that a random link (A,B) is compromised by a
random node C.
Theorem 6.6. The resilience after the compromise of one node is given by
fail1 =
∑k
ω=1 T (ω)∑k
ω=1 P (ω)
(
n
k
) . (6.4.9)
Proof. The total number of possible ω-links with ω ≥ 1 is
k∑
ω=1
P (ω),
so the total number of triples (A,B,C) where (A,B) is a link is
k∑
ω=1
P (ω)
(
n
k
)
.
The total number of triples (A,B,C) where (A,B) is a link and C compromises
this link is
k∑
ω=1
T (ω).
The resilience is just the quotient of these two quantities.
143
6.4 The BEKPS of Cichon´ et al.
Define fail1(ω) to denote the probability that a random ω-link (A,B) is com-
promised by a random node C. We have the following obvious result.
Lemma 6.7. For any ω ≥ 1, we have
fail1(ω) =
S(ω)(
n
k
) . (6.4.10)
Lemma 6.7 provides another way to derive the formula (6.4.9) for fail1. Let λω
denote the probability that a random link is a ω-link. It is clear that
λω =
P (ω)∑k
i=1 P (i)
(6.4.11)
and
fail1 =
k∑
ω=1
λωfail1(ω). (6.4.12)
Then, from (6.4.10), (6.4.11) and (6.4.12), we have
fail1 =
k∑
ω=1
λωfail1(ω)
=
k∑
ω=1
P (ω)S(ω)∑k
i=1 P (i)
(
n
k
)
=
∑k
ω=1 T (ω)∑k
ω=1 P (ω)
(
n
k
) ,
agreeing with (6.4.9).
6.4.4 Numerical examples
We now provide some numerical examples of our formulae. First, we give an
example to illustrate the computation of resilience parameters.
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Example 6.1. Suppose n = 1000, c = 4 and k = 31. Then the expected
number of temporal keys shared by a pair of nodes, given by (6.4.1), is ω =
3.511857771, which is a bit less than ω = 4.
[23, Theorem 2] estimates fail1(4) by computing the quantity(
kc
n
)c
= 0.0002364213760.
A more accurate estimate for fail1(4) based on the analysis in [23], would be(
m−c
k−c
)(
m
k
) = 0.0001980391200.
However, from (6.4.10), the exact value of fail1(4) = 0.0001651542962.
We find that the overall resilience of the scheme determined from (6.4.9) is
fail1 = 0.01330121549. This is quite a bit higher than fail1(4), primarily because
links consisting of fewer than four temporal keys (which occur frequently) are
compromised with higher probability. This can be seen in the following tabula-
tion of values λω and fail1(ω):
ω λω fail1(ω)
1 0.08756777557 0.1185218591
2 0.1843995070 0.01364696407
3 0.2407996311 0.001524883082
4 0.2188569817 0.0001651542962
5 0.1472998707 0.00001731603382
6 0.07626527018 0.000001755184555
Our next example considers the effect of varying the parameter k.
Example 6.2. Suppose n = 1000 and c = 4. We compute the values of fail1
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for various choices of k:
k fail1
5 0.01925413575
10 0.03349126556
15 0.03904935504
20 0.03548705708
25 0.02588255435
30 0.01518790238
35 0.007187785428
40 0.002776219702
45 0.0008938567010
50 0.0002464139425
It is interesting to observe that fail1 at first increases, and then decreases, as
k increases. The higher values of fail1 for small values of k reflect the fact
that the network has fewer links and the links that do exist are more easily
compromised.
Our next example considers the effect of varying the parameter c.
Example 6.3. Suppose n = 1000 and k = 25. We compute the values of fail1
for various choices of c:
c fail1
2 0.02636458442
3 0.02785890369
4 0.02588255435
5 0.02240961738
6 0.01861362594
7 0.01509874645
8 0.01211001320
9 0.009692483706
10 0.007795858957
The interesting thing to note here is that fail1 decreases as c increases beyond
3, but the decrease is gradual and not very dramatic.
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6.4.5 Intersection thresholds
We introduced the idea of an intersection threshold in the q-composite scheme
(Scheme 3.1, Section 3.2). As q increases, the resilience increases and the con-
nectivity decreases. We now develop formulae for these metrics which depend
on the intersection threshold of the scheme.
Theorem 6.8. For a scheme with intersection threshold q, we have that
Pr1 = 1−
∑q−1
i=0 P (i)(
n
k
)2 . (6.4.13)
Proof. There are
(
n
k
)2
possible pairs of nodes, of which
∑q−1
i=0 P (i) are not
connected.
The formula for resilience (6.4.9) is generalised as follows.
Theorem 6.9. For a scheme with intersection threshold q, the resilience is
given by
fail1 =
∑k
ω=q T (ω)∑k
ω=q P (ω)
(
n
k
) . (6.4.14)
Proof. The proof is a straightforward modification of the proof of Theorem
6.6.
We now revisit Example 6.1.
Example 6.4. Suppose n = 1000, c = 4 and k = 31, as in Example 6.1. We
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compute the connectivity and resilience for various values of q.
q Pr1 fail1
1 0.9809852766 0.01330121549
2 0.8950825780 0.003202999469
3 0.7141893766 0.0005577036219
4 0.4779684839 0.00007970558807
5 0.2632730072 0.00001002335465
The use of an intersection threshold allows us to choose a suitable trade-off
between connectivity and resilience. Observe that resilience increases substan-
tially as q increases; however, connectivity decreases at the same time. For
q > 5, the connectivity is too low to be practical. In this example, q = 2 or 3
provides a good way to ‘balance’ connectivity and resilience.
6.5 Revocation
In this section we consider how to design a BEKPS for a resource-constrained
network where it is a high priority to be able to revoke nodes efficiently. As
noted in Section 6.3.3, revocation of compromised nodes can be achieved in
any BEKPS simply by avoiding using their underlying keys to encrypt new
temporal keys. However, this can have the undesired effect of reducing the
connectivity amongst uncompromised nodes, because they will receive fewer
temporal keys if some of their underlying keys are no longer used. In general, it
is possible to recover the level of connectivity Pr1 after revocation by selecting
future temporal keys from a smaller pool, so that each temporal key will be
known to a higher proportion of the nodes. However, this lowers the resilience.
We therefore design a BEKPS which enables the revocation of compromised
nodes whilst retaining the connectivity and resilience in the remaining network,
148
6.5 Revocation
and keeping key storage and broadcast cost low.
Clearly, the most precise way to be able to revoke individual nodes without
causing any damage to the rest of the network is to assign a unique underlying
key to each node of the network. If each node is given a single, unique under-
lying key, then this also has the benefit of achieving minimum key storage per
node. However, an update requires a broadcast of (v−r)κ temporal keys when
r nodes have been revoked, which is infeasibly large for many applications.
If it is not the case that each node stores a unique underlying key, then revoca-
tion cannot be precise: uncompromised nodes will also be increasingly affected
as the number of revocations increases. For example, if each node stores k un-
derlying keys, then when a single node is revoked, k underlying keys are taken
out of use by the base station. We denote this as R(1) = k and derive a gen-
eral formula for the number of redundant underlying keys after i revocations,
when underlying keys are distributed using Scheme 2.1, the Eschenauer Gligor
random KPS [32].
Lemma 6.10. Suppose that each node stores k underlying keys, selected ran-
domly from a key pool of n underlying keys. Let R(i) denote the expected
number of underlying keys removed from use when i nodes have been revoked.
Then
R(i) = n
(
1−
(
1− k
n
)i)
. (6.5.1)
Proof. Let the i nodes which have been revoked be denoted by N1, . . . , Ni. For
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1 ≤ j ≤ n define a random variable
Xj =
{
1 if key kj is known to at least one of N1, . . . , Ni
0 otherwise
and let X =
∑n
j=1Xj. We want to find R(i) = E[X].
The expected value of X1 is E[X1] = 1− Pr[k1 is in none of N1, . . . , Ni], so
E[X1] = 1−
(
1− k
n
)i
.
Linearity of expectation gives E[X] = nE[X1], which gives the result.
This means that an uncompromised node is unintentionally revoked with prob-
ability
(
R(i)
k
)(
n
k
) as it can no longer learn any temporal keys in future broadcasts,
and so after i ≥ 1 revocations the network size v(i) is
v(i) = (v − i)
(
1−
(
R(i)
k
)(
n
k
) ) , (6.5.2)
where v is the original network size.
We propose a BEKPS where precise revocation is possible, that is, v(i) = v−i,
and which provides a choice of trade-offs between key storage and broadcast
cost which are likely to be suitable for a wide range of network scenarios. To
achieve this, we use LKH schemes (Section (6.5.1)) for the underlying key
distribution and random key predistribution for the temporal keys.
Figure 6.1 shows the deterioration of the size of the network, v(i) from Equa-
tion (6.5.2), in comparison to the straight line (v − i), after i revocations. We
see that for a small number of revocations, i ≤ 0.05v, we have v(i) ≈ v − i.
However, there is then a rapid deterioration in the size of the network for
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Figure 6.1: Plot of the deterioration of v(i) (Equation (6.5.2)) in comparison
to the straight line (v − i) for an example network of v = 1000 nodes, where
n = 1000 and k = 30.
0.05v ≤ i ≤ 0.2v, by which stage there are very few nodes remaining in the
network. This demonstrates that, if only a small proportion of revocations
are anticipated, a na¨ıve approach using Scheme 2.1 for the underlying layer
may be sufficient. However, for larger numbers of revocations, it highlights
the importance of our proposed BEKPS for revocation, where the size of the
network is always v − i after i revocations.
6.5.1 LKH
Logical key hierarchy (LKH) schemes [38, 69, 72] are used in the literature
of broadcast encryption for effective revocation. Each of the v = 2d−1 nodes
is allocated d keys, one of which is unique, and the other keys are known to
21, 22, . . . , 2d−1 nodes respectively. In Figure 6.2 we demonstrate this on a
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network of v = 16 = 25−1 nodes. Each node stores five keys: a unique key, a
key δi shared with another node, a key γi shared with 3 other nodes, a key βi
shared with 7 other nodes, and the key α known to all nodes, called the root
key.
If a message is to be broadcast to all nodes it can be encrypted using the root
key. If a set of r nodes is to be revoked, then the message should be broadcast
using the smallest set of keys known only to the v − r uncompromised nodes.
The size of a broadcast is then logarithmic in the size of the network.
α
β1 β2
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Figure 6.2: LKH tree on 16 nodes
6.5.2 BEKPS for revocation
We use LKH for the underlying layer of our BEKPS because it allows fine-
grained revocation with low key storage and logarithmic broadcast cost. Other
revocation schemes may also be adapted to form the underlying layer for spe-
cific BEKPS scenarios, however, to prevent our analysis from becoming un-
wieldy, we restrict our focus to using LKH as a basis for a BEKPS and varying
the distribution of LKH trees in the underlying layer. For other broadcast
encryption or revocation schemes the analysis will remain broadly similar to
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that given here, and any benefits they provide over LKH would likely be re-
flected in the resulting BEKPS. For example, subset-cover revocation schemes
such as the two proposed in [54] require r log v and 2r broadcasts, respectively,
for the revocation of r nodes, whereas LKH requires 2r log v broadcasts. The
second of these schemes also reduces the key storage from log v (as in LKH)
to 1
2
log2 v, and they additionally provide traitor tracing mechanisms. It seems
likely, therefore, that similar improvements would be reflected in a BEKPS
based on these schemes.
Similarly, we demonstrate a distribution of temporal keys which is broadly
based on the Eschenauer Gligor random KPS, but in theory any KPS could
be adapted for the temporal key distribution. We have chosen random key
distribution because it is defined for any size of temporal key storage κ and
key pool Kτ , making it highly adaptable, and it provides a relatively simple
platform upon which to perform our analysis.
In Section 6.5.2.2 we will define exactly how the temporal keys are distributed.
However, to motivate our choice of underlying key distribution, we note here
that before any nodes are revoked, temporal keys will be broadcast using the
root key of the LKH tree. Since the compromise of a node therefore exposes
the temporal keys known to all other nodes, we propose using multiple, smaller
trees to lessen this resilience risk. In this way our BEKPS is fundamentally
different from an LKH broadcast encryption scheme, where a single LKH tree
is used, but the base station may broadcast temporal keys to any chosen subset
of nodes.
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We propose the following BEKPS for scenarios where revocation is a high
priority.
6.5.2.1 Underlying key predistribution
We assume that for a given application, each node can store σ keys in total,
where σ is constant. To distribute underlying keys, we partition the v nodes
into sets of size λ = 2d−1, and we do this µ times. For ease of analysis, we will
assume that λ|v and that these partitions are chosen such that any tree from
partition Πi intersects any tree from partition Πj in at most one node.
Within each set in each partition, nodes are allocated keys according to an
LKH scheme, where the LKH tree has depth d. Thus each node belongs to
µ different LKH trees of depth d and therefore must store k = µd underlying
keys, where µ and d are chosen so that k < σ. The total number of LKH trees
is L = µv
λ
.
Example 6.5. Figure 6.3 illustrates an example of allocating v = 16 nodes
into v
λ
= 4 trees in each of µ = 2 partitions. That is, each tree of λ = 4 nodes
is represented by a shaded loop around the nodes; partition Π1 is represented by
the vertical loops, and partition Π2 is represented by the horizontal loops. Each
tree has been labelled Ti,j, where i denotes the partition to which it belongs, and
j denotes the tree number within the partition. There are L = µv
λ
= 8 trees in
total, and each pair of trees intersects in at most one node.
To construct a partition into µλ trees which fulfills the above conditions will
only be possible for certain values of the parameters v, k, λ and µ. This is a
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1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16
T1,1 T1,2 T1,3 T1,4
T2,1
T2,2
T2,3
T2,4
Figure 6.3: Example of partitioning nodes into L = µv
λ
trees
well-studied problem in the literature on resolvable designs [26, 53]. Briefly, a
design is said to be resolvable if the blocks can be partitioned into µ sets or
parallel classes, each of which forms a partition of the set of points. Thus, a
resolvable (v, µλ, µ, λ)−configuration provides a suitable construction for our
underlying key predistribution. Resolvable designs have been widely studied;
see [24] for existence results and constructions.
6.5.2.2 Temporal key distribution
From our assumption that total key storage is constant, it follows that each
node can store at most κ = σ − µd temporal keys. For each partition Πi
(1 ≤ i ≤ µ), a temporal key pool Kτi of m keys is generated. We require that
these key pools are disjoint, that is Kτi ∩Kτj = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ µ, so that
we have µ independent Eschenauer Gligor schemes. Relaxing this requirement
would allow for improvements in connectivity at the cost of decreased resilience.
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A random set of temporal keys is allocated to every tree in the following
way. For each partition i and each underlying LKH tree Ti,j belonging to that
partition (where 1 ≤ i ≤ µ and 1 ≤ j ≤ v
λ
), a set of bκ
µ
c temporal keys is
chosen at random from the key pool Kτi and encrypted using the underlying
root key for Ti,j.
We assume that nodes require only one temporal key in common in order to
establish a link, that is, the intersection threshold is q = 1, and a pair of nodes
should use a single key to encrypt their communications, that is, Ω = 1. For
ease of analysis, we also create the following rules:
• If two nodes are in the same tree Ti,j in any partition Πi then they will
share the set of temporal keys broadcast to Ti,j. The single temporal
key which they use for communication should be randomly selected from
this set. Any other keys which they may coincidentally share should be
ignored. Note that there is no ambiguity because it is not possible for
two nodes to be in more than one common tree.
• If two nodes are not in the same tree in any partition, they may form a
link if they have at least one key in common; they should select just one
of these keys at random to secure the link.
For example, we consider the possible connections between pairs of nodes in
Figure 6.3:
• Nodes 1 and 9 both belong to the tree T1,1 in partition Π1. This means
that they will share the set of temporal keys from key pool Kτ1 which
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are broadcast to tree T1,1. They must pick one of these keys at random
to encrypt their communications.
• Nodes 1 and 11 are not in a common tree in any partition. However,
they may have one or more keys in common if
– the set of keys broadcast to T1,1 has non-empty intersection with
the set of keys broadcast to T1,3,
and/or
– the set of keys broadcast to T2,1 has non-empty intersection with
the set of keys broadcast to T2,3.
They should pick a single one of these keys at random with which to
encrypt their communications.
Notice that if the set of keys broadcast to T2,1 has non-empty intersection with
the set of keys broadcast to T2,3 then nodes 1 and 9 will have keys in common
from key pool Kτ2 . However, they must use a key from key pool Kτ1 to encrypt
their communications because they belong to a common tree in partition Π1.
In summary, if a pair of nodes are in the same tree then they have probability
Pr1 = 1 of being connected. If not, the probability of them being connected is
proportional to the Eschenauer Gligor connectivity probability (Lemma 3.1),
as we explain below. If these rules were relaxed and a pair of nodes could
use any combination of their shared temporal keys to secure their link, the
connectivity and resilience of the network would increase, and so our analysis
produces lower bounds.
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6.5.2.3 Temporal key update
New temporal keys may be broadcast to the network as often as desired. To
revoke a node Ni, the base station should broadcast new temporal keys to all
nodes that are not in a common tree to Ni. For any nodes that are in a common
tree to Ni, the base station can broadcast new temporal keys encrypted using
the smallest set of LKH keys so that all uncompromised nodes receive the
new temporal keys but Ni is unable to decrypt any temporal keys from the
broadcast.
For example, to revoke the single node 6 in Figure 6.3, the base station should
do the following:
• for each tree other than T1,2 and T2,2, broadcast a new set of temporal
keys using the tree’s root key;
• for tree T1,2 broadcast a new set of temporal keys using the smallest
number of underlying keys known to nodes 2, 10 and 14 but unknown to
node 6;
• for tree T2,2 broadcast a new set of temporal keys using the smallest
number of underlying keys known to nodes 5, 7 and 8 but unknown to
node 6.
To later revoke another node Nj the base station must repeat this process
whilst continuing to ensure that node 6 receives no further temporal keys. Thus
it can be seen that the broadcast load for the second revocation is greatest if
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node Nj is not in either tree T1,2 or T2,2, and the broadcast load is actually
lessened for the second revocation if node Nj is in either tree T1,2 or T2,2 and
was receiving keys using its unique underlying key after the first revocation.
6.5.3 Analysis
We begin by calculating br, the broadcast cost of revoking r nodes.
Lemma 6.11. For all µ, r ≥ 1, the broadcast cost of revoking r nodes is given
by
br ≤ (σ − µd)
(v
λ
+ rd− 2r
)
. (6.5.3)
Proof. We begin by calculating b1, the broadcast cost required to revoke a
single node Ni. Notice that Ni belongs to µ trees. Calculating b1 requires
the number of temporal keys per tree σ
µ
− d, the broadcast to the L− µ trees
of uncompromised nodes, and the LKH revocation for the µ trees containing
the compromised node, which requires d − 1 broadcasts per tree. Thus if the
number of nodes per tree is greater than 1,
b1 =
(
σ
µ
− d
)
(L− µ+ µ(d− 1)) = (σ − µd)
(v
λ
+ d− 2
)
.
If the number of nodes per tree is 1 (i.e. d = 1) then we assume that µ = 1
so that the number of trees L equals the number of nodes v. Then b1 =
(σ − 1)(L− 1).
The value of br for r > 1 will depend upon whether any of the r nodes are in
the same tree(s). However, we have observed that the broadcast cost is largest
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when each of the nodes to be revoked is in a different tree, hence
br ≤
(
σ
µ
− d
)
(L− rµ+ rµ(d− 1)) = (σ − µd)
(v
λ
+ rd− 2r
)
.
To analyse the connectivity and resilience of this BEKPS for revocation, we
study separately the cases µ = 1 and µ = 2, and consider the effect of varying
d and hence λ, the size of each LKH tree.
6.5.3.1 LKH trees where µ = 1
We begin by considering µ = 1, that is each node is in exactly 1 tree, and the
total number of LKH trees is L = v
λ
.
Lemma 6.12. When µ = 1, the connectivity is given by
Pr1 =
λ− 1
v − 1 .1 +
v − λ
v − 1
(
1−
(
m−(σ−d)
σ−d
)(
m
σ−d
) ) .
Proof. Fix a single node Ni, belonging to a single LKH tree Tj (since µ = 1).
We consider the probability of Ni being connected to another of the v − 1
nodes, which fall into two categories:
• Ni will share temporal keys with the other λ−1 nodes of its tree Tj with
probability 1
• Ni will share at least one key with the remaining v − λ nodes with the
Eschenauer Gligor connectivity probability (Lemma 3.1), and κ = σ−d.
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We now calculate the resilience metric fail1. We must consider the probability
of a random link being compromised when it is a link between nodes of the
same tree, and when it is a link between nodes which are not in a common
tree.
Lemma 6.13. When µ = 1, the resilience is given by
fail1 =
f1
[
λ−2
v−2 .1 +
v−λ
v−2
(
σ−d
m
)]
+ f2
[
2λ−2
v−2 .1 +
v−2λ
v−2
(
σ−d
m
)]
f1 + f2
,
where f1 =
(
λ
2
)
v
λ
and f2 =
(
1− (
m−(σ−d)
σ−d )
( mσ−d)
)((
v
2
)− (λ
2
)
v
λ
)
.
Proof. There are f1 =
(
λ
2
)
v
λ
pairs of nodes in the network where both nodes
are in the same tree. After compromising a single node, the adversary can
break a link between one of these pairs with probability
fail1,f1 =
λ− 2
v − 2 .1 +
v − λ
v − 2
(
σ − d
m
)
,
since for a given link, there are λ−2 nodes which, if compromised, would break
that link with certainty by virtue of being in the same tree. A compromise of
one of the remaining v−λ nodes would reveal the desired key with probability
σ−d
m
.
The total number of pairs of nodes which are in different trees is
(
v
2
) − (λ
2
)
v
λ
,
and each pair is connected with the Eschenauer Gligor connectivity probability
(Lemma 3.1). Therefore we have that the expected number of links between
pairs of nodes from different trees is
f2 =
(
1−
(
m−(σ−d)
σ−d
)(
m
σ−d
) )((v
2
)
−
(
λ
2
)
v
λ
)
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and for these,
fail1,f2 =
2λ− 2
v − 2 .1 +
v − 2λ
v − 2
(
σ − d
m
)
.
This is because, if we fix a link between uncompromised nodes Ni and Nj from
different trees, there are 2(λ−1) nodes which are in a common tree with either
Ni or Nj and therefore know their shared key with certainty. This leaves v−2λ
nodes which each have a probability of κ
m
of knowing their shared key.
Figure 6.4: Plot of the values of Pr1, fail1 and b
′
1 when µ = 1 and there are
1, 2, 22, . . . , 28 nodes per tree for key storage σ = 25, 50 and 100 respectively
We demonstrate these formulae in Figure 6.4. For comparison, we consider a
fixed network size of v = 1024 nodes, and temporal key pool size of m = 1000
keys. We consider nodes which can store 25, 50 or 100 keys respectively,
and plot the corresponding values of Pr1 and fail1 for underlying LKH layers
of 1, 2, 4, . . . , 256 nodes per tree. In order to plot the broadcast cost (Equa-
tion (6.5.3)) on the same axes, we plot b1 as a fraction of the number of keys
to be broadcast when there is only one node per tree (d = 1), i.e. we plot
b′1 =
b1
(σ−µ)( vλ−1)
.
We see that if nodes can store 100 keys then Pr1 ≈ 1. If nodes can store
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only 50 or 25 keys then the connectivity decreases significantly, but this has
the advantage of lowering fail1. Finally, we note that the broadcast cost b
′
1
decreases exponentially as the number of nodes per tree increases. That is, for
fixed network size v and key storage σ, the broadcast cost can be decreased
by increasing the number of nodes per tree. The plots show that b′1 is almost
identical across different values of σ, however, as we know from the formula,
the actual broadcast size b1 increases with σ. For example, when there are 8
nodes per tree, the broadcast to revoke one node is b1 = 2730 when σ = 25,
b1 = 5980 when σ = 50 and b1 = 12480 when σ = 100.
We make some final remarks to justify the design of our BEKPS for revocation.
The plot does not include the case where there is exactly one underlying LKH
tree (λ = v), as in LKH broadcast encryption. It is clear from the formulae that
whilst the broadcast cost would be minimised and the connectivity maximised,
the resilience would be minimised, making it inadvisable for use as a BEKPS.
Whilst a single LKH scheme is appropriate for many broadcast encryption
applications, it is not appropriate for BEKPS because of the different design
goals, and the fact that the base station always broadcasts temporal keys
encrypted by the root key (or the smallest set of keys unknown to revoked
nodes). Notice that if this restriction on the base station were removed and a
single LKH tree were used for the underlying layer, this would be similar to
our BEKPS except that nodes would have to store more underlying keys and
therefore fewer temporal keys, restricting connectivity.
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6.5.3.2 LKH trees where µ = 2
We now consider the case where µ = 2, that is, each node is a member of
two trees, one from each partition. Each node therefore stores 2d underlying
LKH keys, leaving space for it to store σ−2d temporal keys. The base station
may broadcast a set of at most bσ
2
c − d temporal keys to each tree. Indeed,
in general the base station may broadcast at most bσ
µ
c − d to the root of each
tree. For ease of notation we will omit the floor symbols.
Lemma 6.14. When µ = 2, the connectivity is given by
Pr1 =
2(λ− 1)
v − 1 .1 +
v − 1− 2(λ− 1)
v − 1
1−
(m−(σ2−d)σ2−d )(
m
σ
2
−d
)
2 .
The proof follows in the same way as that of Lemma 6.12. The Eschenauer
Gligor probability contains a squared term because the probability of two nodes
from different trees not being connected is the probability of them not sharing
any keys from partition Π1 multiplied by the probability of them not sharing
any keys from partition Π2.
Lemma 6.15. When µ = 2, the resilience is given by
fail1 =
f1
[
λ−2
v−2 .1 +
v−λ
v−2
(
σ
2
−d
m
)]
+ f2
[
2λ−2
v−2 .1 +
v−2λ
v−2
(
σ
2
−d
m
)]
f1 + f2
,
where f1 =
(
λ
2
)
L and f2 =
1− [(m−(σ2−d)σ2−d )
( mσ
2−d)
]2((v
2
)
−
(
λ
2
)
L
)
.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 6.13, we calculate fail1 by considering the
two cases:
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1. If the link is between two nodes in a common tree in partition Πi, λ− 2
other nodes from that tree can break the link with probability 1, and
v − λ nodes can each break the link with probability σ2−d
m
using their
knowledge of keys from the key pool Kτi . There are f1 =
(
λ
2
)
L such
links.
2. If the link is between two nodes which are not in a common tree, 2λ− 2
other nodes in their respective trees can break the link, and v− 2λ other
nodes can break the link with probability
σ
2
−d
m
. The expected number of
such links is f2 =
1− [(m−(σ2−d)σ2−d )
( mσ
2−d)
]2((v
2
)
−
(
λ
2
)
L
)
.
Figure 6.5: Plot of the values of Pr1, fail1 and b
′
1 when µ = 2 and there are
1, 2, 22, . . . , 28 nodes per tree for key storage σ = 25, 50 and 100 respectively
In Figure 6.5 we demonstrate some numerical values using these formulae. As
in Figure 6.4, we set v = 1024 and m = 1000 for each of the key pools. Again,
we see that Pr1 is highest when 100 keys are stored per node, at the cost of a
slightly increased value of fail1. Comparing Figures 6.4 and 6.5 we find that,
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when all other variables are fixed, the higher value of µ gives lower values of
Pr1 and fail1, with little effect on b
′
1. For comparison, we note that when there
are 8 nodes per tree, the broadcast cost to revoke one node is b1 = 2080 when
σ = 25, b1 = 5460 when σ = 50 and b1 = 11960 when σ = 100, that is, a little
lower than when µ = 1. We therefore suggest that if the lower value of Pr1
can be tolerated for the network’s purposes, then µ = 2 should be chosen to
give higher resilience and lower broadcast for revocation.
When µ > 2 the analysis for the connectivity and resilience becomes increas-
ingly complex, and it remains an open problem to determine whether there are
any advantages to higher values of µ. It seems likely that as µ increases Pr1 will
decrease, because nodes within the same tree will always be connected (unless
revoked), but nodes which are not in a common tree can only be connected if
they know keys from the same Eschenauer Gligor scheme, of which there are
µ different schemes. Since each node can only store a fixed number of keys
σ, as µ increases the number of temporal keys per Eschenauer Gligor scheme
will decrease, and so Pr1 will decrease accordingly. By the same argument, it
seems likely that fail1 would also decrease, giving higher resilience against an
adversary
We have thus constructed an effective BEKPS protocol which allows efficient
revocation and where, given key storage σ, there is some freedom to choose
an appropriate trade-off between the parameters br, Pr1 and fail1, not only by
varying the size of the key pool (as with any KPS), but also by varying the
size λ of LKH trees in the underlying layer, and the number of trees µ to which
each node belongs.
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6.6 Hierarchical temporal key distribution
In Section 6.2.3 we introduced the idea of using a BEKPS to create hierarchy
in the temporal layer, by broadcasting extra keys to certain nodes. This can
provide more efficient routing of information through a network. The flexibility
which a BEKPS provides to change which nodes have the extra keys reduces
both the damage caused by extra battery usage and the risk posed to the
resilience of the network. We will refer to nodes which are allocated extra keys
as primary nodes, whilst the remaining secondary nodes have fewer keys.
Regularly changing the set of nodes that are primary will mean that the bur-
dens of being a primary node are spread across the network over time. Random
allocation of primary nodes reduces the risk of an adversary launching a tar-
geted attack to reveal a high number of keys through a small number of node
compromises.
6.6.1 BEKPS for hierarchical temporal key distribution
We now consider the question of how to create a BEKPS so that any node
can be chosen as a primary node, and so that at any time period between
broadcasts there should be p primary nodes and v− p secondary nodes. (Note
that the number of primary nodes p may be changed at any broadcast, so that
there are pi primary nodes after update i. However, since each update can be
analysed without reference to the number of primary nodes which have gone
before, we simply write p in the analysis which follows, for ease of notation.)
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6.6.1.1 Underlying key predistribution
We propose that the best choice of KPS for the underlying keys is again one
based on a revocation scheme such as LKH. We justify this with the following
observations. Suppose that a node Ni with underlying key set Ui is to be chosen
as a primary node. The base station must broadcast a higher proportion of
temporal keys to it than to secondary nodes.
1. If at least one of the underlying keys in Ui is known uniquely to node
Ni, then the base station can simply use this key to encrypt the extra
temporal keys.
2. If none of Ni’s underlying keys is known uniquely to Ni, that is, for each
uj ∈ Ui there exists a node Nk with uj ∈ Uk, then in broadcasting extra
temporal keys, it will happen that some other nodes learn some extra
temporal keys too. This will have the effect of creating a multiple-layered
hierarchical network, where p nodes are primary nodes but amongst the
remaining v − p nodes there is variety in how many temporal keys are
received. Whilst this may be desirable for some applications, in others it
would cause some unnecessary battery drainage amongst the v−p nodes
and complicate routing protocols. We therefore restrict our study to a
strictly two-layer hierarchy of primary and secondary nodes.
We conclude that to efficiently create primary and secondary nodes and to
avoid burdening non-primary nodes unnecessarily, it is desirable that each
node stores a unique underlying key. For similar reasons to those given in
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Section 6.5.1, we propose an underlying layer based on LKH. As in Section 6.5,
using a single LKH scheme minimises broadcast cost but maximises underlying
key storage, and so we partition the nodes into several underlying LKH trees,
each of size λ = 2d−1.
6.6.1.2 Temporal key distribution
A straightforward way to allocate temporal keys in order to create p primary
nodes is to use a slight modification of the Eschenauer Gligor KPS [32], where
each primary node is allocated κ1 temporal keys and each secondary node is
allocated κ2 temporal keys from a key pool Kτ of m temporal keys. We will
demonstrate that this allows the connectivity and resilience parameters to be
easily altered with each broadcast, though of course many other KPSs would
be suitable. For ease of analysis, we choose an intersection threshold of q = 1,
that is, two nodes may form a link if they have one key in common. We will
also assume that if two nodes have more than one key in common then they
randomly select one of those keys to secure the link, that is, Ω = 1. Relaxing
this assumption would increase the resilience of the scheme.
The choice of primary nodes could be made deterministically or randomly, as
desired. The benefits of choosing them deterministically are:
• more efficient shared key discovery
• the possibility of node identity authentication
• a node will not be required to be a primary node twice until necessary,
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i.e. when all other nodes have been used as primary nodes at least once.
On the other hand, choosing the primary nodes at random may increase the
difficulty for an adversary to target them for compromise. Given the increased
risk to the resilience of the network which primary nodes cause, the unpre-
dictability of the choice of primary nodes is an important security consider-
ation. In our analysis we assume that the adversary compromises nodes at
random, and therefore our analysis is applicable to deterministic and random
allocations of primary nodes.
The base station may choose how to broadcast the temporal keys to secondary
nodes in order to achieve a particular trade-off between connectivity, resilience
and broadcast cost. We consider this in more detail in Section 6.6.2.2.
6.6.2 Analysis
6.6.2.1 Connectivity
We now derive formulae for the connectivity probabilities in terms of the size
m of the temporal key pool and the number of temporal keys assigned to
primary and secondary nodes, κ1 and κ2 respectively. We use Pr1,1 to denote
the probability of two primary nodes being connected, Pr1,2 for the probability
of a primary node and secondary node being connected, and finally Pr2,2 for
the connectivity probability between a pair of secondary nodes.
Using the Eschenauer Gligor probability of connectivity given in Scheme 2.1,
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we have that
Pr1,1 = 1−
(
m−κ1
κ1
)(
m
κ1
)
and
Pr1,2 = 1−
(
m−κ1
κ2
)(
m
κ2
) .
Similarly, it can be seen that
Pr2,2 ≥ 1−
(
m−κ2
κ2
)(
m
κ2
)
when we consider that 1 − (m−κ2
κ2
)
/
(
m
κ2
)
is the probability that two secondary
nodes with different temporal key sets are connected. Two secondary nodes
which are given the same set of temporal keys because they were encrypted
with a shared LKH key will certainly be connected, and this is why a lower
bound for Pr2,2 is given. The exact value of Pr2,2 will depend on choices which
the base station makes regarding how to use the LKH tree(s) to distribute the
temporal keys, as we describe in Section 6.6.2.2. In Section 6.6.2.3 we derive
an estimate for Pr2,2 using an assumption about the temporal key distribution.
m κ1 κ2 Pr1,1 Pr1,2 Pr2,2
500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 ≥ 0.1844
500 50 15 0.9962 0.7990 ≥ 0.3709
1000 85 15 0.9996 0.7388 ≥ 0.2041
1000 85 25 0.9996 0.8945 ≥ 0.4731
1000 60 30 0.9783 0.8481 ≥ 0.6045
5000 100 50 0.8701 0.6377 ≥ 0.3965
Table 6.1: Examples of connectivity parameters (to four decimal places) for
different key pool sizes m and the number of temporal keys given to primary
and secondary nodes, κ1 and κ2 respectively.
Thus the base station can choose the parameters m, κ1 and κ2 to achieve differ-
ent levels of the connectivity probabilities. Some example values are given in
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Table 6.1; the values were chosen to demonstrate a variety of achievable trade-
offs between the three connectivity parameters. Observe that connectivity
between secondary nodes may not be necessary or even desirable; for exam-
ple, to conserve resources whilst maintaining a connected network, it may be
preferable to have a very low value of Pr2,2 as long as Pr1,2 is high enough to
ensure that almost every secondary node is connected to at least one primary
node, and Pr1,1 is high enough to ensure that almost every primary node is
connected to all other primary nodes. Finally, we note that m, κ1 and κ2 are
independent of the network size v, and can be changed at each broadcast if
desired.
As with any random KPS, higher connectivity in this BEKPS results in lower
resilience. In particular, the compromise of a primary node will reveal κ1 of
the total m keys. This risk will be reduced by dynamically changing the choice
of primary nodes to lower the risk of their compromise, and by choosing Pr2,2,
Pr1,2 and Pr1,1 to be as small as possible whilst retaining functional connectivity
across the network. We calculate fail1 in Section 6.6.2.3 after considering the
different options available for the base station for the broadcast.
6.6.2.2 Broadcast cost
The following example considers how the temporal keys could be distributed
to the secondary nodes.
Example 6.6. Suppose we have a network of v = 16 = 25−1 nodes arranged in
an LKH tree so that each node has to store d = 5 keys, as illustrated in Figure
6.6.
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α
β1 β2
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Figure 6.6: LKH tree on 16 nodes
Suppose that we wish to create p = 3 primary nodes, and at random we pick
these to be nodes N1, N11 and N12 (underlined in Figure 6.6). The base station
would broadcast κ1 temporal keys to each of these primary nodes, using their
unique underlying keys. For the secondary nodes, there is a choice to be made
about the temporal key broadcast.
1. The key centre could broadcast a separate temporal key set to each of the
secondary nodes using their underlying keys. This creates the maximum
broadcast cost, the highest resilience, and Pr2,2 achieves its lower bound:
Pr2,2 = 1−
(
m−κ2
κ2
)(
m
κ2
) .
2. The key centre could minimise the broadcast by using the smallest set of
LKH keys not known to the primary nodes, that is, by using the LKH
keys associated with the minimal covering set of the secondary nodes.
In this example, temporal keys would be broadcast to N5, N6, N7, and N8
encrypted by their shared key γ2; to nodes N3 and N4 using δ2; and to
N2 using its unique underlying key. Similarly, the broadcast to nodes
N13, N14, N15 and N16 would be encrypted by their shared key γ4, and
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nodes N9 and N10 would be broadcast temporal keys encrypted by under-
lying key δ5. The number of temporal key sets to be broadcast is then
reduced from 16 to 8. The probability that a pair of secondary nodes have
at least one common key is then
Pr2,2 =
2
(
4
2
)
+ 2
(
2
2
)
+ (1× 2× 4× 2× 4)
(
1− (
m−κ2
κ2
)
(mκ2)
)
(
13
2
) ,
which is greater than if unique underlying keys were used, at the cost of
reduced resilience.
3. In order to find a trade-off between the above options, the key centre could
choose not to use the smallest set of LKH keys unknown to the primary
nodes, for example by using the six δi keys with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8} \ {1, 6},
plus the unique key known to N2. Then
Pr2,2 =
6
(
2
2
)
+ (1× 12 + 2× (10 + 8 + 6 + 4 + 2))
(
1− (
m−κ2
κ2
)
(mκ2)
)
(
13
2
) .
This example illustrates that there are choices to be made about the broadcast
within each LKH tree, as well as about the number of underlying LKH trees
v
λ
. In our analysis we will assume that, on average, each set of temporal keys
is broadcast to x secondary nodes, where x < λ and x → λ as p → 0 if the
base station is using the minimum broadcast cost. Then to broadcast a set of
κ1 temporal keys to each primary node and κ2-sets of keys to each secondary
node requires a broadcast of size
b ≈ κ1p+ κ2 (v − p)
x
.
Using our assumption that each set of temporal keys is broadcast to x sec-
ondary nodes, we can revisit the expression we derived for Pr2,2 and use
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weighted probability to derive the estimate
Pr2,2 ≈ x− 1
v − p− 1 +
v − p− x
v − p− 1
(
1−
(
m−κ2
κ2
)(
m
κ2
) ) .
6.6.2.3 Resilience
We can make an estimate of fail1 using Equation 3.2.1 from Section 3.2 with a
weighted probability for primary and secondary nodes: the expected number of
keys known to an adversary after the compromise of one node is κ1
p
v
+κ2
(v−p)
v
,
and so we have that
fail1,est =
κ1p+ κ2(v − p)
vm
,
since there is exactly one key securing each link. However, this method does
not take into account the proportions of the three different types of links.
We now extend the definition of fail1 to the hierarchical network setting. We
retain our assumption that the adversary compromises all nodes with equal
probability, and give each type of link in the network the same weight. In
Table 6.2 we see comparisons between the approximation fail1,est and our more
detailed calculation of fail1.
Lemma 6.16. The resilience of a hierarchical BEKPS is given by
fail1 =
1
T
[(
p
2
)
Pr1,1fail1,1
+ p(v − p)Pr1,2fail1,2
+
(
v − p
2
)
Pr2,2
[
v − p− x
v − p− 1 fail2,2,a +
x− 1
v − p− 1 fail2,2,b
]]
,
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where Pr1,1,Pr1,2 and Pr2,2 are as given above, and where
fail1,1 =
κ1(p− 2) + κ2(v − p)
m(v − 2) ,
fail1,2 ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1(p− 1) + κ2(v − p− x)
m
+ x− 1
)
,
fail2,2,a ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1p+ κ2(v − p− 2x)
m
+ 2(x− 1)
)
,
fail2,2,b ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1p+ κ2(v − p− x)
m
+ x− 2
)
,
and
T =
(
p
2
)
Pr1,1 + p(v − p)Pr1,2 +
(
v − p
2
)
Pr2,2 .
Proof. We begin by finding the total number of links in the network, before
any compromise, which is
T =
(
p
2
)
Pr1,1 + p(v − p)Pr1,2 +
(
v − p
2
)
Pr2,2 .
Now we consider each type of link and its resilience.
1. Primary-primary links
There are
(
p
2
)
Pr1,1 primary node to primary node links. Fix such a link
between some primary nodes Ni and Nj, and consider the advantage to
an adversary of compromising a single node Nk /∈ {Ni, Nj}. If Nk is a
primary node, the adversary will learn κ1 keys; if Nk is secondary it will
reveal κ2 keys. Thus the adversary breaks the link with probability
fail1,1 =
1
m
(
κ1
p− 2
v − 2 + κ2
v − p
v − 2
)
=
κ1(p− 2) + κ2(v − p)
m(v − 2) .
176
6.6 Hierarchical temporal key distribution
2. Primary-secondary links
The number of primary node to secondary node links is p(v−p)Pr1,2. Fix
such a link between primary node Ni and secondary node Nj. Suppose
that the base station is using less than the maximum broadcast cost.
Then the adversary can certainly break the link if it compromises a
secondary node which is ‘near’ to Nj in the LKH tree, such that it stores
the same set of temporal keys as Nj. That is, if we assume that on
average, each set of temporal keys is broadcast to x secondary nodes,
then an adversary who compromised a secondary node Nk will certainly
be able to break the p(x− 1) links between primary nodes and the x− 1
secondary nodes with which Nk shares the underlying LKH key used for
the broadcast. Therefore, we have that a primary-secondary node link
is broken with probability
fail1,2 ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1(p− 1) + κ2(v − p− x)
m
+ x− 1
)
,
where the approximation comes from x being an average value.
3. Secondary-secondary links
There are
(
v−p
2
)
Pr2,2 secondary node to secondary node links. Fix such
a link between secondary nodes Ni and Nj. As with primary-secondary
links, the adversary can break the link with certainty if the broadcast cost
is less than the maximum and the adversary compromises a secondary
node Nk which has received the same temporal key set as one (or both)
of Ni and Nj. Suppose that Ni and Nj have different temporal key sets
KNi and KNj . Then the probability of the link being broken after the
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x p m κ1 κ2 Pr1,1 Pr1,2 Pr2,2 fail1 b
22 50 500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 0.1870 0.0290 4875
23 50 500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 0.1905 0.0357 3687.5
24 50 500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 0.1973 0.0492 3093.75
23 100 500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 0.1908 0.0383 6125
23 250 500 50 10 0.9962 0.6548 0.1921 0.0476 13437.5
23 50 1000 50 10 0.9280 0.4027 0.1027 0.0236 3687.5
23 50 500 80 10 0.9999 0.8281 0.1905 0.0384 5187.5
23 50 500 50 20 0.9962 0.8835 0.5683 0.0554 4875
23 50 500 50 30 0.9962 0.9617 0.8536 0.0744 6062.5
Table 6.2: Examples of connectivity and resilience metrics (to four decimal
places) and broadcast cost for fixed network size v = 1000 and varying: the
average number of secondary nodes to which a single temporal key set is sent,
x; the number of primary nodes p; the number of keys in the key pool m;
and the number of keys given to primary and secondary nodes, κ1 and κ2
respectively.
compromise of a single node is
fail2,2,a ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1p+ κ2(v − p− 2x)
m
+ 2(x− 1)
)
,
and finally, if KNi = KNj , then the probability of breaking the link is
fail2,2,b ≈ 1
v − 2
(
κ1p+ κ2(v − p− x)
m
+ x− 2
)
.
Combining these results gives the stated formula.
We illustrate some example values of fail1 in Table 6.2.
We observe that:
• Increasing x reduces the broadcast cost and creates a marginal increase in
Pr2,2, leaving the other connectivities unchanged. However, it noticeably
increases fail1, that is, it substantially reduces the resilience.
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• For most applications the number of primary nodes need not be large;
Pr1,1 and Pr1,2 can be set to be high independently of p, whilst increasing
p reduces the resilience and significantly increases the broadcast cost.
• As we would expect, increasing m lowers the connectivity probabilities
and fail1, increasing the resilience. The broadcast cost is unaffected.
• Increasing κ2 substantially increases the connectivity Pr2,2, whilst in-
creasing the broadcast cost and reducing the resilience to a lesser extent.
It may seem, therefore, that a comparatively high value of κ2 will be
desirable for most network applications. However, secondary node to
secondary node communication may be unnecessary as long as Pr1,2 is
high enough to ensure that most secondary nodes are connected to at
least one primary node. It may therefore be desirable to keep κ2 very low
in order to increase resilience, reduce broadcast cost and conserve bat-
tery power in anticipation of secondary nodes becoming primary nodes
in the future.
6.7 Conclusion
We have introduced the term broadcast-enhanced key predistribution schemes
(BEKPS) in order to describe schemes which combine key predistribution with
a trusted base station and broadcast channel, and discussed some of the many
motivations for using BEKPSs. We developed a framework for the design and
analysis of BEKPSs, and demonstrated its use throughout our paper. In Sec-
tion 6.4 we provided simpler proofs for some of the results given by Cichon´
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et al. in [23] for their scheme, which we classify as a BEKPS. We derived
more general formulae to calculate the resilience and explained how intersec-
tion thresholds can be used to increase resilience at the cost of decreasing
connectivity.
In Sections 6.5 and 6.6 we proposed appropriate BEKPS protocols for specific
applications. In Section 6.5, we demonstrated a practical BEKPS where revo-
cation can be performed without any uncompromised nodes losing keys. We
showed that for a given key storage parameter σ, suitable trade-offs can be
found between the connectivity, resilience and broadcast cost by varying the
size of the temporal key pool, and the number and size of LKH trees used to
distribute underlying keys. In Section 6.6 we demonstrated a BEKPS which
creates a network with two-layer hierarchy. This brings the benefit of more
efficient data routing. The ability to dynamically change the connectivity
probabilities and the allocation of primary nodes reduces the risks of battery
drainage and lowered resilience from which other hierarchical networks suffer.
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Chapter 7
Concluding remarks
We have used a variety of combinatorial approaches and techniques to analyse
and construct KPSs and BEKPSs for resource-constrained networks.
In Chapter 3 we saw how an unjustified assumption of independence led to an
incorrect formula for calculating the resilience of q-composite random KPSs.
We stated and proved, using combinatorial probability, the connectivity and
resilience parameters for the seminal Eschenauer Gligor scheme [32], and pro-
vided a simpler formula for the connectivity of q-composite schemes [20]. We
also noted that the graph of a random KPS is not equivalent to an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
graph [31], as commonly asserted. The papers [27, 5, 74] study the connectiv-
ity threshold of the key graph for the Eschenauer Gligor scheme. It remains
an open problem to study the key graph of other random KPSs such as the
q-composite scheme.
Finally, we presented and proved a generalised resilience formula which applies
to these schemes and to a wider class of random KPSs. We showed that
the original formula slightly overestimates fails, that is, it underestimates the
resilience. Although our contribution is of mathematical importance it has
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limited impact on applications, as the original formula from [20] provides a
close approximation to the true value.
In Chapter 4 we corrected some erroneous claims about the use of expander
graphs in KPSs. We showed that expansion is a useful metric, amongst others,
for analysing the key graph and intersection graph of a KPS. Exisiting KPSs
which are directly based on expander graph constructions have good expansion
and perfect resilience. However, we noted that whilst this may be appropriate
for some applications, it is often desirable to have slightly lower resilience,
with the benefit of much greater connectivity and expansion. We showed
that random KPSs and various deterministic schemes based on combinatorial
designs have good expansion; this is a previously unstated advantage of using
these approaches to construct KPSs.
In Chapter 5 we argued that hypergraph representations of KPSs demonstrate
the key storage and resilience, as well as the connectivity, which is the only met-
ric demonstrated by an ordinary (unlabelled) graph representation. Building
upon work in Chapter 4, we suggested using expanding hypergraph construc-
tions to produce KPSs with good expansion and without perfect resilience.
We gave an explicit example of a Cayley hypergraph, before noting its equiv-
alence to a strongly regular graph. We described in general the relationship
between hypergraphs and designs, and discussed the possibility that expand-
ing hypergraph constructions may be related, or even equivalent, to existing
constructions for combinatorial designs. In future work we will explore the
potential relationship between random uniform hypergraph constructions, and
constructions for random strongly regular graphs.
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It seems likely that the expansion of other KPS constructions can be analysed,
alongside various other graph-theoretic properties, in order to better under-
stand their suitability (or otherwise) for practical applications. In particular,
we would like to study the expansion of transversal designs, since these have
an additional benefit of providing efficient shared key discovery [48].
Finally, in Chapter 6 we categorised a class of schemes as broadcast-enhanced
key predistribution schemes (BEKPSs). We noted that the scheme of Cichon´
et al. [23] is a BEKPS, and provided simplified proofs and further analysis of its
connectivity and resilience metrics. We then proposed two families of BEKPS
for particular purposes: one which allows efficient revocation, the other which
allows nodes to act as a dynamically changing, hierarchical network. Our
analysis showed that these schemes are effective in achieving their aims and
provide flexible trade-offs between the conflicting parameters of key storage,
connectivity, resilience and broadcast load. For future work, there are many
variations of BEKPSs which can be studied. We note the following open
questions:
• Can other revocation schemes provide advantages over LKH in the un-
derlying key predistribution of some BEKPSs?
• Are there advantages to assigning temporal keys deterministically (other
than aiding shared key discovery)?
• How can a BEKPS design be adapted to be more efficient if the locations
of nodes are known to the base station?
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